INTRODUCTION TO WJS SPECIAL ISSUE: “PRAGMATISM, PHENOMENOLOGY AND COGNITIVE SCIENCE”

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Historically, phenomenology and pragmatism emerge as separate trajectories and traditions. However, these traditions would not remain apart for long. Philosophers noticed that both phenomenology and pragmatism thematized experience, and any scholar of phenomenology knows fully well the fertile seeds James’s thought and pragmatism can yield. James enjoyed widespread appeal and fame, and crossed the Atlantic several times in his life. As a man of letters, he corresponded in several European languages, and is cited by almost every major phenomenologist. In keeping with this fertile ground to be explored, Kevin Decker and I wanted to revisit these themes in James (and in others too) and see what current philosophers nowadays think of the relationship between phenomenology and pragmatism. In so doing, we’ve brought together several promising attempts of both established and up and coming scholars that take up the question of the relationship between pragmatism and phenomenology in Edmund Husserl, John Dewey, William James, Max Scheler, Charles S. Peirce, Herbert Mead, and the contemporary pragmatist philosopher Mark A. Johnson.

In making good on the promise to think beyond James, but within the purview of phenomenology and pragmatism, Mark Johnson’s work is ripe for engagement. Kelvin J. Booth’s “The Meaning of the Social Body: Bringing George Herbert Mead to Mark Johnson’s Theory of Embodied Mind” attempts to synthesize George Herbert Mead’s theory of social meaning with Mark...
Johnson’s work on embodied mind. Specifically, Booth problematizes the underdeveloped conception of the social in Johnson’s theory since Johnson’s mention of the social is limited to infant imitation and distributed cognition. Mead’s idea of a “conversation of gestures,” while not strictly a “conversation” normally meant by the term, can be interpreted as part of Johnson’s theory of embodied meaning since the *conversation of gestures* is “a seamless flow of simultaneous mutual adjustment of two organisms to each other in a single system of communication” (7-8). Moreover, this system of mutual adjustment can occur in the very pragmatic organism-environment relation that prefigures Johnson’s theory of embodied mind.

In “Toward a Non-Reductive Naturalism: Combining the Insights of Husserl and Dewey,” Gregory A. Trotter meditates on the relationship between phenomenology and pragmatism. He seeks to synthesize the naturalism gap between Dewey and Husserl and attempts to arrive “at the best insights of both philosophers regarding human modes of knowing and interacting with the world in an effort to get closer to a form of naturalism that does not require that we give up on the contributions to experience made by experiencing subjects” (21). In this article, Trotter open doors to philosophers whom we might not have expected to come together. According to Trotter, Dewey and Husserl agree that consciousness is and of the world (and therefore of nature). This non-reductive relation can help establish a much-needed, non-reductive naturalism that preserves room for experiencing subjects but can also avoid supernaturalist and transcendental philosophies that posit a radical break between mind and world in general.

Aaron Massecar’s “How Pragmatism and Realist Phenomenology Can Bring Cognitive Science Back Into Philosophy” attempts to establish a framework for cognitive science. Specifically, he argues that Peirce’s “extreme scholastic realism” and early phenomenology can explain a new source of realism that navigates between the excesses of a mind-independent traditional realism on the one hand and a Husserlian idealism of consciousness on the other hand. According to Massecar, Peirce
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offers a semiotics of signs that forms the middle ground between the idealism of the subject and the realism of the external object. In other words, this process unfolds in experience and can provide a structural account for a realism rooted in Peirce’s semiotics. Massecar seems to identify this process-based realism with the way in which intentional structures, for early phenomenologists like Scheler, are extra mente and with the relational structures or habits of behavior that emerge in Peirce. This process yields laws that are “constantly in the process of development and are immanent to experience” (43). These structures, Massecar posits, give us the tools to connect minds to the environment. Overall, his efforts are propaedeutic to exciting questions that can undoubtedly be expounded upon in the future.

Finally, I offer a new interpretation of James’s metaphysics of value in his “The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life.” This interpretation, like Massecar’s, finds inspiration in early phenomenology. Specifically, we can see that the complexity of James’s thought experiment given in Section 2 of “The Moral Philosopher and the Moral Life” are comparable to Scheler’s phenomenologically-based value rankings. While James wrote without knowledge of Scheler, we can see the seeds of phenomenological thinking about value already in James’s thought: the complexity of a value ranking culminates in religion providing the highest values for James as it does so in Scheler’s account. I offer textual support for this interpretation of James’s theory of value, and why we should interpret it through phenomenology by showing that he is committed to a type of realism that Scheler articulates (what I’ve called participatory realism elsewhere). I close the essay with some thoughts regarding the relationship between phenomenology and pragmatism that anticipates new questions to ask about the relationship between these two philosophical movements, and so it seems fitting to end on my essay and bring the volume to a close.

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