WILLIAM JAMES’S PSYCHOLOGICAL PRELUDE TO POLITICS: WHAT PLACE FOR MORAL EQUIVALENTS IN AMERICAN POLARIZATION ON THE POTOMAC AND THE JORDAN?

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This article presents William James’s “Moral Equivalent of War” in light of the evolution of his own thinking about war, his psychology, and its application to US debates about the Israel-Palestine standoff. This conflict now takes on the coloration of American polarization between military and religious conservativism, and liberal advocacy for international diplomacy and human rights. James’s psychology contributes to possibilities for reducing antagonisms by highlighting the selective attention of opposing players who literally focus on different facts and interpretations in conflict situations. Political action needs a prelude to prepare contesting cultures for any degree of possible effectiveness. James’s ideas suggest the importance of steps toward honest acknowledgement of the respective and substantial reasons for antagonisms and toward cultivation of civic interactions. This psychological prelude to politics does not offer a peace plan, but suggests what he called the “legitimacy … of some” steps toward less violence.
There are many valid criticisms of “The Moral Equivalent of War.” The essay reinforces gender stereotypes with its talk of manly toughness. Marilyn Fischer argues that James was not particularly “worried about how to end war,” but concerned because its loss would lead modern society to devolve into “effeminacy and unmanliness.” President Jimmy Carter used James’s phrase to encourage energy conservation in 1977, and critics pounced on the idea that expecting a moral equivalent to such realistic problems would only bring a weak MEOW (in literal and ridiculing use of the essay’s initials), compared to the real and rigid truths of de facto economic and military power relations. John Kaag even finds James agreeing with the “reflective apologists for war.”

I turn to James’s essay from the perspective of the author’s intentions, as an evaluation of human “pugnacity,” the impulse for fighting, which he presents before his proposals for less-destructive “substitutes” for war. Now my question becomes, can this psychology of war be useful in efforts to prevent or reduce conflicts that so consistently turn to violence?

Following James’s interest in the Stoic medical assessment of theorizing to address the persistent plagues of human affairs, my presentation is in three parts: first, on James’s psychological diagnosis of the roots of warfare, second on his prescription with substitutes to prevent or reduce those warrior impulses, and third, on the support his thoughts could provide as steps toward healing persistent human antagonisms, with the Israel-Palestine standoff as a case study. As with his pragmatism in general, James’s ideas on war do not suggest a miracle cure, but they may serve as a psychological tonic for politics with more peaceful relations.

DIAGNOSIS: TOWARD A PSYCHOLOGY OF WAR
While the “Moral Equivalent of War” drew upon James’s earlier psychology, if he had written it earlier, he would have shown little interest in finding substitutes for organized violence. During the Civil War, he cautiously supported the high purpose of
emancipation but was repulsed by the whipping up of warrior ferocity for “spread-eagleism” during the Civil War.\(^6\)

When the Spanish-American War began in April of 1898, James was cautiously optimistic about this war’s democratic promise, with potential even to encourage reform. He openly dismissed pacifism, and he even said that the point of the violent action was “humanity,” in apparent support of popular descriptions of the American mission to free colonies from Spanish control. But he continued to display the classic American fears that this “model Republic,” as he had declared during the Civil War, would follow the corruption of aggrandizing European states. He warned that “it may end by conquests” even as he maintained optimistically “it was certainly begun by no desire for them.”\(^7\)

Within weeks, as his skepticism about US war aims grew, he “confess[ed] I can feel no enthusiasm for the cause.” As fighting passions flared, his bountiful hopes eroded still further. Instead, psychologist James noticed mere political “blindness and instinctiveness.”\(^8\) Without renouncing war in principle, he was already renouncing this war.

As the war expanded from the Caribbean to the Pacific, James’s disgust hardened, even as his position still drew upon his initial hopes—now dashed. He punctured the veneer of democracy and benevolence (including his own recent hopes for “humanity”) by defining “philanthropic empire, educative for freedom” as “just empire” pure and simple.\(^9\) He did not extend this critique to explicit acknowledgment of the empire-like conquest of Native Americans and domination of African Americans, but he returned to his republican hope to keep the US out of ancient cycles of conquest and destruction. He reluctantly acknowledged war’s role as “the great force that has hammered the [E]uropean states,” but he had not yet thought of any alternative.\(^10\) As warfare led to occupation of overseas territory, James’s views of war soured still further.
PRESCRIPTION: DEMOCRATIC SUBSTITUTES FOR WAR

James is well known for not producing political philosophy, but he was “profoundly attuned,” as Alexander Livingston shows, “to the psychological … dimensions of politics.” That is the prime task he set out to perform in the “Moral Equivalent” essay. He gazed with increasing horror at the politics of war, with victory prompting easy acceptance of territorial rule. “Missionaries of civilization,” such as Theodore Roosevelt “sow our ideals [and] plant our order” as justified by “the white man’s burden,” James pointed out, but in the US-controlled Philippines, this march of “modern civilization” only “amounts to … [a] big, hollow, resounding, corrupting, confounding, confusing torrent of more brutal momentum and irrationality.” To his own counter-torrent of denunciation, James added the argument he developed the same year in “On a Certain Blindness in Human Beings”: warfare amplifies human blindness, so that in the Philippines, “individual lives are nothing.” He then imagined a very non-political substitute, contrasting the work of “civilization” pushed by expansionist US power with the impact that one decent person could implement. He imagined “a saintly sort, … a missionary, … ethical reformer, or philanthropist.” That person connecting with the Philippine people “would do more real good in these islands than our whole army and navy can possibly effect with our whole civilization at their back.” If the energies directed toward destruction could be redirected in constructive ways, they would “build up realities” with more significant lasting impact; no matter that this impact initially comes “in however small a degree.”

While Americans justified war for spreading civilization, James was considering ways to displace the energies for war.

James’s experiences from 1898, as he witnessed raw examples of political pugnacity, prodded his shift from cautious supporter of war to identification as “pacifist” in the “Moral Equivalent.” He reported on the appeal of “militaristic sentiment[s]” while clearly disagreeing with these enthusiasts of the “war-party.” He even acknowledged some “virtues” in their position; war brings “fidelity, cohesiveness, tenacity, heroism, … and vigor” mixed in
with its vices. The “peace-party” should recognize the value of these war-propelled virtues, since they “count in peaceful as well as in military” settings. So by “enter[ing] more deeply into the … point of view of their opponents,” he and his fellow pacifists could “cheat our foe,” that is, undercut the effectiveness of war’s appeal. That posture, he recognized in 1904, could offer some “preventive medicine,” even as the grip of fighting impulses would prohibit more “radical cure” in ending warfare.

James’s incongruous hope to “conciliate the side I don’t belong to,” shows an enlistment of his psychology of attention. This mental function serves as a gatekeeper at the cutting edge of conscious awareness for processing “the mass of incoming currents.” The mind makes selective choices about parts of experience for particular purposes as shaped by immediate needs or interests, while “we actually ignore most of the things before us.” His point is that there is always more in experience than the human mind can comprehend or even perceive. In “The Sentiment of Rationality,” James applied this way of thinking to the development of intellectual positions, which for all their elaborate intricacy, generally begin with selective attention to particular facts and interpretations. This explains how “pacifism makes no converts from the military party,” even when summoning sound and bold arguments about “war’s expensiveness and horror.” Warriors simply argue that “war is worth these things” while selecting fighting virtues for attention.

Without “substitutes” for what war provides, the “anti-militarists … as a rule do fail.” This tragedy, James laments, has been amplified in modern times when “whole nations are the armies and the science of destruction” has made “war… absurd and impossible from its own monstrosity.”

James was not cowed by the “war-function” even though it has been so strong and persistent in human affairs. “War-making” is “subject to prudential checks … just like any other form of enterprise,” he insisted, and war is not the only way to manifest “martial virtues.” Instincts for sociability that draw upon “other aspects of one’s country” could excite passions and virtues
conventionally associated with warfare. In place of destructive “morals of military honour, … morals of civic honour” could be built up toward “constructive interests.” Life is hard enough without the addition of war; and that “toil and … pain” should be distributed across social classes, rather than leaving the privileged few immune to such hardships. James challenges his fellow critics of war: focus on tasks that spur “civic passions[s]” or watch your pacifist words evaporate without impact while “war must have its way.”

James suggests “a conscription of the whole youthful population” for national service, in particular, recruitment of muscular labor in the “immemorial human warfare against nature.” Writing before the time when human development would clearly place so much of the environment in critical danger, he could still think of “an army against nature” as an opportunity to live in closer touch with nature, encouraging people to renew human “relations to the globe.” By tapping the “strong life, … life in extremis,” these moral equivalents would draw upon martial virtues without destruction, producing “toughness without callousness.”

James’s suggestions lack political realism about the prohibitive challenges in implementing his “utopia.” However, he displays psychological realism about both the depths of human pugnacity and its constantly amplifying capacities for destruction, grown beyond the violence that originally sculpted human aggressiveness in evolutionary development. James challenges political realism’s routine acceptance of organized violence by proposing and encouraging ways to reduce the violence, even while he did not expect war to become completely “forever impossible.”

Instead of trying to eliminate war, James encourages small steps toward reduction of warfare wherever possible. His often-quoted 1899 critique of “bigness & greatness in all their forms” also includes another form of bigness, large scales of time. He knew that his own moral equivalents were just “so many soft rootlets,” mere “molecular moral forces” subject to impatience or ridicule. They only gain power “if you give them time.”

In “The
Social Value of the College Bred,” he amplified his confidence that “the steady tug of truth and justice, give them but time, must warp the world in their direction.”38 As with the probabilistic force of Darwinian species development from countless particular adaptations, small social steps over a long time, he maintained, add up to moral bigness.

James’s awareness of the relation of small steps and big hopes is a political application of his pluralist philosophy, where he argues for “the legitimacy of … some.”39 Just as he dismisses absolutism because “the substance of reality may never get totally collected,” so he does not hold out for the ideal of settling every conflict.40 Still, he urges “seiz[ing] every pretext, however small” for encouraging peace.41 His utopia is more pragmatic than perfect, with practical prods toward idealistic moral goals. James’s “Moral Equivalent of War” provides a framework for improving the chances for peace.

HEALING: PROSPECTS FOR LESS WAR
“The Moral Equivalent of War” contains political applications of James’s psychology and philosophy. His evaluation of politics suggests how humans can relate with each other in more moral and humane ways than he was witnessing in his experience of politics. The ideas of the essay suggest a framework, supported by his other works, which is an enriching adjunct to politics for preventing and reducing conflict and turns to violence. The standoff between Israelis and the Palestinians manifests an unmistakable gulf of disagreement and hostility akin to James’s identification of pugnacity steadily triumphing over peace, even as this conflict encourages persistent hopes for better outcomes that reflects his utopian vision for less warfare. It is a fitting if difficult test case for James’s diagnosis and prescription about the psychology of warfare.

James’s observation, “as things stand, I see how desperately hard it is to bring the peace-party and the war-party together,” could readily apply to the Israelis and Palestinians.42 Contrasting narratives about the very same history, in the very same place, and
during the very same years, fuel the sharpness of their disagreements.

The dominant Israeli narrative emphasizes the state of Israel as a remedy for the history of anti-Semitism. The early Zionists in Palestine expected that their European connections would be welcomed by the indigenous Arab people. Moshe Dayan, famous for his military leadership during the 1967 Six-Day War, as a boy in the land “called Palestine” in the 1920s, felt “no doubt that it was possible to live at peace with them,” and one of his childhood Palestinian friends even played the flute at his wedding. The hopeful prospects of Zionist-Arab encounters were marred by anti-Semitism, including the 1930s collaboration of Palestinian leader Amin Al-Husseini with Nazi Germany. Al-Husseini linked his hope for Palestinian independence to the murderous “solution for the Jewish problem.” Israeli leaders have doubted the plausibility of Palestinian cultural identity and emphasized the strategic vulnerabilities of their small nation, even as Palestinians can become Israeli citizens. Israelis also emphasize the poor governance by Palestinians in their own lands, and radical Islamic terrorism as reasons to be skeptical of Palestinian claims, and of the movement for Boycott/Divestment/Sanctions (BDS) of Israel, which they regard as a product of misguided left-wing activists duped into support of anti-Western militants.

While Israelis stake claims to the Palestinian territory from Biblical history, Palestinian people have resided in this place for centuries. Their collective identity, like that of many non-Western nations, was partly imposed and partly in gradual development after colonial subordination, first to the Ottomans and then to the British. Immigrant Jews seemed like another set of Europeans, with wealth and connections to colonial powers. The Zionist slogan made Palestinians feel downright invisible, “A land without a people, for a people without a land.” Repeated humiliations fueled anger and terrorist attacks, often in response to militant attacks by Zionist terrorists, including the Stern Group, Lehi, and Haganah, some of which simply became the Israeli Defense Force. Haganah founder Vladimir Jabotinsky defined its purpose, “to
colonize a country against the wishes of its inhabitants, in other words, by force.”47 They also observe that Zionists, in their eagerness to encourage Jewish migration to Palestine, negotiated with Nazi Germany; and Palestinians point out that their casualties have been higher than Israeli losses. Palestinians present themselves as the victims of a far greater military power with vastly more wealth. Harry Truman himself, who as president helped to shepherd Israel toward independence and stability, feared for the prior occupants of their territory if the “underdogs” would now become the “top dogs.”48 Palestinians greet BDS and international criticism of Israeli settlements and military attacks as long-overdue recognition of their rights in the face of adamant US support of Israeli assertions of power over them and remind Americans that from 1980 to 2005, the FBI reported terrorist attacks in the US by comparable numbers of both Jewish and Islamic extremists.49

While opposition to anti-Semitism has been a hallmark of modern liberalism, the contemporary support for Israel has taken a conservative turn, with heavy emphasis on security fears, identification of Israel with Western civilization and global markets, and alignment of Israel supporters with conservative critics of post-colonial arguments. Reflecting the polarized character of American politics, Israelis gain support based on conservative security and anti-terrorist concerns while Palestinians make references to liberal critiques of imperialism.50

In a macabre application of James’s psychological observation about the abundance of experience which no one mind can fully grasp, the Israeli-Palestinian standoff provides ample complexities for each side to select particular gruesome cases which amplify grievances that encourage retribution on each side.51 However, James’s explicit attention to the psychological depth of each side’s belligerence, along with searching for alternatives, could offer steps out of the constant cycles of fear, anger, and violence.

James’s theories resemble Gerald Graff’s call concerning American cultural conflicts to listen to and teach each opposing side. They both observe that there will always be conflicting
voices. In his impatience with both warriors and peace advocates, James like Graff advocates “respecting the … minds one presumably hopes to change.” When encountering views in disagreement, they suggest learning how those views gain their appeal.  

The ideas of James and Graff, with assessment of whole contexts, do not lend themselves to immediate military or policy effectiveness, but they can be used as psychological preludes to politics. They can divert those slides from fear and hostility to overt violence with guidance toward practices that provide small steps toward less destruction. While the history of Israel and Palestine of the last century has provided a perfect storm with each side’s views and actions reinforcing the worst fears of the other side, there have indeed been steps in more peaceful directions. For example, historian Mark Cohen highlights “memories of Jewish-Arab coexistence in past times,” with hopes that awareness of this history will serve as “a distant mirror of what might yet be.” This message from his deep learning receives popular reinforcement in current efforts to encourage each side to listen—and first even to notice—the other side’s historical narratives. The educational group Tiyul-Rihla brings Israelis and Palestinians on tours of places central to their respective histories, with the experiences spurring “long-term, subtle changes.”

Striving for a less-violent world requires thinking beyond the effective vs. the ineffective. By that standard of evaluation, the peacemakers will almost always come up short because they are frankly ineffective by the standards of political realism: the conflicts are in place; calls for peace are naïve about those facts; preparation for conflict is essential. The focus on immediate security then reinforces cycles of fear and fighting. James’s framework suggests different questions to ask: not about effectiveness as things stand, but about which scenario or action step gains attention. The narratives of political realism and the fighting that comes in their wake receive enormous attention. James’s outlook suggests that efforts for peace are of course small, but they can grow if they get more attention. Without at least some
attention to “molecular moral forces,” we induce a kind of sleepwalking toward constant warfare.55

With realistic assessment of threats and constant preparation for war, someone, acting with humanity’s creative “spontaneity,” as James points out, will combine selective attention with fiery passion that will trigger the implementation of those realistic plans into realistic action, in very real warfare.56 James offers a way to think past and beneath those politically realistic scenarios; he offers a realistic diagnosis of war’s psychological grip on our imaginations and prescriptions for less violence to gain attention. His suggestions are not perfect, and his framework has limits, but if he had lived to witness the Israel-Palestine standoff and other deeply polarized conflicts, he likely would have joined the chorus, because really all he is saying, about his psychological prelude to politics, is that it can give peace a chance.

James’s view of war is embedded in cultural views full of masculinist and misogynist assumptions with limited recognition of class and racial hierarchies. Another criticism, that his views include proposals full of political impracticality, is both true and limited in its critique of his actual goals. He was not even trying for an explicitly political policy proposal, but he offered a psychological prelude to politics. For potential challenges to the various versions of the “war-party” in the US, the Middle East, and wherever pugnacious humans live and persistently conflict, James counters those assumptions of political realism with psychological realism about the factors that normalize the turn to war. Middle East tensions and the U.S.’s intimate relations with its dilemmas make up just one set of so many knotty problems that beset the contemporary world. While experts in foreign policy, economics, the environment, social justice, and other specialties can provide valuable insights toward resolution of these enormous issues, the piece that James provides is a way of thinking that can foster a prelude to making use of those insights for political implementation. “The Moral Equivalent of War,” as Tryg Throntveit points out, serves as a political “tool” that the democratic “polity needs” to maintain its health because it suggests
the kinds of public applications of “epistemic virtues” that Francesca Bordogna sees in James, with potentials “to transgress cognitive and social divides.” James’s framework can inject entrenched old problems with new thinking starting with paying attention to each side’s substantial grievances. Politically realistic paths have not substantially reduced inclinations toward war. James’s pragmatism, with political ideals and psychological realism, may be among the worst options we have, except all others.

APPENDIX A: WILLIAM JAMES ON ACCEPTANCE VS. STRUGGLE LEADING TO “THE MORAL EQUIVALENT OF WAR”
This chart displays the presence of key ideas about the psychology of war and its prevention in James’s essay as they appeared, directly or indirectly, throughout his career. After earning his medical degree in 1869, he wrote in a private notebook about the twin tugs to “accept the universe” or to “protest against it,” as he himself considered the choice between a life of “resignation” or taking on “the effort to improve.” His point, in his youth and throughout his life, was that each outlook plays a significant role in human life, within particular personal temperaments, as bases for different ways of philosophical thinking, and at the root of different ideologies. He had a preference for the struggle approach to life, but he sometime turned to the acceptance mode for time of relief and recharge. As he reported in 1877, he preferred life “without any guarantee,” because then he felt, “provided I am überhaupt [at all] in vigorous condition,” a “willingness to do and suffer anything.” In 1867, even when he was feeling so depressed that he actually considered suicide, he also said “I still cling to the hope of amelioration.” Before developing his theory of “meliorism,” he was striving to keep his struggling spirit going, even as the efforts exhausted him. This placement of James’s views on war within the whole span of his life and work also reveals that he did not confine war or peace to only one side of his thinking about acceptance vs. struggle:
Acceptance vs. Struggle

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<tr>
<th>Personal</th>
<th>Healthy</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sickly</td>
<td>Living with Energetic</td>
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<tr>
<td>Seeking Help</td>
<td>Strength</td>
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<tr>
<td>Recognizing Limits</td>
<td>Taking Risks</td>
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<td>Willingness</td>
<td>Will</td>
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<tr>
<th>Theoretical</th>
<th>Morality</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>Meliorism with</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holidays for the Spirit</td>
<td>Strenuous Life</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tender-Minded</td>
<td>Tough-Minded</td>
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<tr>
<td>Certainty with Convictions</td>
<td>Uncertainty with Inquiry</td>
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<th>Social</th>
<th>War</th>
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<tr>
<td>Peace</td>
<td>Hardihood</td>
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<tr>
<td>Safety and Prosperity</td>
<td>Negotiations for Arbitration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Righteous, Routine War</td>
<td>Fighting for Peace</td>
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</tbody>
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APPENDIX B: JAMES’S IDEAS APPLIED TO POLARIZATION IN ISRAEL AND THE PALESTINIAN TERRITORIES

The stories here provide a preliminary collection of ideas and activities about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that exhibit at least some features of the Jamesian framework about warfare, in diagnosis of its psychological appeal, with prescriptions for redirecting that appeal in less destructive directions, and with its healing potential for preventing or reducing violence.

Imam Shamsi Ali and Rabbi Marc Schneier moved past their initial suspicions of each other to start a practice they call “twinning,” with leaders of each faith community, Islamic and Jewish, visiting each other’s houses of worship, not only in North...
American and Europe, but also in the Middle East; and in *Sons of Abraham*, they pursue their hopes for reducing conflict by rooting dialogue in the resemblance of their distinct religions.63

Irshad Manji founded the Moral Courage Project, now at both New York University and the University of Southern California, designed to encourage speaking out for peace with justice even in the face of improbable odds and overwhelming power. As a Muslim ready to recognize the “trouble with Islam,” she critiques the manipulators of Palestinian rights, “both Israeli soldiers and Arab oligarchs,” and urges nonviolent resistance to both forces.64

Arab-Israeli cook Nof Atamna-Ismaeel has ambitions to open a Jewish-Arab cooking school to “create common ground between Arab and Jewish Israelis.” “I really think,” she explains, that cooking and eating “together, laughing, talking about what they like in food,” may be “the only way we can solve a little bit of this conflict.” Cultivating this commonality can encourage “trying to talk to each other.”65

The Mohammed Bin Naif Counseling and Care Center on the outskirts of Saudi Arabia’s capital, Riyadh, is a rehabilitation center for convicted terrorists. Counselor Awad Al-Yami explains that, in addition to psychological counseling, religious re-education, vocational training, and financial incentives, they employ art therapy; the captured violent activists use drawing as a substitute for their destructive impulses. Through their art, they express emotions, anger, and depression. The Center boast a success rate of 80% of former terrorists not returning to their violent ways.66

The Palestinian organization Hamas in the Gaza Strip continues to engage in attacks with no hope of military victory, which prompts overwhelming retaliation by the Israeli Defense Forces, followed by restrictions on Palestinian movement in their own territory, which of course has a withering effect on the local economy and encourages more hostility. Professor Said Zidani of Al-Quds University in Jerusalem urges a simultaneous Israeli removal of military siege and Palestinian focus on economic and social development on the model of the West Bank town of
Ramallah. Ahmed Helou endorses this change; he turned from his former membership in Hamas and now says, “no more blood.”

Jad Isaac monitors and assesses the environmental degradation caused by political changes in Palestine. As Director General of the Applied Research Institute-Jerusalem, he is dedicated to using the tools of sustainable development to promote the “self-reliance of the Palestinian people.” He addresses the political dilemmas indirectly by focusing on the land, with work to increase Palestinian “control over their natural resources.” He points out that “all our life is humiliation. Only the land will bring us back to self-respect.”

Zatoun is a fair-trade company dedicated to using the cultivation of olive tree to promote prosperity and peace in Palestinian territories. This company is one example of a business path for the promotion of peace as advocated by Arab-Israeli businessman Nieme Ayoub. He has laid out a platform with “economic drivers for peace.” In particular, he hopes for “more tangible mutual projects, such as joint industrial parks, and multicultural organizations that aim to accelerate economic growth.” Despite his large ambitions, he insists that such “big change starts small” not only because of the intricacies of development, but also because of his view that gradual steps allow momentum to build with avoidance of overreach. While poverty encourages desperation, he argues, “people who have jobs, homes, future prospects, … are less likely to resort to violence,” and “more interaction will lead to more understanding and more receptivity of the other side’s opinions, beliefs, and thoughts.” On the path to economic cooperation, however, the group known as Who Profits? warns about the profits that Israeli companies generate from occupation of territory where Arabs live.

As with James’s awareness of human temperamental and intellectual differences, these approaches offer a range of different practices. As with his approaches to conflict and war, they are not panaceas for immediate transformation, but offer outlooks and actions that can enable development of relationships and practices with substitutes for violence. As with James’s hopes for healing,
they do not present complete political solutions, but no peaceful solution can begin without them.

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———. “Garth Wilkinson James’s Return to Charleston Harbor.” William James papers, bMS Am 1092.2 (63).


———. “Reading Notes & Observations; Sketches.” Notebook 3, 1862–63. William James papers, bMS Am 1092.2 (4497).


NOTES
1 Fischer, “Moral Equivalent of War,” 104.
3 Kaag, “A Call to Arms?,” 110.
4 James, “Moral Equivalent of War,” 164 and 162.
5 See Martha Nussbaum’s description of Stoicism’s medical assessment of philosophy as intellectual therapy (Nussbaum, Therapy of Desire, 7, 33, 353, and 316); James took daily doses of “Old Mark’s” writings because he found Stoic Marcus Aurelius’s ideas served as effective remedies to his own personal and theoretical puzzlements (James to Ward, 8 June [18]66, in James, Correspondence, 4:140–41).
6 Henry James, Social Significance, 1–2. William James likewise criticized “theatrical” patriotism with a mocking sketch of a spread eagle over conquered territory and the words “Let the eagle scream!!!!”(William James to Alice James, 5 March [1865], in James, Correspondence, 4:97; and see James, “Garth Wilkinson James’s Return”).
7 James to Salter, 8 April 1898, in James, Correspondence, 8:355; and James, “Reading Notes,” 22.
In historiographical terms, James was shifting from the type of argument made by Boot in defense of the “colonial wars” fought by the US against Spain and in the Philippines that were “better than average,” to critiques of unjustified aggression in the American turn to empire in, for example, Hoganson’s *Fighting for American Manhood* (Boot, *The Savage Wars of Peace*, 127).

James to Salter, 18 November 1898, in James, *Correspondence*, 8:454.

Critiques of James and other pragmatists for overlooking the racial hierarchy all around them, even as they benefitted from those privileges, include Eddie S. Glaude and William David Hart. In addition, however, Glaude and Cornel West treat pragmatism as a resource for responding to the “risk-ridden future” in striving for social progress toward the nation’s “precious ideals” (Glaude, *In a Shade of Blue*, 34, 46; West, *Keeping Faith*, 113). John Thomas writes that in the late nineteenth century, “the specter of Rome in decline from republican splendor to imperial decadence appeared with disturbing clarity” (Thomas, *Alternative America*, 1; see also, 79 and 117). James’s internal debate in evolution over a few days anticipates the debate between John Dewey and Randolph Bourne almost two decades later. Dewey supported the US entrance into the “Great War” in 1917 also for its potential to promote progressive ideals; Bourne criticized him with a James-inspired skepticism. He enlisted James’s stance on war in doubting that such ideals could “control and mould” war to “liberal purposes.” In 1917, Bourne warned that martial passions engulf civic virtues once the shooting starts, and repeatedly take on a savage life of their own beyond the original moral motivations. He echoed James’s belief that, in the constant cycling of problems unanswered and passions flaring, with organized fighting in response, “every war leaves such miserable legacies, fatal seeds of future war” (James, “Robert Gould Shaw,” 73). So Bourne challenged Dewey by asking “If William James...
were alive would he be accepting the war-situation so easily and complacently?” (Bourne, “Twilight of the Idols,” 688–702; Bourne, *World of Randolph Bourne*, 195 and 191).

Livingston, *Damn Great Empires!* 7. Also see page 76 on James’s “psychological approach to politics” and the politics in his pragmatism.

James, “Philippine Tangle,” 157.

Ibid. In “The Philippine Question” James observed that it never “occurred to anyone at Washington that the Filipino could have any feelings or insides of their own whatever that might possibly need to be considered in our arrangements. It was merely a big material corporation against a small one, the ‘soul’ of the big one consisting in a stock of moral phrases, the little one owning no soul at all. . . . We have treated the Filipinos as if they were a painted picture, an amount of mere matter in our way. They are too remote from us ever to be realized as they exist in their inwardness. They are too far away” (James, “Phillipine Question,” 159–60). This criticism of treatment of the “other” is not explicitly about Filipino ethnicity, but that is implied by his recognition that they are a people “far away”; and while he is patronizing about the “little one[s],” he does recognize they have “insides of their own” (Ibid., 160).

James, “Moral Equivalent of War,” 165.

Ibid., 167.

Ibid., 165, 167.

Ibid., 168; James, “Remarks at the Peace Banquet,” 122.

James, “Remarks at the Peace Banquet,” 122. James’s opposition to war evolved: his strong ideological opposition to this war pulled him toward social commentary to develop ways to prevent war or reduce its cruelties, and even toward moral objections to war in general, but especially to the amplified destructive efficiencies of modern war. See Fischer’s helpful research showing the first entry in the *Oxford English Dictionary* for “pacifist” from 1906, for those who “sought to reduce the
occasions for war” (Fischer, “Moral Equivalent,” 98). It is very common to hear soldiers talk about the personal “virtues” of war that James describes, even as they feel guilt about these positive personal traits emerging with such destruction. The comments of Special Forces officer Robert Reault about his Vietnam War experiences are typical of this combination that James describes: this loyal soldier was not proud about the coldness of his military behavior, and in fact “it was distressing to realize that I was at my best doing something as terrible as war” (quoted in Burns and Novick, The Vietnam War, episode 2: “Riding the Tiger,” minute 37).

James, “Moral Equivalent of War,” 170.

James, Psychology, 192.

James, Principles, 273.

James, “The Sentiment of Rationality,” 34–38 and James, “Moral Equivalent of War,” 168.

James, “Moral Equivalent of War,” 168. Girard, in Violence and the Sacred and “On War and Apocalypse” shows kinship with James in recognition of deep impulses for violence: Girard identifies its source in persistent human envy and desire to gain what others have, while insisting that these belligerent impulses can be quelled by religious traditions that offer substitutes for violence in rituals of sacrifice.

James, “Moral Equivalent of War,” 169.

Ibid., 170. See the “Introduction” of Holden and Conley-Zilkic’s Indefensible for critiques of the sale of high-technology weaponry for the enormous expenses, multiplied by contracts generated for political purposes, and doubtful enhancement of security. In The Better Angels of Our Nature, Steven Pinker shows skepticism about the alarm that James and so many observers share about modern warfare. He makes a case for the actual decline of violence in modern times by focusing on the reduced frequency of wars (225), even as he admits that wars have become more destructive with enhanced technology and organization (226), and
with these forces, modern warfare has been destructive both on the battlefield and off (300). This, of course, is precisely James’s point about the “monstrosity” of the modern “science of destruction” (James, “Moral Equivalent of War,” 170). Pinker recognizes the tremendous “destructiveness of the world wars,” but calls those events “freakish” in the context of a marked decline in warfare among Western nations in modern times (Pinker, The Better Angels of Our Nature, 301). So the precise point of his proposition about humanity’s better angels in modern times is that the twentieth century was, on average, indeed the “bloodiest century in total numbers, but not relative” to the increased population of the time (193). Pinker’s broadest point is that modern democracies with free trade and rights revolutions have committed to social contracts with their citizens leading to less organized violence. While the West enjoys MAW, mutually assure (enormously destructive) warfare, the maw of industrial-scale killing, sent around the world with Western sales of military technology, continues these amplified destructive potentials in non-Western countries. Rather than a wholesale decline of warfare, modern times have witnessed its shifts: there are more inhibitions to war in some regions of the world and more implementation of individual conscience on a wide scale to inhibit violence, while also ever-more sophisticated technologies enable more massive killing in ways more distant and therefore less personal, making the violence less subject to the inhibitions on violence that Pinker praises. Richard Koenigsberg challenges the optimism of Pinker’s claim about reduced warfare. In Nations Have a Right to Kill, he argues that modern nationalisms with the civic religions of nation states have amplified the tug toward warfare through their insistence on sacrifice in combat as violent rituals of devotion to the nation.

26 James, “Moral Equivalent of War,” 170.
27 Ibid., 171.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
Fischer describes James’s discussion of both destructive and constructive instincts in *Principles* (Fischer, “Moral Equivalent,” 96). James’s emphasis on pugnacity rather than sociability anticipates Steven Pinker critique of the “Hydraulic Theory of Violence,” the view that “humans harbor an inner drive toward aggression, which builds up inside us and must be discharged. Like Fischer (and as with James in his psychology), Pinker believes that humans are “not innately good or evil,” so he argues that in addition to those aggressive impulses, humans also possess “better angels,” that is, motivations that “can orient them away from violence and toward cooperation and altruism” (Pinker, *Better Angels*, xxv). Walter Lippmann provides a tough-minded endorsement of James’s psychological realism in striving for peace first by recognizing the appeal of war. In fact, Lippmann used this framework to enlist a wide range of citizens in reform projects; as he put it, the “moral equivalent” way of thinking encourages “the establishment of positively good things instead of trying simply to check bad ones” (Lipmann, *Preface to Politics*, 42). By contrast, idealist reformers forget that “a ban does not stop the want” (35); such proposals “cover about as much of a human being as a beautiful hat does” (42). Along with James, he believed that “instead of tabooing our impulses, we must redirect them” because then the political and moral goal would “fit the whole man,” and the reform measure would “turn the power” of the “whole nature of man . . . to good account” (42), but simply “ignore what a man desires and you ignore the very source of his power” (175). Like James, Lippmann supported the argument for moral equivalents to maintain a democratic engagement with average citizens. Popular but misguided political movements, such as jingoistic enthusiasm for war, are the political equivalent of “indigestible food.” There is a disservice to the public in merely criticizing such political positions because that simply leaves the public no “less hungry” because they had been taking in “the wrong food” (76). The moral
equivalent argument takes the psychological impulses seriously while redirecting the destructive political choices.


32 Ibid., 171.

33 Ibid. 163, 172. On the Anthropocene, the name for recent history when “human being increasingly order the world,” with a case for its emergence in the 1940s, see McNeill and Engelke, The Great Acceleration, 100.

34 James, “Moral Equivalent of War,” 165.

35 Ibid., 168. Hans Morgenthau provided the classic modern expression of political realism, maintaining that, because the actions of people and nations are based on unchanging human appetites for self-interest, “all politics is a struggle for power” (Morgenthau, Politics Among Nation, 25). Also advocating political realism, Edward Carr actually shows agreement with James in criticism of idealist hope for peace because this outlook puts too much faith in reason and cooperation. “The role of force . . . is indeed more constant and more conspicuous than most sentimental democrats care to admit” (Carr, Twenty Years’ Crisis, 215). Also with James, Carr took this as a challenge for politics: “How to effect necessary and desirable changes . . . without war” (209). He held out hope for the end of the reign of the “independent nation-state,” and dedicated his book “To the Makers of the Coming Peace” (viii, ix).

36 James to Sarah Whitman, 7 June 1899, in James, Correspondence, 8:546.

37 Ibid.

38 James, “Social Value,” 110. When thinking about accumulation of small steps, James drew upon the long-term thinking in Peirce’s philosophy of science; see Croce, Eclipse of Certainty, 191–95. On the role of probabilities in Darwinian theory and James’s awareness of and use of this thinking, see Croce, “From History of Science,” 19–32; Eclipse of Certainty, 99–106, 198–201; Young William James Thinking, 73–75.
39 James, *Pluralistic Universe*, 41.
40 Ibid., 20.
41 James, “Remarks at the Peace Banquet,” 123.
42 James, “Moral Equivalent of War,” 165.
43 Dayan, *Story of My Life*, 31, 34, 58.
46 Muir, “A Land without a People,” traces the origins of the phrase to nineteenth-century British Christian Zionists who enthused about the biblical prophecy about Jewish return to the land of Israel.
47 Judis, *Genesis*, 90.
50 While Palestinians have gained some liberal support, there are still many Democratic supporters of Israel, even of its military policies. For example President Barack Obama authorized an increase in military aid to Israel (see Baker and Davis, “U.S. Finalizes Deal”). By contrast, US contributes 1/5000th to Palestinians (see Lieber, “State Department”), and the Donald
Trump administration has cut off aid to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency which provides aid to Palestinian refugees (see Harris and Gladstone, “U.S. Withholds”). The following works offer a sampling from two large literatures, each with advocacy for US support of contrasting narratives, respectively, about Israeli vulnerabilities and Arab intransigence and violence, and about Palestinian victimhood in the face of Israeli strength. In support of the Israeli narrative, see Lieber, *Retreat and its Consequences*, especially 46–70; Troy, “Anti-Zionist War on Academia”; Dershowitz, *Terror Tunnels*, especially ch. 17–19; and in support of the Palestinian narrative, see Mearsheimer and Walt, “The Israel Lobby”; Blumenthal, *Goliath*, especially 101–44; Chernus, “The Middle East.”

52 Graff, *Beyond the Culture Wars*, 36; for a contemporary application, see Croce, “Historians.”
53 Preville, “Interview with Mark Cohen.” Also see Cohen, *Under Crescent and Cross*, especially 3–15 and Cohen, “Islamic Policy toward Jews.” For another example in the same spirit, see the fall 2017 Fordham University lecture series, “A Different Take,” taught by David Myers, head of the Center for Jewish History in New York and Hussein Ibish, senior resident scholar at the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington; and Seliger, “Myers and Ibish Co-Teach.”
54 Tiyul-Rihla educational initiative, whose name is based on the Arabic and Hebrew word for “trip” (https://www.tiyul-rihla.org/); Miller, “Israelis and Palestinians.” For more examples, see Appendix B. Thinking about how to encourage a psychological prelude to politics has kinship with management work on wickedly difficult problems and with the practice of multi-track diplomacy. On the identification of wicked problems and strategies for coping with them, see “Wicked Problems;” Camillus, “Strategy as a Wicked Problem;” and Brugnach and Ingram, “Ways of Knowing and Relational Knowledge.” On Track Two Diplomacy, see

55 James to Sarah Whitman, 7 June 1899, in James, *Correspondence*, 8:546.

56 James describes the evolutionary advantages of the human mind for its ability creatively to break from routine thoughts, with each person making choices, for good or ill, in his “Remarks on Spencer’s Definition,” 12.

57 Throntveit, *William James*, 132; Bordogna, *William James*, 10. Frega suggests related ideas and defends “our epistemic powers,” arguing that they are “adequate in fixing our moral and political beliefs;” in particular, pragmatism provides mental resources for addressing “problematic situations” such as “moral disagreement” and “public controversies,” by turning them into “objects of rational inquiry” (Frega, *Practice, Judgment, and the Challenge*, 8, 10).

58 Winston Churchill said “that democracy is the worst form of Government except for all those other forms that have been tried from time to time,” when speaking in the House of Commons on November 11, 1947; see Langworth, “Democracy is the Worst.”


60 William to Alice Gibbens James, 7 June 1877, in James, *Correspondence*, 4:571.

61 William to Henry James, Sr., 5 September 1867, in James, *Correspondence*, 4:194.

62 James, *Pragmatism*, 137.

63 O’Neil, “Unlikely Friendship.”

65 Fehling, “Arab Israeli Celebrity Chef.”
66 Amos, “Treating Jihadists.”
67 “Making Peace.”
69 See “Zatoun is Palestine in a Bottle.”; Ayoub, Economic Growth, 1, 7, 4, and 15; and “Who Profits?.”