THE NON-DISCIPLINARY WILLIAM JAMES

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ABSTRACT:
William James crossed many disciplinary fields in his career. He composed his theories, especially in psychology, philosophy, and religion, in contexts that did not yet contain sharp disciplinary boundaries, and in fact, many were just starting to take modern shape. His biographical roots in science and religion and his commitment to understanding their relation to each other fostered thinking that emphasized the interrelation of the parts of his work. These forces encouraged James to be a non-disciplinary thinker. He did not ignore disciplines, but he also did not stop at their boundaries on his path toward understanding experience. He was also committed to viewing the world without reliance upon various dualisms of science and religion or related contrasts between material and immaterial dimensions of life, including empiricism and idealism, objectivity and subjectivity, body and mind, and the natural and the spiritual. And so the non-disciplinary James was also the non-dualist James, experiencing and thinking without assuming contrasting poles of thought. In addition, he was also ready to work on either side of these divisions, and so his non-disciplinary affiliations also contributed to his facility for bridge building, his “hankering for the good things on both sides of the line,” as he said in Pragmatism. And these mediating dimensions of James suggest still further ways to use his insights to facilitate understanding across intellectual and cultural divides.

“He approached philosophy as mankind originally approached it, without having a philosophy, and he lent himself to various hypotheses in various directions.”

George Santayana, 1920

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George Santayana could be both admiring and impatient. His comments show his mixed feelings for the way his former teacher and friend seemed to be in the discipline but not of it. Alfred North Whitehead blurted out that James was “that adorable genius,” as if he were some kind of philosophical marvel unconnected to any disciplinary tradition at all, and he explained his general comment by specifying that his genius was “greatness with simplicity.” These observations show some cardinal features of James’s career: his tendency to work outside disciplinary boundaries with a spirit of irreverence for authority and for its standards, the contribution of his sharp insights to many professional disciplines, and the appeal of his fluid style to various audiences. And Santayana hints at another trait that Whitehead addresses: James’s simplicity or unmediated way of interpreting; he commented directly on experience and used his thoughts to guide experience, by implication with use of philosophical categories as means rather than as ends in themselves.

Santayana and Whitehead noticed aspects of James which I characterize as “non-disciplinary,” and which I will explore on three levels. These correspond to James’s relations to the disciplines before, during, and after his career as a philosopher: first, the personal and social reasons for his lack of attraction to disciplinary affiliation, even as he remained eager for philosophical reputation; second, the support from his non-dualism for his non-disciplinary stance; and third, the legacy of James’s position especially for education and politics, where most students and citizens operate without the insights or the inhibitions of disciplines. Early in his career, he worked before the formation of firmly-defined disciplines, and this pre-disciplinary stance contributed to his non-disciplinary affiliations and influences. These distant relations to the disciplines have produced frustration for some readers, listeners, and students of his thought, but they provide a synthesizing way to understand his theories, especially in relation to each other, and they suggest on-going applications of his ideas and example, especially for the mediation of differences.

**EARLY CAREER: PERSONAL DEVELOPMENT AND SOCIAL CONTEXTS**

William James grew up irreverent. He was raised in a family of five children; his mother offered steady support while his father used his wealth and spiritual commitments to educate the children with extensive travel, wide exposure to diverse experiences and beliefs, and an insistence on avoiding specialization in their work. With the only rule of the house being such
freedom, the elder Henry James was eager for the children to be sound characters and sturdy thinkers before taking on specific work, goals both chronologically and thematically prior to vocational achievement. As with the defiance of formality and social convention in his antinomian spiritual philosophy, the father put a priority on being before doing: the maturing person each child was to become was more important than the eventual work they would take on. This existential imperative had a particularly decisive impact on the eldest son William, who shared many of his father’s interests and raised the parent’s expectations for the son to extend the family’s spiritual commitments into the scientific fields that were gaining more authority and influence in the middle-to-late nineteenth century. When William James went to scientific school, however, he met a more rigorous and materialist brand of science than his father expected, but he carried the elder James’s irreverence on his circuitous path to becoming a psychologist and philosopher. He learned much from the sciences, but more for use of their insights rather than to dwell in scientific commitment.\(^3\)

James’s experience of science from home to school to teaching and writing in his own voice reflected social trends in scientific fields of the time: in his scientific work, he avoided commercial ties; his father would appreciate that. And his position with a moratorium time in his youth to choose his vocation while studying widely and then teaching science would confirm that he was living away from the marketplace that defined the “professions” in the nineteenth century. His experience and his views differed from the mainstream trends for knowledge workers in his critique of specialization; this too would please his father, but his defiance of focused work was not a reversion to the older ideal of the generalist who in effect grazed among the specialties. Instead, James was challenging the intellectual premise of the specialist scientists in their increasing commitment to a materialist philosophy. This intellectual stance complemented the social practices that would confine inquiry to one aspect of life, and such specialization was a tacit endorsement of a dualist vision of the world with scientists set to work on bodily dimensions of life and nonscientists either confined to idealistic speculations on an ethereal mind or recruited to provide methodological support for the more substantial work of science. A philosophy that reduced experiential factors to material explanations both grew from and reinforced the social goal of the new university scientist working for “pure science.” This emerging vocation brought removal from direct market demands, but also practical usefulness to
society with devotion to “investigating the principles and laws of the material universe,” as astronomer Benjamin Gould declared, and with British anatomist and aggressive advocate for independent and reductionist scientific research Thomas Huxley widely presented as the ideal.\textsuperscript{4}

While still in scientific training, James wrote a critical review of Huxley himself. But first, he praised the British Darwinist’s science, especially his anatomical research. He slyly noted that these positive words would grant his review “perfect respectability” that would serve “as a shield” for his critical commentary. The young science student took issue with Huxley’s “faith” in current scientific assumptions, and especially his use of them as a “battering-ram” to assert that all “phenomena of life ... result directly from the general laws of matter.” Huxley’s own specialization in anatomy, with his attention to the physical dynamics of the body, encouraged the philosophical focus on material explanations of phenomena. In place of this materialist assumption prevalent in most professionalizing science, James proposed a “Program of the Future of Science,” which would support open inquiry, without philosophical materialism: Hence his eagerness to “Let … all … be admitted to the speculative arena. But let it be on an equal footing with all comers, all to wear the speculative colors, no odds given, and no favors shown.”\textsuperscript{5} By contrast, science guided by materialism gave favors to its own approaches, and this enabled pure science to produce materialist answers to specialized questions, all very focused and cautious with judgments, and hesitant to inquire about the broad implications of the work. Academic fields were becoming modern professional disciplines and subject to their organizing influence, after all, the word “discipline” means not only a subject of study, but also behavior in accordance with rules, implying obedience and control; disciplinary influence, therefore, could set limits on inquiry. James’s irreverence for disciplines emerged as a feature of his impatience with the increasingly narrow scope of research; it was of a piece with his philosophical commitment to pluralism in his epistemological and metaphysical inquiries, and it suggested his critique of scientific caution in “The Will to Believe.” The single-topic focus of specialized work and the single emphasis on material dimensions of life, if treated as the norm, would rob inquiry of its richer textures, and suggest a thinner portrait of humanity.

James brought these concerns about materialism into his own steps from science to philosophy, which he reached through the new field of psychology. Within the institutionalizing trends in education and the specializing trends in the disciplines, the very emergence of the discipline of psychology gave James a loose but energized relation with the field. There was no
When James was making his early vocational choices, he distanced himself from professionalizing assumptions, but he was also working his way into professional work. But which field to choose was as yet unclear: he was a trained scientist; he hoped for philosophy; he adopted the fledgling field of psychology. In the early 1870s, he readily identified as a scientist; with his medical degree in 1869, and his extensive study of anatomy and physiology, he sometimes called himself a biologist. Still, years of introspection and reflection on the methods and implications of science, including in the Metaphysical Club made him vow that “philosophy I will nevertheless regard as my vocation and never let slip a chance to do a stroke at it.” So he decided “to stick to biology for a profession,” but only “in case I am not called to a chair of philosophy.” He began his teaching career with a physiology course in 1873, and he continued
to teach anatomy and physiology for the next few years. He took a step in the direction of his philosophical interests in 1875 when he introduced a course on “The Relations between Physiology and Psychology.” His personal path in mediation of his scientific and introspective interests became the basis of his innovative approaches in physiological psychology, and at the same time, he was a pioneer in the development of a psychology laboratory at Harvard, where his appointment was upgraded to full time in 1876.\(^7\)

Despite these achievements, they remained merely means toward his long-term end of gaining an appointment in philosophy. He realized that writing would be the vehicle toward improving his visibility and chances. He acted in effect as an intellectual entrepreneur, hoping to write himself into the job he hoped for—both by writing to gain status and writing to articulate his own fit for a future hiring. Since 1865, he had been composing numerous reviews, which placed him in a broad community of discourse in science, philosophy, psychology, and contemporary intellectual issues in general. These dozens of reviews, ranging from notes to brief essays, placed him mostly on the receiving end of new developments, a place well suited to his stage of career. In 1878, he started producing longer articles, allowing him to develop ideas contributing to the discourse. For example, expanding on propositions he had developed in his review of Huxley, James wrote “Are We Automata?” in which he critiqued the reduction of mind to brain action; and his “Sentiment of Rationality” and “Remarks on Spencer” were bold arguments for the role of psychological choice and personal will in philosophical orientation—and these would become some of the founding texts of pragmatism.\(^8\) Even before writing philosophy texts informed by his psychological training, he set out to explain that mix of fields.

In 1876, James made a public case for the kind of philosophy he was beginning to formulate. Writing in the \textit{Nation}, a magazine of general intellectual interest, “The Teaching of Philosophy in Our College” articulated his own internal debate about how to reconcile philosophical reflection and scientific inquiry. The essay is justifiably well known for its endorsement of contemporary reform arguments to grant the natural sciences greater authority and influence in teaching and research. He stated that “physical science is becoming so speculative and audacious in its constructions, and at the same time so authoritative, that all doctrines find themselves, willy-nilly, compelled to settle their accounts and make new treaties with it.” In the wake of scientific advances, especially in physiological psychology, “The sleepiest doctor-of-divinity-like repose must soon be awakened.” Philosophers would simply do their jobs better, if they would “go through a
thorough physiological training.” So far, he seems to be calling for a scientific housecleaning of philosophy to get with the very kind of program that he had been criticizing in Huxley.

Part of James’s rallying cry was self-interest. His description of the kinds of philosophy that would be emerging in the next generation bore a decided resemblance to the kinds of training he had acquired. He remained fascinated with philosophical questions, but enthusiasm alone would not earn him a position. His claim to professional standing was in science, particularly the fields that were building toward a physiological approach to psychology. His comment toward the end of the essay was transparently autobiographical given his ambitions to earn a philosophy professorship: “the study of the nervous system and the brain” is so important to philosophy that “she ... must and will educate herself accordingly. Young men who aspire to professorships and who will bear this in mind will, we are sure, before many years find a number of vacant places calling for their peculiar capacity.” This essay was, then, on one level, a translation of his vocational worries into confident public prose and an attempt to position himself favorably in the changing stream of academic fashion.

An emphasis on James’s career goals and the quotable flair of his statement about the authoritative force of science can, however, obscure his intentions in the essay as a whole. The lines about science were designed to redress an imbalance he had seen in the teaching of philosophy, which had for too long neglected science. In the essay, he emphasizes the need for philosophy to come to terms with science not so that philosophy will become subordinate to science, but in order to wean philosophy from religious orthodoxy. And in doing so, he was not objecting to the beliefs themselves but to their claims to legitimacy through authority—no matter its source. This was a more comprehensive version of his Metaphysical Club friend Chauncey Wright’s call for a philosophy that “denies nothing of orthodoxy except its confidence.” And so James argued that extreme commitments to either religion or science can each be dangers for philosophy.

James begins the essay in critique of contemporary philosophy teachers who emphasize doctrinal “safeness” rather than free reflection “on the world and our position in it.” He once again held up Germany as a model because there, “philosophic speculation has gone on as a rule without any reference to its ecclesiastical consequences.” By contrast, “in England and this country, ... whilst speculation on political and practical matters has been free as air, metaphysical thought has always been haunted by the consciousness of the religious orthodoxy of the country.” This religious
dogmatism has had a doubly pernicious influence because “we are bribed beforehand by our reverence or dislike for the official answer.” As a result, philosophic discourse becomes polarized between the deferential impulse to harmonize with orthodoxy and the “skeptical” desire which becomes “polemical” in its eagerness to overturn orthodoxy—a trait he repeatedly criticized in his reviews. James found “dismal shallowness” in both “the spiritualistic systems of our textbooks of ‘Mental Science’” and “the free-thinking tendency which the Popular Science Monthly ... represents.” He rejected each camp, both doctrinal religious belief and modern scientific enthusiasm, because “the result in both cases alike is mediocrity.” In other words, philosophers have either acceded to the accepted certainties of orthodox religion or, in rebelling against them, have turned to an equal but opposite dogmatism about scientific answers. “The form of philosophical problems and discussions, in short,” he lamented, “is too apt to be set for us by the existence of the Church”—to support or to decry its doctrines.\textsuperscript{12}

He found historical allies in his rejection of dogmatism: “All we contend for is that we, like the Greeks and the Germans, should now attack things as if there were no official answer pre-occupying the field.” Despite his admiration for ancient thought, he was actually repulsed by fawning for the Greco-Roman world. Just as he admired the ancient Greeks as historical examples rather than as fixed icons, so he objected to required training in the Greek language. After all, “Greek is but a language among others.” More important would be to imitate the Greeks in spirit, and “teach all sciences in a liberal and philosophic manner” rather than to march students through “dry, grammatic” exercises. How much better, James argued, “to give young men a wider openness of mind and a more flexible way of thinking than special technical training can generate.” He proposed hopefully that this approach would coincide with the mental instincts of college-age students: “youth is certainly the time when the impulse to metaphysical reflection is in its flower,” even as he realized that such pedagogical ideals could not always be reached. The openness that James advocated, would lead to the teaching of philosophy as “the reflection of man on his relations with the universe.” Freed of specific religious or scientific answers, philosophy’s “educational essence lies in the quickening of the spirit.” Far from advocating scientific or any other authority, he even noted that “what doctrines students take from their teachers are of little consequence.” Better for students “to catch from [their teachers] the living, philosophic attitude of mind” and an “eagerness to harmonize” different points of view.\textsuperscript{13}
For all of James’s desire to balance science and religion, there are still important ways that his essay on “Teaching Philosophy” displays his commitment to science. First, because of the institutional establishment of religion, advocacy for science training was the need of the hour. He also acknowledges the perspectives of enthusiasts for science. He is, for example, “willing here to concede the extreme Positivistic position” in its doubts about “the attainment of universal truths”—but he linked this rigorous position with suggestions that positivists should also doubt the “universal truths” generated by their own scientific zeal. In his own field of study, he admired the insights of Gustav Fechner and Hermann von Helmholtz, but he did not treat them as untouchable icons in the professional canon. In fact, he even doubted whether Fechner’s psychophysical law “is of any great psychological importance,” and he found that Helmholtz’s inferences “are not the last word of wisdom in the study of perception.” And yet, the popular view of these scientific achievements illustrates a problem in the comprehension of science. “People who do not understand them will remain persuaded that they are of portentous moment” and will therefore treat them as part of a new dogma based on science. James wanted to be sure that philosophers avoided substituting science in place of the traditional reverence for religion. His essay on the teaching of philosophy reflected his own career at this time. James was eager to teach beyond department boundaries and his success in proposing new courses added to his enthusiasm. His course combining physiology and psychology brought some psychology to the advanced students of physiology at the Lawrence Scientific School, and his undergraduate courses over the next few years were even bolder institutionally because they would bring scientific physiology to philosophy. His own tortured path toward these steps and his eclectic interests served as prime assurance that he would not teach his science only as materialism. By 1876, he had finally moved past both his first preliminary vocational steps toward security in science and his personal concerns for excessive philosophical introspection.

Despite all his bold promises in print and to himself, James’s hopes for broad, relentless inquiry in philosophy teaching foundered in part from the limits of his physical energy. Even in 1876, he complained that he had only “a little spoonful ready for each day.” But as usual with his claims of inactivity, he also mentioned the things he did accomplish. He continued to teach full-time, he published more and more each year, and he read widely in his vocational fields and outside them. The lighter reading was not part of his professional work, but it contributed to his developing philosophy—and it stimulated the nonmaterialistic questions that he asked of his scientific studies in
psychology. He also thought of it as his chance, “outside of his work,” to read and reflect in order to “cultivate the ideal,” because “I think a professor in addition to his fach [subject, discipline], should be a ganzer Mensch [whole person].” Charles Peirce was already aware that James was succeeding in his broad teacherly goals. He said that even beyond James’s technical proficiencies, “he is eminently the man to have a good effect on the minds of his pupils.” These interests intersected with his psychology and complemented it as he sought to balance humanistic concerns with scientific knowledge in his professional constructions.

When he wrote his manifesto for the teaching of philosophy, James was still a few steps removed from teaching or writing philosophy. There lay his hopes, but he was then preoccupied with his current job teaching biology as he liked to call his courses in anatomy and physiology. He complained however, that “all the men here,” in the university setting and especially the students and teachers of science in his immediate proximity, “seem so dry and shopboard like.” These were not the aspects of science he hoped to bring to the “Teaching of Philosophy in Our College.” In keeping with his public manifesto, one of the ways he kept his own courses lively was to treat the materialism of scientific inquiries as questions, rather than as answers for psychology or philosophy. Moreover, his simultaneous extensive humanistic reading reminded him that “I ... can’t breathe without some suggestion of contact with lives of other people—vigoroues ones, I mean.” And this reminded him of his primal attraction, beneath the physiological study, to the field of psychology: “I like human nature,” he blurted out disarmingly. He set out to understand humanity and its relation to nature using the tools of philosophy and science, but he was also simply pursuing his own curiosity.

James’s efforts to position himself for philosophy paid off: he received an appointment as Assistant Professor of Philosophy in 1880. He was well versed in science but he was not beholden to the claims of its enthusiasts. James’s intellectual position on science, especially the way he distanced himself from materialism, also had broad social appeal; after all, the rising materialism had intellectual plausibility within the scientific disciplines and even practical applications for technology and industry, but it was still viewed with worry and suspicion by much of the public and by wary cultural leaders. When James sought a position as a Lowell lecturer in 1878, he hit just the right tone in response to these worries, presenting himself honestly as a knowledgeable practitioner in the material work of science, but he added, “I can safely say that I am neither a materialistic partisan nor a spiritualistic bigot.” As historian of
higher education Julie Reuben points out, despite the increase in specialization within the
disciplines, especially in the sciences and as spurred by scientific methods and assumptions,
university leaders in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries retained the traditional hope
for synthesis and even unity of knowledge, which would include some form of continued
harmony of religion and science. So while structures of specialization were transforming
higher education around the model of the modern research university, its leaders looked for ways
to mitigate the distancing effect that those trends generated between the professors and the
public. James’s own impulses to find moral dimensions in knowledge and his openness to
religion, even if in its less institutional and more spiritual varieties, appealed strongly to
educational leaders not only at the Lowell Institute, but also at his home institution, Harvard.
They would not, however, be as pleased with the way that James mediated his science and
scholarship with his religious and moral messages, especially his non-dualism, which would
erode the very unity they were trying to achieve.

James’s path into psychology also defined his path out of it—or out of his exclusive
commitment to it. Those late 1870s essays that helped to define pragmatism, and that helped to
launch his career in academia, were part of his plan to write “a psychological work on the
motives that lead men to philosophize.” His psychology texts in the 1890s ranged from the
thorough and authoritative Principles of Psychology (1890) to the accessible and practical Talks
to Teachers on Psychology (1899), and they shared that same impulse to philosophize that he had
shown in brooding personal troubles, discussions with friends, and early essays in philosophical
psychology, even if now emerging after pages of physiological facts and psychological analysis.
James became a leader of the new discipline of psychology, but he himself viewed the field or
any related discipline as a means to a broader end of understanding human nature. This could be
called James’s philosophical core, which pervaded his career from youthful speculation and
psychological research to his urgent scrambling to complete the arch of his philosophy with
Some Problems of Philosophy, only published posthumously in 1911. The philosophy profession
formed in his lifetime, often influenced by the norms of science and the impress of psychology,
as Francesca Bordogna insightfully shows; as James grew impatient with these trends and
persisted with irreverent treatment of its norms and an often non-professional range of styles,
James in a sense continued on his path of speculation begun in his youth, with his commitment to
“general philosophy.” Santayana captured the spirit of his work by saying that James had a philosophy “without having a philosophy,” and that it was rather simplistic, a philosophy “as mankind originally approached …” human curiosity about meaning and searched for orienting direction in life, with little concern for technical precision. With less literary flair, but perhaps with more suggestions for contemporary use, I have called this strand the “non-disciplinary” James.

**MATURE CONTRIBUTIONS: JAMES THINKING WITHOUT DISCIPLINE**

James swam in a sea of troubles in his youth, including his long search for a vocation; throughout, he maintained philosophical goals, even if he did not yet have philosophical answers. Some of his first philosophical thoughts emerged in reflection about vocational choice, about what discipline to choose, and indeed about disciplining his own active and worried mind toward particular directions. While in his own troubles, he found it easier to enunciate his inchoate theories in the form of advice to others about their vocational choices. This stance lent a calm assurance to his comments, for example, to Tom Ward, a confidante since they had traveled together on the natural history expedition to Brazil in 1865 (itself a vocational exploration of this branch of science): “Results shd. not be too voluntarily aimed at or too busily thought of.” Meanwhile, rather than worry about gaining particular vocational achievements, he had to take it on faith that, “from a long enough daily work at a given matter,” some decent results—with particulars unforeseen—would be “sure to float up of their own accord.” As the young James persistently read physiology and hoped for work in psychology but also kept meeting setbacks from health problems, personal discouragements, and even from awkwardness with women, he tried to build up his confidence, without waiting on particular accomplishments; this would be the spirit of his later theory of “precursive faith” in “The Will to Believe.” The germ of his concise theoretical statement of the 1890s, that “faith in a fact can help create the fact,” was already present in the experiential comment of the 1860s: “even when you seem to yourself to be making no progress,... if you but go on in your own uninteresting way [results] must bloom out in their good time.” This outlook, he reported, has had a “potent effect in my inner life.” It spurred his motivation despite discouragements, because it “gave me a willingness to work where I saw no object to be gained.” Even when he had little yet to show for it, he felt confident that in time “the result would come up as it were of its own accord.” When writing to his fellow
student of physiology, Henry Bowditch, he could take deep solace that, “however discouraging
the work of each day may seem, stick at it long enough, and you'll wake up some morning,—a
physiologist.” Before he had a label for it or precise argumentation to describe it, James had
developed his own private will to believe in the ambiguous vocational path he was on, a belief he
maintained even though he had few results yet in evidence. This would allow him to act with
purpose, not based on an ideal or on final certainty, but because of his hope derived from
immediate positive steps. He would build on these ideas to develop goals that were based not on
the past or on an abstract ideal, but on the future in the making, what Ramón del Castillo
describes as James’s focus on the “unattain[able] future.”

While James was on this self-disciplining path before entering into a particular vocational
discipline, he found reinforcement for his emerging views from a number of sources. He was
captivated by ancient Greek sculpture because of its simple directness of expression. While
admiring the “sobriety” of some works in Dresden’s Zwinger Museum, he reported with
amazement that they are “simply standing in their mellow mildness without a point anywhere in the
whole thing.” And he concluded his commentary by suggesting the losses that have emerged
with modern progress and sophistication: “their things are simple—ours are at best simplified.”
Ancient art has the simplicity of harmony with nature as given, unaware of modern
complications and longings. Ancient art is simple, whereas modern art has a “laboriously
attained simplicity,” an artificially constructed harmony, an attempt to return to something lost.
In the same spirit, toward the end of his life, he noted that most philosophies are attempts to
improve our understanding compared to the results of experience, which has its
“disappointments and uncertainties,” but which is “perfectly fluent”; theories offer simplified
explanations of more directly simple experiences, or as he expressed this idea more grandly,
theories are attempts to “restore the fluent sense of life again, and let redemption take the place
of innocence.” He did theorize, but he maintained that philosophies are “ever not quite”
compared to experience itself, which offers the really real, if also the uncountably large and
undigestable real.

James also found reinforcement for his patient approach to developing his vocation and for
his uses of philosophy from yet another ancient model. As Emma Sutton has pointed out,
reading Stoic philosophy encouraged his hope to worry less about the broad direction of fate
beyond individual control, and instead attend to our personal responses to fate’s overwhelming immensity. Theories may be pale replicas of robust experience, but they are vital tools for human understanding and personal direction. The Roman Stoic and emperor Marcus Aurelius wrote a philosophy for personal consumption, like James’s own private writings before he turned to teaching and publication; we know the Roman’s work as a book published much later, the famous *Meditations*, but the text as written was a set of notes “To Myself,” to reinforce his “inner citadel” of personal will—it was philosophy as guide to life’s troubles, philosophy as mental and volitional exercise. James noted that “old Mark” presented a model for “a life in which your individual will becomes so harmonized to nature’s will” that you will “cheerfully … acquiesce in whatever she assigns to you.” James did not yet know his own vocational direction, but he admired the Stoic proposal to quell the longing, “knowing that you serve *some* purpose in her vast machinery wh. will never be revealed to you.” This was not life without purpose or life with fixed purpose—the most stark positions emerging, respectively, from scientific or religious thought—but life with purpose unfolding. Marcus’s reminders confirmed his goal to live a life, “easily & patiently, without feeling responsible for its future.” For James as for Marcus, this meant daily work without waiting on results—and it also meant that personally, when he did achieve results, he was not dependent on them for personal affirmation, and vocationally, he was less inclined to maintain commitment to a particular channel of work.²¹

This path of patience about results supported his sense of direction, but it could also be unsettling especially when amplified by his considerable ambivalence and indecision. Reading French philosopher Charles Renouvier confirmed his resolution and gave him a theoretical framework and reason to support it. Renouvier’s critique of certainty would allow him to make a virtue of his own ambivalence: uncertainty was not just a burden; it could also be liberation—the positive side of uncertainty was freedom. After years of striving for a firm will in the face of his youthful troubles, which included finding support in the examples of the ancients and urging resolution in others while he sought it for himself, James first read Renouvier in 1868. Much reading and many troubles later, and after he completed his M. D. the next year, the moral significance of the French philosopher’s message sank in. In 1870, he wrote his well-known diary entry, recording that Renouvier’s *Essais de critique générale* had inspired his moral courage to believe that “my first act of free will shall be to believe in free will.” He explained his admiration because with this philosophy “an act [is] enthroned in the heart of philosophic
thought. Liberty is the centre of gravity of the system, which henceforth becomes a moral philosophy.” He said it, but it was still difficult to do. The ambivalent young physiologist had been trying action steps for years, and he would only start to see the fruits of his efforts in the next few years with his professional and personal achievements. But now he had a philosophical plan to express and match his fledgling efforts; Renouvier crystallized his own personal goals and in the process confirmed the supportive role of philosophy as a means to personal insight.

The French philosopher affirmed still more of James’s thought: although Renouvier “took his stand on Kant,” James noticed that he repudiated the strict duality of phenomenal and noumenal, the materially knowable and the ineffable, and rejected both the claim of certainty through empirical science and the quest for certainty in morality and religion. And so, like James, Renouvier maintained that materialism was a philosophy brought to science, but this philosophy was not the science itself. He compared Renouvier favorably in contrast with the “slouchy dumping of materials” about our physiological states that was emerging in the new physiological psychology. The senior philosopher also affirmed James’s insights from Charles Peirce in the Metaphysical Club about the central importance for science of its commitment to inquiry as a path to discovery, while also affirming Peirce’s insight that the path of inquiry could only produce probabilities, not certainties. Renouvier went on to propose that while certainty of philosophic premise should not direct human understanding or belief, it is an important part of inquiry, but only at its end not its beginning. Even though “all yard-stick criteria of certitude have failed,” leading to the conclusion that “there is no certitude,” James said in summary of Renouvier’s insights, “all there is is men who are certain.” Renouvier therefore provided confirmation of ideas in formation and philosophical sanction for pursuit of these threads: the free-will philosophy built on non-dualist premises, with denial of metaphysical certainties, but with support of psychological certainties—all these ideas served to rekindle James’s philosophical commitment. Renouvier convinced him of the “the possibility … of absolute beginnings,” for the start of his own career and for an opening outlook for his own philosophical orientation.

Attention to interaction across dualist distinctions pervaded James’s career. This shaped his emphasis on the relation of his fields of work in psychology, religion, and philosophy, and his interest in the relation of material and immaterial parts of life. In the last decade of his life,
James gave full articulation to his own philosophical beginning, his most profound contributions to philosophy that began from reflections outside the field. While specialization in the disciplines thrives on various dualisms, with claims to essential distinctions of parts of the world, James pointed to the relationships within our experience. He had learned about non-dualist philosophies from Renouvier and others, and as early as 1863, he was already thinking in terms of the intimate integrity of parts of the universe: “Nature only affords Thing. It is the human mind that discriminates Things. We think of individuals, units, things…. The division is artificial.” In the last decade of his life, in his essays in “radical empiricism,” he placed the conventionally dualist “subject or … knower” and “the object known” as features of the same “pure experience,” simultaneous and in intimate relation. As he insisted, they “coexist.” While acknowledging the contrasts of each side, he was repeatedly driven to search for the natural settings, the intimate relations, and even the common underlying sources of each of these human traits—and the common features of different academic disciplines. Of course the pairs, expressed in objective and subjective parts of experience, are different from each other, but they each display, respectively, ingredients from material and immaterial dimensions, as expressed in bodily and mental parts of life, and in disciplinary domains often surrounding, respectively, science and religion. But they are all part of natural experience. This allowed for evaluation of experience without the preconceptions of neighboring philosophical assumptions. James proposed that these contrasting dimensions, manifesting in objective and subjective parts of experience, form a seamless relation, with “unity … aboriginal” in the “stream of thinking.”

The resulting non-dualism of his theory of “pure experience” went deeper than interaction of material and immaterial events; instead, he proposed their simultaneous existence. His evaluation took experience, as did ancient sculptors, simple and direct, prior to theoretical categorization; and so his non-dualism was in effect a pre-dualism, with attention to experience before the distinctions of thought. The “stream of thinking” only begins to capture the character of experience understood pure, as lived with mind in body; it could just as readily be called the “stream of … breathing” with brain action and nerve input, or simply the stream of “muscular adjustments”; these are the physical events that are happening while consciousness attends, discriminates, and chooses paths; they are as much part of consciousness as its immaterial thoughts. Neither the immaterial nor the material events could exist without the other. The subjective or objective reckoning of experience each offers useful discriminations, but each also
serves as expression of something deeper. With radical empiricism, “the selfsame experience
[is] taken twice over in different contexts,” and because of that, dualism may be useful for
analyzing and organizing understandings and actions, but it is artificial, and so he avoided
commitment to its picture of the world. He proposed “no separateness needing to be overcome”
in metaphysical portraiture of the world, even as he acknowledged that perceived separateness
can be used in the work of the world.25

James recognized an “aboriginal sensible muchness,” as he explained in Some Problems
of Philosophy, but he also acknowledged that from “out of this” field of data, “attention carves
out objects, which conception then names and identifies forever—…. and all these abstracted
whats are concepts.” Especially in Western culture, the “substitution of a conceptual order” for
original experience includes dualist concepts. James did not present his radically empiricist
philosophy in direct contrast with dualism, but instead his vision included an overall picture of
lived experience, with dualism as a conceptual choice, often quite useful. This is a way to
understand the relation of major parts of his philosophy. He introduced his first public
expression of pragmatism with an image that suggested his radical empiricism: the “trackless
forest of human experience.” This “fulness [sic] is elusive,” but “the human intellect” supplies
“spots, or blazes” which “give you a direction and a place to reach”; these “formulas” and
“conceptions,” including some quite “technical,” signal that “we can now use the forest”—it is
“no longer a place merely to get lost.” Such theories, or “philosopher’s phrases,” however
useful, still leave “unexpressed almost everything” in original experience, or in the words of his
original metaphor, “they do not give you the integral forest with all its … wonders.” So his
radical empiricism serves as a constant warning for philosophies, including pragmatisms, to
avoid mistaking their blazes for the whole of the forest; theories after all are not the whole of
experience. Just as pragmatism is a way of “settling … disputes” between philosophical
positions, so it can also serve as a way to integrate the roles of different disciplines when
addressing problems. With this framework for his pragmatism, this supportive but chastened
approach to our conceptual worlds, James maintains that “theories become instruments, not
answers to enigmas.” And with this pragmatic sense that ideas are tools, disciplines then are
collections of these tools; they collect facts relevant to their inquiries, and even claim a kind of
possession of them—after all, as James said of the forest of experience, “the blazes give a sort of
ownership.” And theories within the discipline evaluate the meanings of those facts, and their implications and potential uses. James’s radical empiricism and pragmatism, his theories of experience and of use, have extensive implications for experiential use.

**LEGACY: JAMES APPLIED...IN CONSTELLATIONS WITHOUT DISCIPLINE**

James’s relation to philosophy began with irreverence and caution about the dangers of speculation, grew with his cultivation of its insights for personal direction, and culminated in trend setting for the field. He has had on-going influence in psychology from largely introspective insights that have spurred research programs into his theories of consciousness, the self, emotion, attention, and more; his “science of religion” was at the fountainhead of the new psychology of religion, which became a founding discipline of modern religious studies; his careful scrutiny of psychical experiences gave support to that controversial field; and of course his will to believe, pragmatism, radical empiricism, and pluralism are still used and debated in ethics, epistemology, and metaphysics. This is the best-known James, and these uses of his thought highlight his disciplinary affiliations, either from his lifetime or in later application. These are vitally important subjects, but these do not encompass the whole of his identity, significance, and potential legacy. There is “another side of James,” to adapt from Loren Goldman’s translation of Ernst Bloch’s 1942 critique of the American philosopher. James also thought outside of these disciplinary lines of work. With his importance both inside and outside the academy, he can bridge these realms. Given that whole swathes of culture and even of intellectual life occur and thrive outside of the reach of disciplines, these other dimensions of James can serve as particularly significant guides to non-academic ways of thinking. With his thorough importance in the academy, he can serve as an intellectual emissary to a wider world.

Of all the domains outside the disciplines, I choose two for immediate attention: college education and politics. These are fields where James did some work, although that work was not central to his corpus. They are also fields where the subject matter of philosophical and other academic investigators regularly appear, albeit in generalized and simplified forms, even while the prime actors in education and politics, namely undergraduate students and politicians, pay little attention to the disciplinary insights of academics. And yet the ideas of philosophers and other academics have been, and could be still more, valuable enrichments to classroom dialogue and public discourse. Impediments to such communication reside on both sides: academic work...
has indeed become more specialized, with language more refined; and students and political workers often partake of an impatience with intellectual refinements, preferring thought based on immediate experience, with support from images, emotion, personal testimony, or brief summaries of complex issues. The history of this turn to simplifications of complex issues is itself complex, but it can be summarized as a widening gulf between sophisticated realms of knowledge and interpretation, and an indifference to, or even an anti-intellectual hostility for academic enterprises. This story is part of the history of democratization, with popular sovereignty challenging the power of monarchical and aristocratic elites in the early modern world, and then turning that anti-elitism against intellectuals especially since the nineteenth century. Professors may be an already overworked class of people, but the fruits of all their efforts are still often unwelcome and generally underutilized in the culture as a whole.

William James presents ideas, and has ways of presenting them especially in his non-disciplinary dimensions, that may be useful at this juncture in our history. Whitehead’s aside about his simplicity, and Santayana’s slur about his “philosophy … without having a philosophy,” suggest just the approaches that academics can actually adopt for letting their ideas have a wider audience, even as of course James is not the only academic example on this path. And James himself recognized that such approaches are not counsels to water down academic discourse itself; rigorous pursuit of information and understanding within areas focused enough to provide depth will always be the chief calling of academics—and will produce the deepest wells of knowledge and understanding. But if non-academics cannot drink fully of the waters of specialized discourse, perhaps they can get fair tastes of its richness. James’s example suggests a way to do just that: he did in fact do this rigorous work directed toward his fellow academics, but he also spoke and wrote in ways that others could understand; and he did this not instead of his intellectual insights, but by taking the fruit of it for clearer consumption. Robert Richardson even presents four different styles that James used in different texts, ranging from his “technical writing” and “exposition [for]… students,” to his writing for educated non-specialists and a “public style.” With these styles, James shows the wisdom of the teacher who detects the need not just to say things of significance, but also to speak to the particular student’s—or particular audience’s—own condition. This wisdom can apply to academic work in general and may
enable its practitioners to bring a leaven not only to students in our classrooms, but also to politicians and citizens in the public.

Non-academics generally do not think with the benefit of disciplinary frameworks, but they still grapple with intellectual questions. For example, students wonder about the plausibility of various divergent spiritual messages and even about the meaning of life, especially about the direction of their own careers; and politicians deal with issues of free will when deciding about the merits of regulations or incentives to promote social values. There are two key differences in the ways they approach such questions: first, while academics emphasize theories and schools of thought, non-academics emphasize stories, and without the narrative of a story, academic discourse can seem stale and unreal to those uninitiated to the ways disciplinary analysis; as one of my students said about his course on the French Revolution, “we have spent so much time on historiographies of schools of interpretation, that we have not even learned what actually happened—it’s as if there weren’t even any guillotines!” And second, non-academics make judgments about their experiences by emphasizing lived and felt convictions rather than privileging the results of inquiry. There are many ways to characterize this difference, including the distinctions between heart and head, emotional reactions and reasoned judgment, or even the anecdotal impulse and the verifiable conclusion. Although even academics cannot fully adhere to the reasoning or even the objectivity of inquiry, these aspects of thought have greater value within the academy. While conviction and inquiry are not the exclusive products of religion and science, they have their roots in these distinct sources of authority for emphasizing realms of experience and deciding areas to value and ways to make judgments. Disciplines provide academics with the paths toward understanding experience through theories that are designed to organize information, show relations of different perspectives or even defend particular positions about the relative importance of different parts of experience; disciplinary work provides academics with ways to make sound judgments on experience based on the knowledge and interpretations brought by constant inquiry. But to non-academics, these methods can seem like abstract removal from experience itself; academic bridges can seem like walls to understanding.

James’s philosophy is, of course, a philosophy grounded in direct contact with experience. The first step of radical empiricism is an insistence on taking experience “pure,” which in the language of non-dualism is recognition of experience unmediated by the idealistic emphasis on the knowing mind or by the empirical emphasis on the objects known; and so with
radical empiricism, experience is understood with the “total conflux of its parts” which can then be understood in different ways by different people when that experience is “taken in one context or in another.” This is an approach that is potentially supportive of the non-disciplinary emphases on direct experience for understanding and making judgments. And yet James here is still offering a theory of experience, which can seem highly abstract to non-academics, even if they can detect a friend in the court of academia. James did offer still more support to non-disciplinary thinking. In 1903, during the same season when he was composing the essays that would become the Essays in Radical Empiricism, he declared that universities, including his own should maintain a “tolerance of exceptionality and excentricity,” and in fact, “our undisciplinables are our proudest products.” And he practiced what he preached: Perhaps because of his own experience entering academia in such unstructured ways, he was an ardent friend to eccentrics, such as Thomas Davidson, founder of the Ethical Cultural Society, and freelance philosopher Benjamin Blood. He himself approached education in terms of cultivation of individuality rather than as training toward disciplinary precision; and he frequently invited students, especially the eccentrics, to his home near campus and during summer vacations in Chocorua, NH, and Keene Valley, NY.  

James also integrated undisciplined thought into his own writing. Sometimes this took the form of actual stories to illustrate his theories. For example, to make his point about differences in human perspectives on the world and our tendency to “blindness” about the perspectives that others treasure, James told his own story. While traveling in the mountain country of North Carolina, he saw cleared land that to “my mind was one of unmitigated squalor,” truly “hideous, a sort of ulcer” compared to the “sacred … beauties” of wild nature. But then he observed that to the owner of the land, “these coves under cultivation” represented “personal victory” and “sang a very pæan of duty, struggle, and success.” He admitted that in his first impressions, “I had been losing the whole inward significance of the situation.” He presented the theme of his theory as a report of growing personal awareness: “I had been blind to the peculiar ideality of their conditions as they certainly would have been to the ideality of mine.” In addition to stories, James also made extensive use of metaphors, which are after all brief word pictures operating much like stories in conveying lived experience in a concrete way. For example, James expressed his theory about the active human mind with its “subjective
interests” and spontaneous variations as adaptive traits in “Remarks on Spencer’s Definition of Mind”; and then in *Principles*, he presented the mind as “a theatre of simultaneous possibilities.” He supplemented this metaphoric expression of his abstract theory with yet another metaphor: “The mind, in short, works on the data it receives very much as a sculptor works on his block of stone.” The stone is the “primordial chaos of sensation,” which gives to each of us “mere matter … indifferently”; the mind is the artist at work in the studio of experience, and “by slowly cumulative strokes of choice,” individual experiences are sculpted, but “other sculptors, other statues from the same stone.” In his philosophy, the theories themselves and even the way he told them built bridges to the mental worlds of citizens who think outside disciplinary boundaries.

James provided still more support to non-disciplinary thinking from the beginning of his philosophical career with his 1879 essay “The Sentiment of Rationality.” It presents an argument about the sources of philosophical commitment. Before their elaborations, and their refinements within the canons of disciplinary specialization, commitments to theories themselves begin with a “feeling of sufficiency, … [an] absence of all need to explain.” This is a description of the work of assumptions in our minds, which provide “perfect fluency” precisely because they are ideas not questioned or explained. He said that this theory grew from “psychological work,” and it was directed toward “the motives which lead men to philosophize”; and indeed, he was using his psychology of selective attention and field theory, with each mind focusing on a portion of its field of potential awareness, its own center of attention, with margin or fringe of consciousness trailing off from that center. James points out different sentiments of rationality that form the basis of most philosophical orientations; from these assumptions, he argues that the rest is details, or more precisely, from these cores, philosophies grow with their nuance, elaboration, and footnotes to factual and authoritative sources. The framework presented in the essay suggests a way of understanding the character of disciplinary and non-disciplinary thinking: they each have different sentiments of rationality.

Inquiry and conviction are crucial, respectively, to disciplinary and non-disciplinary thinking. The roots of these words further help to illustrate their mental uses: *Inquiry* means the action of seeking, seeking to know by asking or questioning, and it derives from the Latin word “quaerere” meaning to seek, strive for, or ask, and this is also at the root of “quest,” which lends “inquiry” its connotations about an earnest seeking through its use of questions. A *conviction* is
a strongly held belief, a settled persuasion; it derives from the Latin word “convincere” meaning to convince, to prove; and “convince” in turn is built on “con” (with or wholly with) and “vincere” (to conquer), or with conquest, as in a belief taking wholesale conquest of one’s mind. Inquiry is at the center of disciplinary thinking with values placed on questions, with each answer producing more questions, and with the particular information and understanding gained according to the methods of the particular discipline. Conviction is a chief value of non-disciplinary thinking, often achieved with the methods of storytelling and with answers, generally providing guidance through direction or purpose, more important than the questions of constant inquiry. Thinking based on inquiry or on conviction each exhibits a sentiment of rationality, with each providing a “perfectly fluent course of thought,” because they respectively satisfy the assumptions and functional needs of different people with different ways of thinking and different uses for those thoughts.\textsuperscript{34} James supported this framework with his functional psychology and his philosophy of pragmatic use. And in addition to this framework for understanding the differences between thinking based on inquiry and thinking based on conviction, James also provides examples from his own work that support each side. He was a fully credentialed member of the academic guild of professional abstractionists known as philosophers, he wrote with immense knowledge and subtle nuance, and he circulated readily within academic discourse. However, in addition to befriending eccentrics and shifting his style to appeal to popular audiences, James also immersed himself in the world of convictions with his arguments in defense of religious and other beliefs when faced with ambiguous choices, and with his writings about the worlds of religious experiences that thrive on convictions rather than inquiry. As with his non-dualism that did not displace dualism, these paths did not displace his inquiries, but existed alongside. In fact, he readily mingled both intellectual postures: for example, with his “science of religion,” he directed his inquiries into religious convictions, and with “The Sentiment of Rationality,” he proposed the place of convictions within inquiries.

William James was ready to cross disciplines because he was ready to meet experience directly with his non-dualist mingling of not only religion and science, but also idealism and empiricism, subjectivity and objectivity, mind and body, the spiritual and the natural, and the immaterial and the material in general. The disciplines have become epiphenomena of deeper boundaries in the conventional wisdom about the dualist shape of the world. With disciplines as
with dualisms, he did not so much seek to heal the divisions—although he welcomed such efforts—but to confront experience afresh either without their dividing direction, or by using their insights as tools, as means for investigation, as entry tickets to pools of experience, rather than as last words in their own right. So he did not ignore disciplines, but he also did not stop at their boundaries on his path toward understanding experience. And so the non-disciplinary James was also the non-dualist James, experiencing and thinking without assuming contrasting poles of thought; he also worked with a “hankering for the good things on both sides of the line,” as he said in Pragmatism, and he encouraged inquiry in divergent realms, while maintaining skepticism about them as well.\(^\text{35}\)

This view of James without discipline can shed light on his philosophical reputation and on the relation of the James studied in different disciplinary fields: it suggests that his reputed inconsistencies constitute reflections of some rather decisive ambivalence, with his openness to different sides reflecting his unblinking evaluation of the disparate realms of life; meanwhile, his contributions to different fields constitute in effect grand inconsistencies in his work which would become embedded into dramatically different schools of thought within psychology, philosophy, and religious inquiry. According to dualist assumptions, those differences appear as clashing contrasts—hence his infamous inconsistencies—but generally to James himself they are alternative paths in constant relation and divergent use. Beyond his academic significance, this non-disciplinary view of James can also shed light on his potential to reach broader audiences, including in the classroom and in politics, through expressions to translate disciplinary insights by giving them clarity and vividness, and through genuine hearing of the non-intellectual concerns of genuinely non-disciplinary thought. James’s type of sympathetic understanding will not solve all problems, but that was not his point. He sought to manage them, even sometimes deflating them by examining their assumptions and relations. In his mature philosophy as in his youth experiences, when surrounded by a sea of troubles, he sought ways to thrive despite their burdens.

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Original publication dates appear in [brackets].

Abbreviations of frequently-cited works:


ERE: Essays in Radical Empiricism, 1976 [1912].


James papers: The William James Papers, Houghton Library, Harvard University


PRG: Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking, 1975 [1907].

SPP: Some Problems of Philosophy, 1979 [1911].

TT: Talks to Teachers on Psychology, and to Students on Some of Life’s Ideals, 1983 [1899].


WB: The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy, 1979 [1897].

Bibliography of References in Citations:


NOTES

1 Santayana, *Character and Opinion*, 42.


3 This summary of James’s early life (with an emphasis on vocational issues) is based on a number of biographical works, including my own: see for example, my *Eclipse of Certainty*; Simon, *Genuine Reality*; and Richardson, *William James*.

4 Paul Lucier, “The Professional and the Scientist,” 727, 731. Lucier emphasizes the enduring distinction in practice through the late nineteenth century between the professional with commercial relations and the “men of science” who engaged in pure research; and he points out the irony of purists who were enabled to free themselves from “pecuniary considerations” precisely because of newly robust salaries at the new research universities whose endowments from successful capitalists were “designed to prevent the corruption of the pure (science) by the impure (money)” (729 and 728). Also see Haskell, ed., *The Authority of Experts* on the social power of professionals and its scientific sources; and see Ross, *The Origins of American Social Science*; and Hollinger, *Science, Jews, and Secular Culture* for evaluation of the role of scientific standards of thought and the “scientific ethos” among professionals.


6 James to an unnamed correspondent, August 16, 1902, CWJ, 10:590; cited without full date in Perry, TCJ, 1: 228; Diary [1], April 10, [1873], James papers, Houghton Library bMS 1092.9 (4550), [87], and portions of this diary also in Perry, TCJ, 1:343.


8 James, “Remarks on Spencer’s Definition of Mind as Correspondence,” in EPH, 7-22; “The Sentiment of Rationality,” in EPH, 32-64; and “Are We Automata?,” in EPS, 38-61. On the significance
of these early essays, see Thayer, *Meaning and Action*; Seigfried, *James’s Radical Reconstruction of Philosophy*; and Croce, “Psychology as the Antechamber to Metaphysics.”

9. William James, “The Teaching of Philosophy,” in EPY, 5-6. O’Donnell, in *The Origins of Behaviorism*, presents this essay as evidence of James being “professionally expedient,” and he makes frequent reference to this article as a “manifesto” in a “campaign ... for the application of scientific method to philosophy” (92 and 106). Wilson, *Science, Community, and the Transformation of American Philosophy*, emphasizes the “shift from theologically oriented moral philosophy to professional academic philosophy (38), based on the emulation of science. In this trend, Wilson depicts James among psychologists who recognized an opportunity to gain authority for their philosophical speculations by applying the methods and values of science to their work. Bordogna, in *William James at the Boundaries*, also places the essay in debates about competing disciplines, but emphasizes James’s focus on “philosophy as the ‘architectonic’ science,” providing the “framework” for university teaching and research (78).


11. Chauncey Wright to Francis Abbot, July 9, 1867, in *Letters of Wright*, 103.


13. William James, “The Teaching of Philosophy,” in EPY, 4-5. On his attraction to ancient thought, see Sutton, “Marcus Aurelius, William James, and ‘The Science of Religions.’” Although he is showing some mainstream gender assumptions in his references to “men” and “man,” James was fairly open to women’s ways of knowing; for example, in an 1862 notebook, he observed with reference to British philologist Francis Newman, “women do not generalize much, they rather seize on particulars.” James contrasted this approach with the generalizing that shapes “moral rules,” the type of position that his spiritual father objected to; and the young James would himself “seize on particulars” in contrast with abstractions in his natural history field work with Louis Agassiz, his research in scientific psychology, and his pragmatic philosophy; [Notebook 2], Sept[ember] 23rd 1862, James papers, 22. For pursuit of feminist themes in James and pragmatism, see Charlene Haddock Seigfried, *Pragmatism and Feminism: Reweaving the Social Fabric* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1996); and Shannon Sullivan, *Living Across and Through Skins: Transactional Bodies, Pragmatism, and Feminism* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001).


15. William James to Tom Ward, December 30, 1876, in CWJ, 4:552; and Charles Peirce to Daniel Gilman, Sept[ember] 13, 1877, in Cope, “William James’s Correspondence,” 615.

16. William James to Tom Ward, December 30, 1876, in CWJ, 4:552.
James, “Remarks on Spencer’s Definition of Mind as Correspondence,” and “The Sentiment of Rationality,” in EPH, 7-22 and 32-64; and to Augustus Lowell, May 19, 1878, in CWJ, 5:12; O’Donnell, The Origins of Behaviorism, 92; and Reuben, The Making of the Modern University.

Bordogna, William James at the Boundaries, 221.

William James to Thomas Ward, January 7, 1868; and April 4, 1869; and to Henry Bowditch, August 12, 1869, in CWJ, 4:250-251, 371, and 385, Castillo, “The Anxiety of Experience,” 3. Previous commentators have interpreted this advice about not expecting results too swiftly in terms of James family psychological dynamics; for example, Lewis, in The Jameses, suggests that James engaged in “bland filial forgetfulness” because he had not been warned “against reaching too rapidly for results” (190). This does not attend to the way this thinking grew from his 1860s reflections and would grow into his later theories as a kind of future-oriented teleology. More specifically, in Principles of Psychology, he virtually quotes his private writing of twenty-two years earlier: “Let no youth have any anxiety about the upshot of his education…. If he keep faithfully busy each hour of the working day, he may safely leave the final result to itself” (131); and the concept of “percursive faith” in the Will to Believe (29) expanded the application of the idea about future results to include belief in general, not just his youthful concern for belief in his vocational abilities. This is a good example of biographical context funding future theory (see my forthcoming Young William James), and an illustration of his view of the role of concepts offering generalizations on experience (SPP, chapter 4). In addition to its links to his later philosophy, James’s advice not to be anxious about results also shows him applying elements of the eastern religious sensibility that he referred to when worrying about “maya,” or the illusions of the physical world; in Hinduism and other eastern traditions, there is also an urge to avoid being too anxious about results, but instead to follow one’s destiny (or kharma) and let results flow indirectly from that (Diary 1, April 10, 1873), [87].

James, Diary [1], April 11, [1868], 15 and 18; ERE, 45; and WB, 6.


LWJ, 1:147 quoting Diary [1], [83]; James, “Renouvier’s Contribution to La Critique Philosophique,” in ECR, 266. James was particularly influenced by the first part (“L’Homme et ses Fonctions Constituants”) of the second essay (Traité de psychologie rationnelle d’après les principes du criticisme, tome premier) in Renouvier’s Essais de critique générale; see especially chapter 13, “La Liberté: État de la Question; Solution Provisoire,” 305-31. Also see Philippe Devaux, “à propos du
‘Renouvierisme’ de William James,” who doubts the depth of the “influence renouviériste” on James, suggesting that he only read the French philosopher carefully in 1876, and calling the influence a confirmation of James’s own sentiments (396). James’s citing of Renouvier’s influence before that time is, therefore, an indication of James’s own awareness of the power of the will and the elusiveness of certainty in the philosophical reflections of his own diaries, discussions, and reviews.


24 Notebook [3], James papers, 59; ERE, 4, 18, 51, and 19.

25 ERE, 19, 27, and 42. Myers, in *William James*, makes a similar observation: “Pure experience is the stream of consciousness as it is before any conceptualization or distinction-making is applied to it” (312); however, Myers shows little interest in the simultaneous bodily dimensions of consciousness. In 1890, for his psychology text, James evaluated the “stream” functions of the “stream of thought” (PPS, 219-278), bracketing the deeper questions about the character of the “thought” itself; this reinforces the intellectual and social evaluations of James at this phase of his career adopting (or at least working with) a provisional dualism and operating within the psychology profession. In the radical empiricism essays, he took on those deeper questions about the processes of consciousness itself and asserted its simultaneous mental and physical attributes. On his hopes to produce “my metaphysical system,” see “The One and the Many” (1903-1904), in MEN, 3-61 and 323-326; the topic is forecast in his references to monism and pluralism in his 1884 “Introduction” to *The Literary Remains of the Late Henry James* (ERM, 3-63); by 1902, his “hopes hardened into a definite project, a book with radical empiricism as its theme” (Ignas Skrupskelis, “Notes,” in MEN, 325); and this “epochmaking work” was widely anticipated, for example, see F. C. S. Schiller in *Humanism*, who expected it to be “a more hopeful and humaner view of metaphysics” (xiii).

26 SPP 50-51; “Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results” (1998); and *Pragmatism* (1907), in PRG, 258, 28, and 32.

See for example Garrison, et al., eds. *James and Education*; Coon, “‘One Moment in the World’s Salvation’”; and Miller, *Democratic Temperament*.

See for example, see Hofstadter, *Anti-Intellectualism in American Life*; Levine, *Highbrow/Lowbrow*; and Cmiel, *Democratic Eloquence*.


“Sentiment of Rationality,” in EPY, 32, 33, and 64; on center and margin or fringe, see PPS, 249 and 446; PBC, 149; and [Notes for the Lowell Institute Lectures on Exceptional Mental States], in ML 64. On his field theory, see Eugene Fontinell, *Self, God, and Immortality: A Jamesian Investigation*, 25-80; William Barnard, *Exploring Unseen Worlds*, 203-211; and David Lamberth, *William James and the Metaphysics of Experience*, 82-96.


PRG, 14.