In recognition of the fact that James scholars are publishing articles in other academic journals, the editors feel that it is important to keep our readers informed of the diversity within Jamesian scholarship by drawing attention to relevant publications outside of WJS. The Periodicals section of the journal aims to provide our readers with information about related scholarly articles that address the life, work, and influence of James’s thought. If you have recently published a peer-reviewed article on James or have noticed an omission from this list, please contact our Periodicals Editor, Kyle Bromhall, at periodicals@williamjamesstudies.org and we will include it at the next opportunity.

Introspective as well as empirical evidence indicates that emotions shape our thinking in numerous ways. Yet, this modificatory aspect of emotions has received relatively little interest in the philosophy of emotion. I give a detailed account of this aspect. Drawing both on the work of William James and adverbialist conceptions of perception, I sketch a theory of emotions that takes these aspects into consideration and suggest that we should understand emotions as manners of thinking.


Contrary to what some critics of epistemic democracy claim, the association between democracy and truth does not necessarily make the former inhospitable to conflict, contestation, and pluralism. With the help of John Stuart Mill and William James, truth can be interpreted so as to make it compatible with a democratic politics that appreciates conflict and dissent. In some circumstances, truth claims are politically relevant and should become the object of democratic deliberation.


In this article, I aim to resuscitate discussions about the value of pragmatism for public administration by identifying some pragmatist tools that can transform the structures and processes of the administrative state. First, public administrators, having adopted a pragmatist fallibilism, will be able to make decisions and act in the absence of certainty. Second, the pragmatist emphasis on participatory inquiry makes possible a more democratic administrative state. Third, pragmatism helps define a new role for experts and
expertise that can be used to realize the goals of democratic administration.


This paper identifies extensive connections between Adam Smith’s and William James’s accounts of the psychological basis of intellectual, material and moral progress. These connections are brought into focus through discussion of their shared circumspection towards claims to objective truth, which highlights Smith’s distance from mainstream interpretations of his contributions to economics. The paper additionally argues that insight into the sustained emphases that Smith and James place upon the role of psychological satisfaction as a motivating factor in societal and personal progress can aid current efforts to draw upon their work and to reconcile the disciplines that they are widely credited with founding.


That we shape our beliefs to align with our actions should be of interest within philosophy of religion and philosophy generally. Cognitive dissonance, a psychological state in which an individual’s beliefs and actions do not conform with each other, presents just such a situation. The idea that cognitive dissonance, by strict evidentialist standards, compromises our epistemic integrity since cognitive dissonance causes us to hold beliefs for which we do not have evidence, recalls the exchange between William Clifford and William James in which they discuss evidentialism, the idea that we should hold no beliefs for which we do not have evidence. In this paper I draw upon extant published research concerning cognitive dissonance
theory and religion. I also survey the Clifford–James debate, applying considerations from their exchange to cognitive dissonance and (religious) belief. I conclude by showing how cognitive dissonance can have ambiguous results as concerns the justification of beliefs and that philosophy could benefit from attending to factors impacting empirical aspects of belief formation such as cognitive dissonance.


There is a lack of clarity in the sports coaching literature about philosophical pragmatism, but the work of Classical Pragmatists such as C.S. Peirce, William James and John Dewey is worthy of attention by both practitioners and researchers. This stimulus article is divided into four sections: Pragmatic Temperament, which includes a discussion of how English Premier League soccer manager Arsène Wenger might be regarded as pragmatic; Communities of Inquiry, which makes reference to a philosophy group at English Premiership rugby union club Saracens; Mixed Methods Research, which examines the use of abduction, deduction and induction in research; and Reflection, which shows how Schön’s reflective practice is a reworking of Dewey’s theory of inquiry.


Much attention is focussed on recent debates in contemporary political philosophy concerning the relative merits of ideal theory and non-ideal theory. In one of their many forms, these debates take shape as a realist challenge to idealistic or utopian approaches to normative political theory. This article shows that the philosophical tradition of
pragmatism both instructively anticipates and also, more importantly, can today contribute to contemporary realism. It is shown how a political pragmatism, particularly one centred in William James’s work, helps frame two key contributions that would be resources for the realist challenge to ideal theory. First is an orientation towards unruly pluralism as a feasibility condition that should constrain political theorising. Second is a procedural norm of inclusive tolerance that can help enact the motion of a liberal political vision under the constraints of unruly pluralism.


The article attempts to broaden our understanding of faith and belief (Hebrew: emuna) in non-religious spheres in Israel, defining Israeli Jewish secular-believers as self-identified secular (Hebrew: hiloni) people who believe in “whatever may be considered as the divine.” It analyzes the emuna discourse of secular-believer women, as manifested in their religious/spiritual feelings, experiences, and interpretations. Employing the theoretical lens provided by William James and his contemporary successors, the analysis reveals the deep-seated role of the Western, Protestant-oriented understanding of religiosity/spirituality as an individual and therapeutic path in the emuna discourse of secular-believer women. Furthermore, it underscores the centrality of gender and Jewish symbolism in this discourse, thereby resisting the universalistic impulse characteristic of James and his followers and suggesting that social particularities originating in religion and gender (and perhaps also ethnicity, class, and the like) should be taken into account in analysis of non-religious discourses concerning emuna.

In his essay “What Makes a Life Significant,” James argues that significant lives are based on a marriage of two components: consciously chosen ideals and bold energetic activity. James’s metaphor of “marriage” richly indicates the relationship between ideals and courageous activity. As is the case in so many of his writings, James’s metaphors perform philosophical functions by situating abstract concepts like a “significant life” in experiential contexts that reveal core aspects of their meanings. I offer a fresh interpretation of the two elements of significant living, and then explain how they are integrally connected, or, “married.” James’s account is worth another look, in part, because of the unique way it probes the issue of a meaningful life without presuming a single conception of the good life. He helps us to see how to address important issues of character in a pluralist age.


This paper is an attempt to improve the practical argument for beliefs in God. Some theists, most famously Kant and William James, called our attention to a particular set of beliefs, the Jamesian-type beliefs, which are justified by virtue of their practical significance, and these theists tried to justify theistic beliefs on the exact same ground. I argue, contra the Jamesian tradition, that theistic beliefs are different from the Jamesian-type beliefs and thus cannot be justified on the same ground. I also argue that the practical argument, as it stands, faces a problem of self-defeat. I then construct a new practical argument that avoids both problems. According to this new argument, theistic beliefs
are rational to accept because such beliefs best supply us with motivation strong enough to carry out demanding moral tasks.

First published in the early years of the twentieth century, William James’s observation remains a relevant site for intellectual engagement and scholarly debate. Native American colonization and Christian missionary activity inform directly this context; in addition, Roman Catholic efforts to convert African Americans in the northeast region of the United States are also relevant considerations.

In this paper, I analyze the disruptive impact of Darwinian selectionism for the century-long tradition in which the environment had a direct causative role in shaping an organism’s traits. In the case of humans, the surrounding environment often determined not only the physical, but also the mental and moral features of individuals and whole populations. With its apparatus of indirect effects, random variations, and a much less harmonious view of nature and adaptation, Darwinian selectionism severed the deep imbrication of organism and milieu posited by these traditional environmentalist models. This move had radical implications well beyond strictly biological debates. In my essay, I discuss the problematization of the moral idiom of environmentalism by William James and August Weismann who adopted a selectionist view of the development of mental faculties. These debates show the complex moral discourse associated with the environmentalist-selectionist
dilemma. They also well illustrate how the moral reverberations of selectionism went well beyond the stereotyped associations with biological fatalism or passivity of the organism. Rereading them today may be helpful as a genealogical guide to the complex ethical quandaries unfolding in the current postgenomic scenario in which a revival of new environmentalist themes is taking place.


Though William James was not an ecologist, his intellectual contributions are rich in implications for an informed philosophy of ecology. James repeatedly called attention to the importance of relations, diversity, intimacy, and the idea that everything that is genuinely real exists in an environment of other things. One of the more challenging contemporary tasks is the development of an overarching philosophical orientation that encourages ecological attitudes and studies. James’s psychology and philosophy are uniquely situated to help with this task. The present work investigates ecological implications of James’s pragmatism, pluralism, meliorism, and his views on the self and the world.