ABSTRACT

Alfred North Whitehead wrote a letter to Charles Hartshorne in 1936 in which he referred to William James as the American Plato. Especially given Whitehead’s admiration of Plato, this was a high compliment to James. What was the basis for this compliment and analogy? In responding to that question beyond the partial and scattered references provided by Whitehead, this article briefly explores the following aspects of the thought of James in relation to Whitehead: the one and the many, the denial of Cartesian dualism, James’s background in physiology, refutation of Zeno’s paradoxes, religious experience, and other kinships. In the end, the author agrees with Robert Neville that James had seminal ideas which could correctly result in a complimentary analogy with Plato. Therefore, a greater focus on the important thought of James is a needed challenge in contemporary philosophy.

Michel Weber provided a very helpful article in two parts entitled, “Whitehead’s Reading of James and Its Context,” in the spring 2002 and fall 2003 editions of Streams of William James. Weber began his article with a reference to Bertrand Russell: “When Bertrand Russell (1872-1970) visited Harvard in 1936, ‘there were two heroes in his lectures – Plato and James.’” Although he goes on to affirm that Whitehead could have said the same, Weber either overlooks the fact, or is not aware, that Whitehead actually did compare James to Plato in his January 2, 1936 hand-written letter to Charles Hartshorne, as printed by Whitehead’s biographer, Victor Lowe:

European philosophy has gone dry, and cannot make any worthwhile use of the results of nineteenth century scholarship. It is in chains to the sanctified presuppositions derived from later Greek thought . . . . My belief is that the effective founders of the renascence in American philosophy are Charles Peirce
and William James. Of these men, W. J. is the analogue to Plato, and C. P. to Aristotle, though the time-order does not correspond, and the analogy must not be pressed too far. Have you read Ralph Perry’s book (2 vols.) on James? It is a wonderful disclosure of the living repercussions of late 19th century thought on a sensitive genius. It is reminiscent of the Platonic Dialogues. W. J.’s pragmatic descendants have been doing their best to trivialize his meanings in the notions of Radical Empiricism, Pragmatism, Rationalization. But I admit W. J. was weak on Rationalization. Also he expressed himself by the dangerous method of overstatement (2.345).²

What was it about William James that both reminded Whitehead of Plato and in doing so made James such a crucial source for Whitehead? In responding to this question, Weber is a good beginning point. Weber’s stated goal was to “quote all the explicit occurrences of James in Whitehead’s corpus and to weave them into a synthetic argument (Weber 1.18).” While in basic agreement with Weber, I propose some expansions and extensions to his article which should more fully complete the response to the question of the Plato/James analogy.

GENERAL BACKGROUND

Weber uses a Whiteheadian quotation from MT listing “four great thinkers,” as being Plato, Aristotle, Leibniz, and James, to orient his background discussion. Without revisiting this section, suffice it to say that Whitehead saw Plato and James as having the similar creative genius, flashes of insight, or intuitive capacities which were later systematized by their followers. Appendix One of this work lists in chronological order all the explicit references given by Whitehead to James as cited by Weber, along with some additional implicit references which I later describe.

It is fair to say that from his youth Plato was Whitehead’s favorite ancient philosopher as illustrated by his famous comment: “The safest general characterization of the European philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato (PR 39).”³ Consequently, the naming of James as the American Plato seems to be the highest possible Whiteheadian praise. Upon Whitehead’s arrival at Harvard in 1924, he is described as starting
his first lecture by saying “what an honor it was to be at Harvard – the university of William James (Lowe 2.141).” The praise of James is in the opening pages of *Science and the Modern World* (*SMW*, 1925), where Whitehead speaks of William James as an “adorable genius” (*SMW* 2) and later Whitehead identifies James as contributing to “the inauguration of a new stage in philosophy (*SMW* 143).” William James once wrote in a letter to his brother Henry of his problem in writing his great treatise, *The Principles of Psychology*: “I have to forge every sentence in the teeth of irreducible and stubborn facts” (Lowe 2.159). If imitation is the highest form of flattery, then Whitehead’s repeated use in his writings of James’s expression “irreducible and stubborn facts” also demonstrates Whitehead’s implicit admiration (*SMW* 2,3).

In the Preface of *Process and Reality* (*PR*, 1929), Whitehead names Bergson, William James, and John Dewey as those that he is “greatly indebted to” and he writes that “one of my preoccupations has been to rescue their type of thought from the charge of anti-intellectualism (*PR* xii, my italics).” On the issue of James’s anti-intellectualism, Marcus Ford seems to agree with Whitehead when he writes: “For all its originality and insightfulness, James’s thought is unsystematic and often confused” (91). In attempting to systematize James’s thought, Ford provides eight “salient concepts” which he then uses to compare with features of Whitehead’s system. His conclusion, which is consistent with Craig Eisendrath’s basic thesis, is that “Whitehead’s process philosophy provides the basis for just such a development [i.e., of James’s thought]. This is hardly coincidental; one of Whitehead’s aims was to ‘rescue’ James’s philosophy . . . I think that Whitehead succeeds in this (Ford 107).” Although it is beyond the focus of this work to detail Ford’s book, it certainly supports the importance of the James-Whitehead relationship. Near the end of his life Whitehead seems to return to this topic in stating that James’s “system of philosophy remained incomplete (*Dialogues* 333; Weber 1.22)” So what elements of William James’s thought were so appealing to Whitehead?

That question is partially answered by the last and longest reference to James written by Whitehead in *Modes of Thought* (1938):

> Finally, there is William James, essentially a modern man. His mind was adequately based upon the learning of the past. But the essence of his greatness was his marvelous sensitivity to the ideas of the present. He knew the world in which he lived, by travel, by personal relations with its leading men, by the
variety of his own studies. He systematized; but above all he assembled. His intellectual life was one protest against the dismissal of experience in the interest of system. He had discovered intuitively the great truth with which modern logic is now wrestling (*MT* 3; Weber 1.20).

Although this description provides a generalized assessment of James, Whitehead still does not provide the particular aspects of James’s thought that seem to be necessary to rank him with Plato and Aristotle.

**FOCI OF COMPARISON**

Weber organizes his comparison of Whitehead and James around “stylistic similarities” and four “explicit conceptual points . . . . epochal theory of time, the concept of feeling, the functional concept of consciousness, and the definition of the concept of religion (Weber 2.26).” While this is fine as far as it goes, the following expansions of some of his points and extensions to additional points should more fully address why Whitehead compared James to Plato.

*James’s pragmatic description of “The One and the Many:”* Weber is correct in identifying the first explicit indication of Whitehead’s familiarity with James in an article entitled “Mathematics” which is contained in the 11th issue of *Encyclopedia Britannica* (1911) and reprinted in *A Philosopher Looks at Science* (PLS 108; Weber 2.29-30). In the process of explaining the philosophical history of “the one and the many,” Whitehead provides the footnote: “Cf. *Pragmatism: a New Name for some Old Ways of Thinking* (1907).” Although the footnote does not provide specific pages and does not even bother to name William James, it does demonstrate his knowledge of James’s work -- Whitehead had presumably read the book. Whitehead’s reference is apparently to James’s lecture four, “The One and the Many,” in which James uses a pragmatic method to try to explain what he calls after “long brooding over it . . . the most central of all philosophic problems”(8).

Unfortunately, Weber only comments on this reference in the last few pages of his Epilogue, almost as an afterthought. There are at least three important points to be made of this early Whitehead-to-James reference. First, the philosophical topic of the one and many in general has a rich history among various philosophers, but Plato has to be considered to be a
central source. The topic is featured in *Timaeus* to which Whitehead repeatedly refers. Consequently, this early Whiteheadian reference to James would have suggested the James-Plato analogy, which this work is considering. Second, James’s discussion in this chapter pragmatically depicts the relation of the one and the many through expressions including continuous “hanging together,” lines of influence, causal unity, generic unity, some degree of teleological unity of purpose, and aesthetic union. These various expressions are suggestive of precisely the speculative and interrelational philosophy that Whitehead later produced in *PR* in which the “one and the many” was given priority. In fact, Whitehead chooses to call creativity, many, and one his ultimate notions or Category of the Ultimate of his entire cosmological philosophy (*PR* 21).

Finally, this first Whiteheadian reference to James also explicitly relates Whitehead to pragmatism, which James is promoting in this book, although naming Charles Sanders Peirce as the founder. There are two aspects to this. First, I think that Whitehead had a developmental relation to pragmatism. In the first stage, between 1911 and approximately 1926, he either did not refer to pragmatism or used it in ways that connoted negativity or skepticism. The second stage began shortly after *RM* (1926) and extended to the completion of *PR* (1929). During this stage Whitehead made only positive references to pragmatism, associates it with his critical move in asserting the cosmological principle, and referred to it more often than in any other period. The third stage began after the completion of *PR* and continued until his death in 1947. This stage has fewer references to pragmatism and increased explanations of its meaning. Although it is beyond the scope of this work to document this proposal, Appendix Two provides a chronological listing of Whitehead’s many references to pragmatism – inspired at least to some degree by James’s pragmatism.

A second aspect of Whitehead’s relation to pragmatism is associated with his assessment of religion. In *RM*, Whitehead writes about a stage in religious evolution of “uncriticized [i.e., unexamined] belief:” “the stage of satisfactory ritual and of satisfied belief without impulse towards higher things. Such religion satisfies the pragmatic test: It works, and thereby claims that it be awarded the prize for truth (*RM* 28, with my italics).” After describing this unexamined stage of religion that does not seek for higher things, he seems to take on a derogatory tone in maintaining that it still wants to be awarded the prize for truth, even though it never sought higher things. Although Whitehead does not explicitly refer to James in this
reference, one of the supposed benefits of pragmatism given by James in *Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking* (1907) is religious: “she [pragmatism] widens the field of search for God . . . . Pragmatism is willing to take anything . . . . She will count mystical experiences if they have practical consequence. She will take a god who lives in the very dirt of private fact . . . . Her only test of probable truth is what works” (157)\(^{10}\) Since James’s pragmatic basis for religion was fairly well known, it is difficult to not think that Whitehead’s criticism included him, to some degree.

**James’s denial of Cartesian Dualism:** The first extended treatment that Whitehead provides on James in *SMW*, which Weber organizes under the heading “the functional concept of consciousness,” is in the ninth chapter where he praises James as bringing about “the inauguration of a new stage in philosophy (*SMW* 143).”\(^{11}\) He quotes the following statement from James’s 1904 essay, “Does Consciousness Exist:”

> To deny plumply that ‘consciousness’ exists seems so absurd on the face of it – for undeniably ‘thoughts’ do exist – that I fear some readers will follow me no farther. Let me then immediately explain that I mean only to deny that the word stands for an entity, but to insist most emphatically that it does stand for a function. There is, I mean no aboriginal stuff or quality of being, contrasted with that of which material objects are made, out of which our thoughts of them are made; but there is a function in experience which thoughts perform, and for the performance of which this quality of being is invoked. That function is *knowing*. ‘Consciousness’ is supposed necessary to explain the fact that things not only are, but get reported, are known.\(^{12}\)

The significance of this passage for Whitehead is that it marks a break from the mind/body dualism that had been initiated into philosophy approximately two hundred and fifty years earlier by Descartes. James essentially rejected the problematic dualistic model in asserting that consciousness was not a separate substance that was distinct from matter. Rather, James asserted that consciousness was a *function* of experience. In Whitehead’s unusually plain words, “James
is denying that consciousness is a ‘stuff’ (SMW 144).” Weber nicely details what is at stake with the concept of substance, which does not need to be repeated here.

Weber later considers panpsychism, which immediately arises as a result of denying mind/body dualism. He details what he calls a 2x4 hermeneutical matrix in detailing the intricacies of panpsychism. Without attempting to directly respond to Weber’s discussion, I want to make two comments. First, there is interpretative diversity on this issue in regard to James. For example, Lamberth comments that “interpreters of James disagree widely as to whether, and to what extent, he endorsed some form of panpsychism” (248).\textsuperscript{13} Lamberth himself thinks that James held what he describes as a moderate version, or “pluralistic panpsychism, “that eschews the fundamental mind/matter dualism of his colleagues in favor of both a pluralistic metaphysics of pure experience and a correspondingly pluralistic notion of causality” (250). Second, Whitehead’s philosophy conceives the ultimate units of experience, or actual entities, as having physical and mental poles, which his later commentators have variously called panpsychism or panexperience.\textsuperscript{14} Weber is correct that Whitehead himself did not use either term. Although James’s position was certainly useful to and was stated in Whitehead’s argument in SMW, Lowe argues that James’s possible influence on Whitehead was just one of many in regard to panpsychism. It seems probable that Whitehead would have conceived his own explanation as being systematically superior to James (whether this conception is justified is another matter) and perhaps one example of why in his letter to Hartshorne he wrote, “I admit W. J. was weak on Rationalization.”

One last aspect of James’s denial of mind/body dualism is worth noting. Whitehead points out in SMW that Cartesian dualism had resulted in a “division of territory” in which science pursued the material and mechanical universe (predicated on Descartes’ substance of bodies and extension) and philosophy explored the epistemological basis for the mind knowing materiality and (via psychology) explored the internal workings of the mind (Descartes’ substance of mind and thought). Although Whitehead describes this artificial division as not being “a simple business” (SMW 145) since there are obvious “interplays” between the investigatory territories predicated on Cartesian substances, yet there were resulting advances in knowledge during the epoch of dualistic prominence. Whitehead saw in general the advances in physiology leading to the demise of this artificial division, and in particular he thought the work of James was an important if not crucial part. James had studied chemistry, anatomy and
physiology at Harvard; experimental physiology in Europe; and psychology. In describing the difference that medical physiology made, Whitehead writes: “The career of William James is an example of this change in standpoint. He also possessed the clear, incisive genius which could state in a flash the exact point at issue (SMW 147).” The final reference in SMW to James is where Whitehead depicts Descartes and James as being inaugurators of new stages in philosophy, yet not offering final solutions and not being “the most characteristic philosophers of their respective epochs (SMW 147).” As previously mentioned, Ford thinks that Whitehead himself was successful in extending or “rescuing” James’s thought.

**James’s Temporal Atomicity?** In what Weber discusses under the title “epochal theory of time,” in describing the extensive continuum of entities in *PR*, chapter II, Whitehead cites the following passage of James:

> Either your experience is of no content, of no change, or it is of a perceptible amount of content or change. Your acquaintance with reality grows literally by buds or drops of perception. Intellectually and on reflection you can divide these into components, but as immediately given, they come totally or not at all (*PR* 68).<sup>15</sup>

In his footnote that references William James, Whitehead adds, “My attention was drawn to this passage . . . by Professor J. S. Bixler” (*PR* 68, FN 4).<sup>16</sup> Although Whitehead interprets James as holding a view of “drops” or “buds,” Rosenthal disagrees: “Much is made by Whiteheadian scholars of the fact that James speaks of drops or buds . . . [but] his supposed turn away from continuity and infinitesimals to finite drops is perhaps not the move to discreteness that it may at first seem . . . [rather] they ‘correspond logically to the ‘infinitesimals’ (minutest quanta of motion, change, or whatnot) of which the latest mathematics is supposed to have got rid.”<sup>17</sup> Regardless of the way James intended to be understood, or perhaps better described as the way his position developed through time, Whitehead interpreted him as holding the perspective of “drops” of experience. Although Whitehead’s footnote reference to Bixler did not provide an exact reference, on the page of Bixler’s book which quotes the same James reference that Whitehead quoted, Bixler writes: “This it will at once be seen is much nearer a pluralistic theory
of reality [i.e., atomistic] than is the theory of the ‘experience-continuum’ which James also sets forth” (54). This suggests that Whitehead simply understood James on the basis of Bixler’s interpretation – either rightly or wrongly. Whitehead’s actual entities correspond to a “pluralistic theory of reality,” while he also accounts for the “experience-continuum” through actual entities being influenced by their predecessors. Lowe thinks that Whitehead was probably acquainted with James’s *Psychology*, in addition to having read Bixler’s book, and his enthusiasm for James is also demonstrated by his reference, in his 1936 letter to Hartshorne, to the two volumes of Ralph Perry’s books (with over sixteen hundred pages). However, he seems to be far from an expert in the interpretation of James and often seems to use his references to James to bolster the credibility of his own philosophy (Lowe 2.105).

Later in *PR*, when Whitehead describes his own pluralistic cosmology of actual entities, as being temporally and spatially atomistic, he describes it using the expression “a buzzing world.” He footnotes it with the statement, “This epithet is, of course, borrowed from William James” (*PR* 50). There are a plethora of similar expressions in James depicting the world of temporal and spatial atomicity, yet it is important to note that “James never outlined a system of the world on this basis.” Lowe considers pluralism as “the subject of the most obvious kinship between Whitehead and William James.” When Whitehead uses the phrase “underlying substantial activity” for atomistic entities, or the philosophical designation “*causa sui,*” he most likely thinks that he is referring to the same notion as James. Whitehead may have had this in mind when he wrote of rescuing James’ “type of thought.” Ford’s analysis of similarities between James and Whitehead closely focuses on atomistic actual entities and their inter-relations.

I agree with Weber when he writes that Whitehead’s “atomism is plural but can be easily triangulated: Leibniz’s Monadology, Planck’s quantic thunder, and James’s interpretation of Zeno’s everlasting antinomies (Weber 2.26).” James provides a thorough discussion of Zeno’s paradoxes in *Some Problems of Philosophy* (80-95). Whitehead explicitly identifies James in *PR* 68 as using these quanta of experience to overcome Zeno’s arguments or paradoxes, thereby refuting an infinitely divisible space-time continuum. James’s interpretation is probably also implicit in the similar discussion in *SMW* 125-127. Whitehead nuances his agreement with the discussion of James on Zeno’s paradoxes when he writes, “James also refers to Zeno. In substance I agree with his argument from Zeno; though I do not think that he allows sufficiently
for those elements in Zeno’s paradoxes which are the product of inadequate mathematical knowledge (PR 68).” Since Whitehead’s background and initial fame was in mathematics it is hardly surprising that he seems to claim a superior knowledge in this field, regardless as to the relative worth of either of their explanations of Zeno’s paradoxes. Salmon in examining Zeno’s paradoxes comments that “experience does seem, as James and Whitehead emphasize, to have an atomistic character.” Yet, in agreement with Grünbaum, Salmon denies that any metaphysical conclusions can or should be drawn from this, which is what Whitehead does in his theory of actual entities with temporal and spatial atomicity.

James’s Religious Experience: At the outset it certainly seems that Whitehead took great interest in this aspect of James’s thought. Bixler’s book was entitled Religion in the Philosophy of William James and it is a revision of his PhD dissertation on the study of James’s religious philosophy. A brief review of Whitehead’s relation to religion is helpful here. Whitehead had grown up in a religious environment with his grandfather, father, and two uncles being clergymen and teachers in the Church of England; and he had an early personal commitment to Christianity (Lowe 1.14-26). However, in 1897 or 1898 when strong support of Newtonian physics began to crumble he became a pronounced and outspoken agnostic (Lowe 1.188). Later, he changed his mind and thought that his philosophy required a concept of God, beginning in Science and the Modern World (1925), but more fully expressed in Religion in the Making (1926), and Process and Reality (1929). In other words, during the general time period in which Whitehead was reading Bixler’s books on James’s thought on religion, Whitehead was himself making a philosophical move toward a religious perspective, yet an untraditional one. Although it is beyond the scope of this work to consider, I note that Earl Forderhase wrote a PhD dissertation entitled, “A Study of the Concept of a Finite God in the Philosophies of William James and Alfred North Whitehead” (1973, University of Oklahoma) which considers the similarities and dissimilarities between the two. With this background digression in mind, I return to Whitehead’s interest in James’s religious experience.

In William James’s The Varieties of Religious Experience (Varieties, 1902) he writes: “Religion, therefore, as I now ask you arbitrarily to take it, shall mean for us the feelings, acts, and experience of individual men in their solitude . . .” I presume that since Whitehead discussed The Varieties with Price in August, 1945 that he had in fact read the book well before
that time (Dialogues 333; Weber 1.22). In fact, it may have been prior to 1926, since Whitehead wrote in RM: “Thus religion is solitariness; and if you are never solitary, you are never religious (RM 17).” Although Whitehead does not explicitly reference James, their common usage of solitary along with similar perspectives on religion in the surrounding paragraphs is highly suggestive, yet it is admitted that others in the period also used similar language. For example, although Charles Sanders Peirce, writing in 1893, does not use the term ‘solitary’ or ‘solitariness,’ he seems to be somewhat similar when he writes: “Religion, though it begins in a seminal individual inspiration, only comes to full flower in a great church coextensive with a civilization.”

In addition to the perhaps implicit reference to religion as solitariness, I suggest that the last page of AI where Whitehead writes of the union of “Zest with Peace” (AI 296) is reminiscent of, if not an implicit reference, to James’s conclusions in Varieties, where he wrote of new zest and a temper of peace (Varieties 418).

There are a number of commonalities between the two on religious matters. Both affirm a God much more finite than the traditional omnipotent and omniscient concept of traditional Christianity. Both affirm a God in more active and intimate relationship with creation. That is, their God functions within personal experience which may entail that which is often called mystical. For James, “our power of moral and volitional response is probably our deepest organ of communication with the nature of things. But in the Varieties the deepest organ of communication is . . . when man feels the touch of a Power greater than himself” (Bixler 166). For Whitehead, each becoming entity has the particular influence (Whitehead’s technical language is “ingression”) of God for its unique experience, yet the entity also has self-determinacy of the final concrescent outcome that may have accepted or rejected God’s influence of novelty.

Other “kinships”: Victor Lowe, while acknowledging the general influence of many philosophers on Whitehead, defends him from any suggestions of overly strong influence from particular philosophers, including Bergson, James, and Alexander. In order to complete a review of the aspects of James’s thought that appealed to Whitehead, it is helpful to observe his listing of “kinships” between the two, even though it is a bit repetitive from that described above. Lowe calls the “buzzing” world of pluralism the most obvious kinship. He next notes the “remarkable agreement” of the radical empiricism of James and the “peculiar” empiricism of
Whitehead. Although James would have been suspicious of the rationalistic aspects of Whitehead’s speculative philosophy, he would have been in agreement with Whitehead’s assertion that “The chief danger to philosophy is narrowness in the selection of evidence (PR 337).” Both wanted an empiricism that was not limited to mere consciousness predicated on the five senses (Whitehead’s presentational immediacy). James preceded Whitehead in calling the most basic component of immediate experience “feelings” of the others and wrote of “the plain conjunctive experience” (i.e., the stream of consciousness which seems to be a continuous experience, yet is predicated on the function of consciousness arising from the discrete buds or drops of experience). Whitehead employs a similar concept of feelings with perception through “causal efficacy” creating the same sense of continuous experience, with “causal efficacy” having primacy over presentational immediacy. I am in agreement with Weber’s discussion of this in his “the concept of feeling.”

**EPILOGUE**

Why did Whitehead describe James to be the American Plato? In general, Whitehead thought that they had similar creative genius, flashes of insight, or intuitive capacities that inaugurated new philosophical eras. Furthermore, this study has considered the comparative foci of: “the one and the many,” the denial of Cartesian mind/body dualism, temporal atomicity, religious experience, and other kinships. Although I am in basic agreement with Weber, additional details have been developed. Although Whitehead is obviously complimentary toward James and was influenced by him to some degree, I agree with Lowe’s and Weber’s position that this did not rise to the level of being an overly strong influence, or lead to “borrowings.”

Beyond his honorific attribution, was Whitehead justified in his critiques of James? Although a full consideration of this question is beyond the scope of this work, an affirmative answer seems to be generally accepted by James’s interpreters. Beyond the previously mentioned agreement of Marcus Ford, Robert Neville may be representative when he writes: “True, James lacked the technical flair in systematic metaphysics of Peirce or Whitehead. But he had seminal ideas that helped pave the way around modernism” (85).

Finally, given the relatively light consideration of James in many university’s philosophy curriculums, Whitehead’s enthusiasm, both for James’s thought and his subsequent influence on
philosophy, was apparently premature. I hope that Whitehead is better understood as being prophetic toward what may result from more intense study and research of James in the postmodern future. The greater emphasis on the study of the philosophy of both William James and Alfred North Whitehead would certainly be helpful.

Department of Philosophy
Saint Louis University / Saint Louis Community College
scottsin@charter.net

BIBLIOGRAPHY OF BOOKS BY ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD

articles of various dates).

APPENDIX 1: SURVEY OF WHITEHEAD’S REFERENCES TO JAMES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Whiteheadian Book (date)</th>
<th>Usage</th>
<th>Page References</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>PLS</em> “Mathematics” (1911)</td>
<td>Cf. <em>Pragmatism: a New Name for some Old Ways of Thinking</em> (1907)</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harvard Lecture (1924)</td>
<td>the university of William James</td>
<td>Lowe, 2.141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>SMW</em> (1925)</td>
<td>adorable genius</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Implicit</em>: irreducible and stubborn facts</td>
<td>2, 3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Implicit</em>: Cf to <em>PR</em> 68 (Zeno)</td>
<td>125-127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>inauguration of a new stage in philosophy</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>To deny plumply that . . .</td>
<td>143-144</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>. . . possessed the clear, incisive genius</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>RM</em> (1926)</td>
<td><em>Implicit</em>: religion is solitariness . . . (Varieties)</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>S</em> (1927)</td>
<td><em>Implicit</em>: stubborn facts</td>
<td>36-37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>PR</em> (1929)</td>
<td>charge of anti-intellectualism</td>
<td>xii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Epithet . . . borrowed from William James</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The authority of William James (Zeno)</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>AE</em> (1929)</td>
<td>and again in William James</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>AI</em> (1933)</td>
<td>I may add that William James . . .</td>
<td>231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>Implicit</em>: Zest with Peace (Varieties)</td>
<td>296</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Note (Jan. 2, 1936)</td>
<td>W. J. is the analogue to Plato</td>
<td>Lowe, 2.345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>ESP</em></td>
<td>infused philosophy with new life (1937)</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>From Greece to William James (1936)</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>MT</em> (1938)</td>
<td>Plato, Aristotle, Leibniz, and William James</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Finally, there is William James . . .</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Harvard is justly proud . . .</td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Dialogues</em> (1954)</td>
<td>(Prologue) <em>flouruit</em> of William James</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
William James’s definition . . . 79
William James call[s] success the ‘Bitch Goddess’ 111
‘subtle-soul’d psychologist,’ William James 183
Party for the Whiteheads given by 314-315
Like an affable archangel 317
Noble portrait of William James 319
His system remained incomplete 333-334

**APPENDIX 2: SURVEY OF “PRAGMATIC” OR “PRAGMATISM” IN THE WORKS OF WHITEHEAD**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Whiteheadian Book (date)</th>
<th>Usage</th>
<th>Page References</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>M</em> (1911)</td>
<td>No references found</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>PLS</em> “Mathematics” (1911)</td>
<td>Cf. <em>Pragmatism: a New Name for some Old Ways of Thinking</em> (1907)</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>PNK</em> (1919, 1925)</td>
<td>Physical object ‘works’ for pragmatic philosopher</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>CN</em> (1920)</td>
<td>Pragmatist will swallow anything if it works</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>R</em> (1922)</td>
<td>The only guarantee for correctness is the pragmatic</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>SMW</em> (1925)³¹</td>
<td>The creed justified itself by the pragmatic test</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>RM</em> (1926)</td>
<td>The pragmatic test: it works and claims prize</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>S</em> (1927)</td>
<td>Pragmatic appeal to the future</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pragmatic prominent in modern thought</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Obviousness of the pragmatic aspect</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pragmatically the direction of individuals to actions</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The indirect check of pragmatic consequences</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>PR</em> (1929)</td>
<td>Metaphysics cannot satisfy pragmatic tests</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pragmatic use of the actual entity</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Superjective is pragmatic value, Hume’s principle</td>
<td>87-88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pragmatic justification</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Presentational immediacy of utmost pragmatic use  167
Appeal is to pragmatic consequences  179
The very meaning of truth is pragmatic  181
Objective consideration is pragmatic  220
Our test in the selection . . . must be pragmatic  337

FR (1929)
Pragmatism is nonsense apart from final causation  26
The pragmatic function of Reason  27
Reason as a pragmatic agent  28

AE (1929)
No references found

AI (1933)
Pragmatically it experienced supreme justification  131
Anti-intellectualism tinges American Pragmatism  223

ESP “Analysis of Meaning” pragmatic sufficiency  93
(1937)
Pragmatic justification  97
When the pragmatists asks whether it works  98

MT (1938)
Philosophy is on a pragmatic basis  106

PLS “Mathematics and the Good” (194)
“Does it work?” is a reference to theory  16

NOTES


4 Also: S 36-37. Weber calls this “his motto,” but only cites SMW 3, Weber 1.21.
According to Lowe “Bertrand Russell had treated all three of these men as guilty of anti-intellectualism,” PR 2.239; Weber cites the PR quotation, 1.22.


E.g., *Timaeus* is said to be “one of two cosmologies that has dominated European thought,” PR xiv., and “[In *Timaeus*] Plato’s guess reads much more fluid than in Aristotle . . . and more valuable,” CN 17-18. The collection of relatively few personal books surviving his death in the Whitehead archive at Johns Hopkins University Library includes two copies of *Timaeus*.


E.g.: “bubbling vat,” “a mosaic philosophy . . . of plural facts,” “large extent chaotic,” “‘pure experience’ is the name which I gave to the immediate flux of life,” “stream of feeling . . . confluent with some particular wave or wavelet,” “hanging-together,” “stream of experience,” “mere restless zigzag movement of a wild Ideenflucht, or Rhapsodies der Wahrnehmungen,” “every single event is ultimately related to every other, and determined by the whole to which it belongs,” “dust-mind theory,” “distributed and strung-along and flowing sort of reality which we finite beings swim in,” “the turbid, restless lower world,” “drop-wise . . . pulses . . . [of] discreteness,” “stream of time, snap-shots taken as by a kinetoscopic camera,” and “you can hear the vibration of an electric contact-maker, smell the ozone, see the sparks, and feel the thrill, co-consciously as it were or in one field of experience,” James, William. *Essays in Radical Empiricism, A Pluralistic Universe.* Gloucester: Peter Smith publisher, 1967, Radical Empiricism, 41, 42, 46, 93, 100, 107, 160, 162; Pluralistic Universe, 76, 188, 213, 218, 231, 235, 268. Lowe comments that James “never outlined . . . ” 2.226.


E.g., *SMW* 107, 123, 165.

E.g., *PR* 7, 86, 88, 221, 222. Both Descartes and Spinoza had previously used this expression.


Lowe is not sure of the exact date.

Although Whitehead’s conceptual move to God is usually initially attributed to *SMW* (145, 161, 173-9, e.g. “God is the ultimate limitation, and His existence is the ultimate irrationality,”178) a likely earlier reference is in *CN* (1920), where he writes: “We can imagine a being whose awareness, conceived as his private possession, suffers no transition, although the terminus of his awareness is our


31 Cf, “true rationalism must always transcend itself by recurrence to the concrete in search of inspiration,” *SMW* 201.

32 Although there is no usage of pragmatism Whitehead writes, “Geometry and mechanics, followed by workshop practice, gain that reality without which mathematics is verbiage,” *AE* 48.