RELATED SCHOLARLY PUBLICATIONS ON JAMES
January – October 2016

In recognition of the fact that James scholars are publishing articles in other academic journals, the editors feel that it is important to keep our readers informed of the diversity within Jamesian scholarship by drawing attention to relevant publications outside of WJS. The new Periodicals section of the journal aims to provide our readers with information about related scholarly articles that address the life, work, and influence of James’s thought. If you have recently published a peer-reviewed article on James or have noticed an omission from this list, please contact our Periodicals Editor, Kyle Bromhall, at periodicals@williamjamesstudies.org and we will include it at the next opportunity.
Araujo, Saulo. “‘...to rely on first and foremost and always’: Revisiting the Role of Introspection in William James’s Early Psychological Work.” Theory Psychology 26, no. 1 (Feb., 2016): 96-111.

In order to legitimate itself as a science, psychology has faced the ongoing problem of establishing its proper method of investigation. In this context, debates on introspection have emerged that have remained intense since the 18th century. However, contemporary debates and historical investigations on this topic have not done justice to the richness and diversity of positions, leading to oversimplifications and hasty generalizations, as if the terms “introspection” and “introspectionism” referred to one and same thing. The central goal of this article is to offer an analysis of William James’s position on the introspective method within the intellectual context of his time, covering the period from his early writings until the publication, in 1890, of The Principles of Psychology. Our results indicate that James used two different types of introspection. We conclude by discussing divergences in the secondary literature and the implications of our study for historical and theoretical debates in psychology.


A notable feature of classical American pragmatism is its close association with the birth of experimental psychology. In particular, William James’ work as a psychologist influenced, and was influenced by, his pragmatism. This paper seeks to support this reading of the relation between Jamesian psychology and pragmatism, particularly through his “Sentiment of Rationality” and the later contention that the true is the satisfactory. In addition, James’ insights are tested and expanded through reference to contemporary
research on processing fluency, as well as concepts of ecological rationality.


In this article I propose to explore psychoanalysis, philosophy, and other erotic practices as inevitably inclusive of experiments in self-interruption. Indeed, these practices are often such experiments more than anything else. I draw here not only upon Adam Phillips but also on Stanley Cavell, Joan Acocella, and James Snead. The function of experiments in self-interruption is, for at least some practitioners, to turn the qualities of experience upon themselves for the sake of intensifying, deepening, extending, and in other respects enhancing these qualities. In the process of doing so, pleasure can be made so intense as to be practically indistinguishable from pain, and pain or, more precisely, its overcoming, so integral to the execution of an activity as to be an integral part of an intrinsically pleasurable pursuit. Good and evil as well as pleasure and pain have their experiential meaning only in reference to the somatic (hence, erotic) practices of social actors, human or otherwise. “The old phrase ‘stop and think’ is,” Dewey insists, “sound psychology.” It is also critical for pedagogy, philosophy, politics, friendship, and much else. The art of stopping ourselves is, however, a more subtle and difficult one than we might appreciate.


Strenuous effort on behalf of moral ideals was a life-long concern for William James. Growing out of his own well-documented personal struggles as a young man, it was also
a cultural phenomenon in late 19th century America. For many, the cause of the problem of depleted moral energy was environmental. Herbert Spencer’s definition of mind as the correspondence of inner relations to outer relations lent intellectual support to this reduction of moral lethargy to environmental factors and writers such as George Beard and Theodore Roosevelt seemed to be in agreement. While many employed America as an environment in this cultural discussion, William James resisted this environmental reductionism and instead employed “America” as a metaphorical trope around which he organized his thoughts on moral energy. This was no mere literary device on James’s part, but instead a reflection of his own disagreements with Spencer that led James to articulate his own groundbreaking model of consciousness as reflex action. As the framework for addressing the issue of moral strenuousness.


What importance could the radical empiricism of William James have for the ordeal of Meyer Levin? Following the suppression of his staging of The Diary of Anne Frank, Levin decried the excision, in the authorized Broadway production, of key references to Anne’s budding Judaism and to the Jewish particularism of Holocaust atrocities. Because the Communist-influenced Broadway script emphasizes the wrongs implied by universal, rather than specific, expressions of tyranny, James’s philosophy anticipates, and perhaps even helps frame, Levin’s still-pertinent charge that generalization abets both Holocaust denial and efforts to disavow Jewish identity, particularism, and nationalism.

In this paper, I describe some current developments in death and dying literature—certainty vs. context; death as process vs. death as event; acceptance vs. denial; and the present moment vs. the long run. I then show how the work of James and Dewey can be beneficially applied to these topics. In this way, I hope to be true to the spirit of James and Dewey, following in their “wake,” while extending their insights to a new topic, namely death.


In this paper I reconsider James and Wittgenstein, not in the quest for what Wittgenstein might have learned from James, or for an answer to the question whether Wittgenstein was a pragmatist, but in an effort to see what these and other related but quite different thinkers can help us to see about animals, including ourselves. I follow Cora Diamond’s lead in discussing a late paper by Vicki Hearne entitled “A Taxonomy of Knowing: Animals Captive, Free-Ranging, and at Liberty”, which draws on Wittgenstein and offers some insights that accord with pragmatist accounts of knowledge.


As Thomas Uebel has recently argued, some early logical positivists saw American pragmatism as a kindred form of scientific philosophy. They associated pragmatism with William James, whom they rightly saw as allied with Ernst Mach. But what apparently blocked sympathetic positivists from pursuing commonalities with American pragmatism was the concern that James advocated some form of
psychologism, a view they thought could not do justice to the a priori. This paper argues that positivists were wrong to read James as offering a psychologistic account of the a priori. They had encountered James by reading Pragmatism as translated by the unabashedly psychologistic Wilhelm Jerusalem. But in more technical works, James had actually developed a form of conventionalism that anticipated the so-called “relativized” a priori positivists themselves would independently develop. While positivists arrived at conventionalism largely through reflection on the exact sciences, though, James’s account of the a priori grew from his reflections on the biological evolution of cognition, particularly in the context of his Darwin-inspired critique of Herbert Spencer.


One of the most significant features of Wittgenstein's Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology (written after he had completed most of the Philosophical Investigations) is his reflections on emotions. Wittgenstein's treatment of this topic was developed in direct response to his reading of William James’s chapter on emotions in his 1890 masterpiece, The Principles of Psychology. This paper examines the competing views of emotions that emerge in these works, both of which attempt to overcome the Cartesian dualist conception in different ways. The main point of disagreement concerns the relation between emotions and their bodily expression (e.g. the relation between grief and weeping). My interpretation focuses on Wittgenstein's remarks on the emotion of love because, I argue, it is a particularly problematic case. To elucidate his largely unexplored view of love, I draw on his remarks on understanding and criteria in the Philosophical Investigations. I argue that by examining the examples of
complex emotions like love, we can arrive at a more accurate characterization of Wittgenstein's general view of mental concepts and mental phenomena.


Critics in both philosophy and literary studies have rightly emphasized a “poetics of transition” relating the thought of Ralph Waldo Emerson to that of William James. However, less attention has been given to the ways that Emerson’s philosophy of rhetoric correlates with James’s rhetorical perspectives on psychology and philosophy. Fundamentally rhetorical interests in the contiguous circumstances and contingent reception of thinking link James to Emerson beyond matters of poetics and style. This article correlates Emerson’s understanding of a rhetoric of metonymy as the basis of thinking with the principle of contiguity crucial to James’s philosophy of mind. This relation between rhetoric and philosophy reiterates a rhetoric of mind that both Emerson and James associate with the older liberal education of the college just at the point that this curriculum is displaced by the professional, specialized disciplines of the emerging university in late nineteenth-century America.


Famously, William James held that there are two commandments that govern our epistemic life: Believe truth! Shun error! In this paper, I give a formal account of James' claim using the tools of epistemic utility theory. I begin by giving the account for categorical doxastic states that is, credences. The latter part of the paper thus answers a question left open in Pettigrew (2014).

A number of philosophers have called into question the wishful thinking reading of “The Will to Believe.” According to them, William James is not encouraging us to will what we want to believe; rather, he is making the case that under certain epistemic conditions we have a right to believe. I contend that this right to believe thesis, while an important part of James’s essay, fails to capture his full view. First, I inquire into what James means by ‘our passional nature.’ I distinguish three roles the passional nature plays with respect to belief. I then illustrate how each role of the passional nature informs three related arguments within the “The Will to Believe.” Ultimately, I argue that James is not simply advocating the permissibility of religious belief. His primary thesis is that individuals who have a right to believe ought to believe.