ABSTRACT

Jonathan Edwards and William James were preoccupied with religion, and both responded in print, and profoundly, to religious crises in their own cultures: Edwards wrote his Treatise on Religious Affections in response to the hysteria and factionalism spawned by the Great Awakening, and James his Varieties of Religious Experience in reaction to the crisis in faith afflicting his generation. Edwards in Religious Affections provides a model of emotional religion that is neither anti-intellectual nor fanatical, whereas James in Varieties reveals that religion is intellectually respectable and occupies a rightful place in the economy of life. Though disagreeing as to the letter of religion, both agree as to its spirit. Both understand religion to be essentially experiential and emotional, though not excluding the intellect. They alike assign an important role to reason in the religious life. And, significantly, they concur that religion is ultimately validated by the behavior of its adherents.

After this my sense of divine things gradually increased, and became more and more lively, and had more of that inward sweetness. The appearance of everything was altered: there seemed to be, as it were, a calm, sweet cast, or appearance of divine glory, in almost everything. God’s excellency, his wisdom, his purity and love, seemed to appear in everything; in the sun, moon and stars; in the clouds, and blue sky, in the grass, flowers, trees; in the water, and all nature; which used greatly to fix my mind.

Jonathan Edwards, Personal Narrative
Bringing Jonathan Edwards and William James into conversation is appropriate and fruitful. Their fellow-countryman and philosophical peer, Josiah Royce, regarded them together as representative American philosophers, which he explains as follows:

The philosopher who can fitly represent the contribution of his nation to the world's treasury of philosophical ideas must first be one who thinks for himself, fruitfully, with true independence, and with successful inventiveness, about problems of philosophy. And, secondly, he must be a man who gives utterance to philosophical ideas which are characteristic of some stage and of some aspect of the spiritual life of his own people.

Such, thought Royce, are Edwards and James. Other than their being representative they are similar with respect to their education from experience. According to Royce, Edwards “actually rediscovered some of the world's profoundest ideas regarding God and humanity simply by reading for himself the meaning of his own religious experience”; and James “rediscovered whatever he has received from without; because he never could teach what he had not himself experienced.”¹ And the experience of particular interest to them and that they sought to interpret is religious experience which they identified as the essence of religion. Their remarkably similar interpretations and evaluations of religious experience are the focus of this paper.

“There is no question whatsoever, that is of greater importance to mankind,” declared Jonathan Edwards, than, “What is the nature of true religion?” He continued, “it is a subject on which my mind has been peculiarly intent, ever since I first entered on the study of divinity.”² More than a century later, William James wrote his sister Alice, “Religion is the great interest of my life.”³ Their preoccupation with religion was due in part to temperament and background.

The youthful Edwards was prone to mystical raptures and given much to soul searching, agonizing over whether he was among God’s elect. He was engaged in “testing the spirits” native to his Puritan heritage. Like Edwards James was steeped in religion, as might be expected of one raised in the household of his father, Henry James,
Sr., a deep and radical religious thinker of a Swedenborgian caste who published widely on religious and theological topics. James was much exercised by theodicy, finding it impossible to reconcile the evil in the world with the existence of the sovereign God of Calvinism, his ancestral religion, from the trammels of which both he and his father sought to escape—James would abandon the Calvinist God for a finite deity.

Their books about religion, moreover, reflect crises in their respective cultures. In Edwards’ case the crisis was precipitated by the Great Awakening. A bitter fruit of this great religious revival was outbreaks of virulent “enthusiasm” (fanaticism) which manifested itself in bizarre and even dangerous behavior. Philosopher and churchman alike joined in inveighing against the pathology of enthusiasm, which Locke explained as “rising from the conceits of a warmed or overweening brain.” Edwards’ own uncle, Joseph Hawley, for instance, slit his own throat in a fit of religiously induced melancholia during the time of revival. Even Edwards, because of his leadership in the revival, did not escape the charge of enthusiasm, which he vigorously denied. He was branded an enthusiast from the press by Charles Chauncy, a Boston minister, a charge he vigorously denied, contending that he was as much opposed to enthusiasm as Chauncy. Out of this controversy Edwards penned *Treatise Concerning Religious Affections*, his apologia for “experimental” or “heart” religion, that is, one that is experiential and emotional without being “enthusiastic.” He steadfastly insisted that the affections (emotions) are the core of true religion because, among other reasons, they motivate our actions; without them, religion would be a dull, lifeless, and ineffectual contradiction of itself.

In James’ case the religious crisis was wider and deeper. God seemed to have been eclipsed. Darwin’s *Origin of Species* had struck a decisive blow against the teleological argument for God’s existence by showing that the apparent design in nature could just as well be explained by the blind and aleatory forces of natural selection as by the intelligent design of God. Such cultural prophets as Comte, Nietzsche, and Freud had variously pronounced the death of God and confidently predicted that as science waxed religion would wane. Matthew Arnold believed that poetry would fill the spiritual vacuum left by religion. In opposition to the cultured despisers of religion, James sought to find a respectable place once again for it within an increasingly secularized and scientific worldview. James showed that it was possible for one to be both scientifically
enlightened and authentically religious without suffering cognitive dissonance. Indeed, he assimilated religion to science: like scientific beliefs, religious beliefs ought to be treated as inductive hypotheses the truth of which could be validated by their beneficial effects when applied. He took to task men like Freud who sought to reduce religion to pathology—“medical materialists” he called them—and he argued that to evaluate religion on the basis of its presumed roots in the mind’s nonrational or irrational processes was to commit the genetic fallacy—religious experience is to be judged not by its roots but by its fruits. The result was his compendious *Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study of Human Nature*, which joined Edwards’ *Religious Affections* as a profound study in both the psychology and philosophy of religion. Significantly, James quotes Edwards in his *Varieties*.

Both Edwards and James, then, were great mediators engaged in the larger and perennial task of reconciling faith with reason. Edwards demonstrated that heart religion does not necessarily mean irrational enthusiasm, and James that religion and science do not have to be in conflict but are complementary. Moreover, their common interest in religion is matched by their common conception of it, the subject of the remainder of this paper.

Edwards and James have remarkably similar ideas about religion, though this is not to discount their large and undeniable differences. For instance, James rejects Edwards’ monarchical God and his unflinching determinism. But their differences are more theological than not; Edwards had a theology, James none. At the deeper levels of philosophy and psychology, though, they are kindred spirits. Thus they agree (1) that personal religion has primacy over and is the source of its institutional forms; (2) that religion is essentially experiential in nature, and the particular kind of experience defining and determining it represents a fusion of thought and feeling; (3) that religious experience is not wholly subjective—it is objective, being an experience of something exterior to ourselves; (4) that reason plays two indispensable roles in the economy of the religious life—making possible a knowledge inaccessible outside of religious experience, and providing a critique of religion; and (5) that the ultimate test of the truth of religion lies in the actual behavior or good works of its votaries. I shall now amplify each of these points.
“True religion, in great part, consists in holy affections [emotions],” affirms Edwards in *Religious Affections*. A truly religious person necessarily undergoes the gamut of emotions of a peculiar kind such as “fear, hope, love, hatred, desire, joy, sorrow, gratitude, compassion and zeal”—the chief and root of them being love. Edwards locates true religion mainly in the affections because, among other reasons, they furnish the “the spring of men’s actions”; without their motivation, religion would be a dull, lifeless, and ineffectual contradiction of itself—true religion “does not consist in weak, dull and lifeless wouldings [i.e. weak inclinations].”

However, the phrase “in great part” implies that true religion consists in some as yet unspecified part, which is the understanding: “Holy affections are not heat without light; but evermore arise from some information of the understanding, some spiritual instruction that the mind receives, some light or actual knowledge.” The light of understanding is as intrinsic to true religion as the heat of emotion. Genuine religion is cognitive as well as affective. To see how, we need first to explain what Edwards means by “reason” and “understanding.” In discussing them, he makes a pair of crucial distinctions informing his epistemology.

First, Edwards tacitly distinguishes between two senses of “reason.” In its loose sense it is, in his words, “the faculty of mental perception in general,” a synonym for “understanding.” This he defines as the soul’s capacity for perception by which “it discerns and views and judges of things,” typically exercised in our grasping immediately the meaning of a proposition or apprehending a state of affairs. “Reason” in its strict or discursive sense is, as he puts it, “ratiocination, or a power of inferring by arguments.” I shall hereafter refer to them as the perceptive and ratiocinative senses of “reason” respectively.

Second, Edwards makes a distinction between “notional” understanding and the “sense of the heart,” and a distinction between both of these and “spiritual” understanding. Notional understanding is “wherein the mind only beholds things in the exercise of a speculative faculty.” It is our capacity for awareness and judgment. The object of notional understanding, what is thereby understood, is what he calls “speculative” or “notional” knowledge which, for example, makes up the body of science. By contrast, the sense of the heart is “wherein the mind don’t only speculate and
behold, but relishes and feels”; it is to be emotionally affected by what we understand or know. Edwards’ sense of the heart is not merely the capacity to realize something, but to feel an emotional pang or twinge, like delight or disgust, at the very moment of its realization. What essentially distinguishes this sense of the heart from the purely notional understanding is that, as an affective cognition, it engages equally the understanding and the will, of which the affections are an expression. The object of the sense of the heart, what it uniquely grasps, is what Edwards identifies as “sensible” knowledge. Edwards aptly compares these two ways of knowing, viz. notional and by the sense of the heart, to the ways honey might be known. One may know the chemical composition of honey or the manner of its production, and know of its sweetness, but never have tasted it. She has merely speculative knowledge of it. But another has actually tasted honey and knows that it is sweet—she has acquaintance with its sweetness and has savored it. It is she, according to Edwards, who sensibly knows the most important thing about honey.

Speculative (notional) knowledge, then, is abstract and theoretical, whereas sensible knowledge involves not only an intuition but also an affective or emotional response triggered by the thing sensibly known. Edwards’ distinction between speculative and sensible knowledge is recognizable as that between knowledge by description and knowledge by acquaintance.

Spiritual understanding, on the other hand, is a distinctive form of the sense of the heart, “a new spiritual sense, ”analogous to the five natural senses—a “sixth sense,” as it were, “a principle of new kind of perception or spiritual sensation, which is in its whole nature different from any former kinds of sensation of the mind, as tasting is diverse from any of the other senses.” This sixth sense has as its object a new simple idea of God’s beauty or holiness. What is uniquely known through this spiritual sense is nothing that can be simulated by the natural understanding: it is not propositional knowledge or anything expressible in language; neither is it an image conjured by the imagination; nor is it any esoteric meaning that might be divined in a passage of scripture. Rather, it is a tacit knowledge of the reality of God’s surpassing excellence or holiness as it really is: “the beauty of holiness is that thing . . . , which is perceived by this spiritual sense, that is so diverse from all that natural men perceive.” What makes this spiritual understanding wholly new and so radically distinct from natural understanding is that it results from a
supernatural infusion of saving grace in the soul, thereby making it a capacity denied the natural or unregenerate man. For spiritual understanding, in Edwards’ view, is vouchsafed to us only upon the foot of an act of saving grace. In one place he explains spiritual understanding in terms of the influx of “a spiritual and divine light, immediately imparted to the soul by God, of a different nature from any that is obtained by natural means.”

These different ways of knowing, viz. speculatively, sensibly, and spiritually, together with their correspondent objects of knowledge, may be illustrated in the knowledge of God. One may know that God is holy and fully understand its meaning (Satan knows as much), but he has nothing more than speculative knowledge. But the saint or the regenerate, actually “tastes” of God’s transcendent excellence or holiness, and savors it, thereby having a poignant and sensible knowledge of it. Edwards deems this sensible knowledge of God superior to the merely speculative kind because it is of God’s beauty or holiness, by far his most important attribute, and insofar as it is affective knowledge, it has the power to affect us emotionally and so motivate us to action.

Reason has a dual role in Edwards’ philosophy of religion, corresponding to its two types he distinguishes: (1) Perceptive reason, qua understanding, makes possible that unique experience marked off as peculiarly religious. The truths of divinity are revealed in scripture, which means they initially need to be heard or read, requiring that they at least be understood notionally and thought through rationally. Perceptive reason or understanding is the proper subject of spiritual illumination. Once illuminated, by receiving an entirely new, sensible idea of God’s holiness) it determines the specifically spiritual quality (in Edwards’ language, the “graciousness”) of the religious affections. The understanding is the portal to personal religion and the locus of religious conversion. Perceptive reason, though necessary to give us a speculative knowledge of revealed truths, is not sufficient to give us a sensible knowledge of them. Speculative knowledge my leave us indifferent. It is the spiritual sense infused by grace that alone can impart that knowledge. Edwards explains the purely propaedeutic role of perceptive reason and compares it to the new sense of the heart as follows: “’tis not a thing that belongs to reason, to see the beauty . . . of spiritual things; it is not a speculative thing, but depends on the sense of the heart. Reason indeed is necessary in order to it, as ’tis by reason only
that we are become the subjects of the means of it; . . . Reason’s work is to perceive truth, and not excellency.”13

(2) Ratiocinative reason, *qua* criticism, is the means to assaying the genuineness of our personal religion, of detecting hypocrisy and quashing enthusiasm. *Religious Affections* is intended to equip its readers with the means of assessing their own spiritual estate: “the laying down good rules may be a means of preventing such hypocrites, and of convincing many of other kinds of hypocrites” and “may be of use to the true saints, to detect false affections, which they may have mingled with true. And be a means of their religion’s becoming more pure, and like gold tried in the fire.” These rules take the form of certain marks or characteristics, or “signs” as Edwards calls them, such that if exhibited in our affections and behavior certify them as genuinely holy and so constitutive of true religion. Of these Edwards considers the quality of behavior the most important. “Christian practice is the chief of all the signs of saving grace.” To emphasize its importance, he waxes hyperbolic: “Christian practice is the most proper evidence of the gracious sincerity of professors, to themselves and others; and the chief of all the marks of grace, the sign of signs, and evidence of evidences, that which seals and crowns all other signs.”14 The sign of Christian practice was singularly important for Edwards. Introspection may be deceptive; our own feelings may deceive us and our words others, but not our actions. They speak the truth about our innermost being, about our real beliefs. The deception people are vulnerable to as to the truth of their spiritual estate would have been brought home to Edwards by the excesses of the Great Awakening.

Incidentally, the importance of behavior in the religious life provides another reason as to why the affections are essential to true religion. As Edwards explains, “And as true religion is of a practical nature, and God has so constituted the human nature, that the affections are very much the spring of men’s actions, this also shows, that true religion must consist very much in the affections.”15

Unlike Edwards, James does not pretend to give us anything like the nature of true religion; he does not stipulate what religion ought to be. Rather he is concerned only with telling us the truth about religion in general—the truth about its origins, its relation to science and ethics, its metaphysical claims, and its value. Whereas *Religious Affections* is an apologia for a particular kind of religion, i.e. evangelical Calvinism,
Varieties of Religious Experience is an apologia for religion in general. James tentatively and provisionally defines personal religion as “the feelings, acts, and experiences of individual men in their solitude, so far as they apprehend themselves to stand in relation to whatever they may consider the divine.” Religion for him is fundamentally and largely a matter of feeling and a kind of quasi-sensory experience. It is not conceptual, intellectual, or discursive: “We may now lay it down as certain that in the distinctively religious sphere of experience, many persons . . . possess the objects of their belief, not in the form of mere conceptions which their intellect accepts as true, but rather in the form of quasi-sensible realities directly apprehended” (italics mine). (In the italicized passage James seems to presuppose something like Edwards’ distinction between sensible and speculative knowledge.) The psychological source of our religious propensities, experiences and feelings, thinks James, is the subconscious or nonrational part of the mind: “in religion we have a department of human nature with unusually close relations to the transmarginal or subliminal region.” The subconscious is, in James’ words, “the fountain-head of much that feeds our religion.”

Given James’ understanding of religion as being essentially affective and experiential in character, and as welling up from the subconscious, what function does James assign reason (as represented paradigmatically by philosophy and theology) in the religious life? Reason for James is neither the source nor stuff of religion. Its position is secondary, coming only after the fact of experience. What is primary is feeling: “feeling is the deeper source of religion, and that philosophic and theological formulas [rationality] are secondary products, like translations of a text into another tongue.” Indeed, without the impetus of religious feeling, philosophy of religion and theology would scarcely exist. Philosophical theology, not to mention creeds, dogmas and doctrines, contains nothing more than “over-beliefs, buildings-out performed by the intellect into directions of which feeling originally supplied the hint.” Moreover, traditional philosophical theology, according to James, has typically misused and abused reason because of its reliance on overly speculative a priori methods and its consequent obliviousness to facts: “The intellectualism in religion which I wish to discredit . . . assumes to construct religious objects out of the resources of logical reason alone, or of logical reason drawing rigorous inference from non-subjective facts.” And proof of
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rational theology’s illegitimacy is the fact that instead of inducing universal assent to its arguments and so establishing the objectivity of religious claims—which is its main justification—it incurs endless disputes and so no consensus. In brief, reason is impotent to prove the objective existence of that divine milieu to which mystical experience and religious feeling testify.

Reason’s proper function in religion, according to James, is, “To redeem religion from unwholesome privacy, and to give public status and universal right of way to its deliverances, has been reason’s task.” In fact, it must be, for James understands that “we are thinking beings, and we cannot exclude the intellect from participating in any of our functions. Even in soliloquizing with ourselves, we construe our feelings intellectually.”

We can glean from James what specific tasks may, and must, be undertaken in religion.

First, reason furnishes the necessary medium for communicating our religious beliefs and experiences. To discuss them with others, or even to reflect upon them ourselves, we must use language and engage in discursive thought. In James’ own words, “we must exchange our feelings with one another, and in doing so we have to speak, and to use general and abstract verbal formulas.”

Second, reason allows us to harmonize our religious experiences and beliefs with our rational life by enabling us to interpret them in terms of the prevailing philosophical world-view: “Both our personal ideals and our religious and mystical experiences must be interpreted congruously with the kind of scenery which our thinking mind inhabits. The philosophic climate of our time inevitably forces its own clothing on us.”

Third, “By confronting,” as James says, “the spontaneous religious constructions with the results of natural science, philosophy [reason] can also eliminate doctrines that are now known to be scientifically absurd or incongruous”—that is, the perennial task of reconciling faith and reason.

Fourth, reason is indispensable to demythologizing scriptures, separating the husks of cultural context from the marrow of spiritual meaning, thereby extracting what is universal and valid from the world’s great religions. “Both from dogma and from worship,” writes James, philosophy “can remove historic incrustations,” discriminate “the common and essential from the individual and local elements of the religious beliefs which she compares,” and distinguish “between what is innocent over-belief and symbolism in the expression” of
religious doctrines “and what is to be literally taken.” Fifth, reason can treat religious beliefs as hypotheses, “testing them in all the manners, whether negative or positive, by which hypotheses are ever tested. She can reduce their number, as some are found more open to objection. She can perhaps become the champion of one which she picks out as being the most closely verified or verifiable.” Thus, by performing these several tasks, reason “can offer mediation between different believers, and help to bring about consensus of opinion.”\textsuperscript{19} In other words, reason can arbitrate religious disputes and differences, and act as a broker among diverse faiths in a religiously pluralistic world.

In his prescription of reason’s rightful role in religion, James envisions what he calls the “science of religions,” or what today is known as the comparative study of religions. Its contributors would typically be social scientists—psychologists, anthropologists, and sociologists. Its function would be purely taxonomic, critical, comparative, interpretative, and mediatory. James conceives of reason as a meta-activity or sorts in relation to religion, the business of which is to establish, not the so-called truths of religion, but truths about religion. As James says, “all these intellectual operations, whether they be constructive or comparative and critical, . . . are interpretative and inductive operations, operations after the fact, consequent upon religious feeling, not coordinate with it, not independent of what it ascertains.”\textsuperscript{20}

Reason for James, then, performs the same indispensable critical (in its broadest sense) role as Edwards’ ratiocinative reason, although James gives it greater scope than Edwards. James, moreover, does allow, at least implicitly, reason a role other than criticism in the life of religion, one corresponding to that of Edwards’ perceptive reason, in his important discussion of mysticism.

“Personal religious experience has its root and centre in mystical states of consciousness,” James claims. Mysticism, then, is the paradigm of religious experience. He identifies two essential characteristics qualifying a state of consciousness as mystical. One is its “noetic quality,” which he describes as follows:

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Although so similar to states of feeling, mystical states seem to those who experience them to be also states of knowledge. They are states of insight into depths of truth unplumbed by the discursive intellect. They are
illuminations, revelations, full of significance and importance, all inarticulate though they remain.

In brief, through mystical experience one comes to know something otherwise unknowable. This mystical knowledge resembles Edwards’ sensible knowledge issuing from the new spiritual sense of the heart. In a passage reminiscent of Edwards’ distinction between the person who knows (speculatively) about honey, but has never tasted it, and the one who knows (sensibly) it because he has tasted it, James remarks,

Knowledge about a thing is not the thing itself. . . . A science might come to understand everything about the causes and elements of religion, . . . ; and yet the best man at this science might be the man who found it hardest to be personally devout. . . . Knowledge about life is one thing; effective occupation of a place in life, with its dynamic currents passing through your being, is another.21

The second characteristic qualifying a conscious state as mystical is its “ineffability,” i.e., “it defies expression, that no adequate report of its contents can be given in words.”22 Mystical knowledge must be experienced directly by the subject; it beggars description and cannot be communicated verbally to others. At best, it can only be hinted at metaphorically and analogically. Mystical knowledge is as ineffable as the “beauty of holiness” as perceived by Edwards’ spiritual sense of the heart.

James concurs with Edwards that the best validation of the truth of religion is the behavior of its professors; James calls this the “empiricist criterion,” and actually cites Edwards in its defense: “By their fruits ye shall know them, not by their roots. Jonathan Edwards’s Treatise on Religious Affections is an elaborate working out of this thesis. The roots of a man’s virtue are inaccessible to us. No appearances whatever are infallible proofs of grace. Our practice is the only sure evidence, even to ourselves, that we are genuinely Christians.” He continues, “If religion is true, its fruits are good fruits.”23 Edwards and James alike insist on a pragmatic test for the truth and worth of faith.
In summary: Significantly, two of America’s greatest thinkers agree as to the psychology of religion. Both understand it as essentially experiential and emotive, though not excluding the cognitive. They agree also as to the philosophy of religion. Edwards and James both assimilate the knowledge of the objects of religious experience to a form of direct perception, of quasi-sensation. Edwards’ new spiritual sense, a sense of the heart, is “a principle of new kind of perception or spiritual sensation.” According to James, persons undergoing religious experience “possess the objects of their belief. . . in the form of quasi-sensible realities directly apprehended.” Furthermore, both assign reason an indispensable double role in the religious life: In its perceptive sense, as Edwards’ sense of the heart and James’ mystical apprehension, of providing access to certain metaphysical truths accessible only through religious experience. In its ratiocinative sense of making possible the interpretation and critique of religious experience—of imposing a check on false religiosity and an antidote to fanaticism for Edwards; for James, of opening it up to public scrutiny and objective evaluation, and of helping to effect accord and understanding in a religiously pluralistic world. Finally, they are both pragmatists insisting that the best vindication of the truth and worth of religion is the beneficial difference it makes in the world when put into practice as the good works of the religious.

Edwards’ and James’ thoughts on religion are as relevant today as they have ever been. James’ call for a science of religions has been amply heed given the large number of departments of religious studies that have sprung up in American universities and colleges since his time. Related to this, his conception of the mediatory office of reason with its promise of arbitrating religious disputes involving conflicting truth-claims, and of its fostering understanding among different creeds and sects, is especially urgent now given the contemporary rise of militant fundamentalisms of all stripes. And Edwards, with his antidote for the manifold evils of fanaticism, obscurantism, pathological self-absorption, and anti-intellectualism in the religious sphere speaks urgently to our own generation still afflicted with superstition and self-righteous demagoguery. These men, with different emphases, remind us that true religion, which is heat but not without light, fosters open-mindedness, tolerance, intellectual integrity, and a capacity for self-criticism—perennial virtues we neglect at our peril.
It is evident from the above that Edwards and James are truly the representative American philosophers Royce describes insofar as they gave “utterance to philosophical ideas which are characteristic of some stage and of some aspect of the spiritual life of his own people.” One such characteristic is their uncompromising empiricism; an empiricism, indeed, encompassing the broadest range of human experience, even the preternatural experiences of mystics. Another is pragmatism with their emphasis on religious practice as the ultimate validation of religion. Their profound speculations on religion befit “a nation with the soul of a church.”

Fayetteville State University
rhall@uncfsu.edu

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NOTES


6 *Ibid.*, 266.


10 Edwards, *Religious Affections*, 272


18 Ibid., 341, 342.
19 Ibid., 342, 359.
20 Ibid., 342.
21 Ibid., 301, 302, 385-86.
22 Ibid., 302.
23 Ibid., 25, 300.