This paper explores the relation between the thought of the contemporary American philosopher, John J. McDermott, and that of his doctoral advisor, Robert C. Pollock of Fordham University. What becomes apparent in this comparison is that, while the two thinkers both express a high regard for the writing of such philosophers as Ralph Waldo Emerson, William James, and John Dewey, Pollock expresses a further commitment to aspects of the Christian/Catholic tradition that McDermott does not share.
ROBERT CHANNON POLLOCK

1901  Born in Glasgow, Scotland (30 March)
     Immigrated to Chicago
1921–25  Harvard University bachelor’s degree (philosophy and experimental psychology)
         Converted from Judaism to Catholicism
1925–27  Harvard University master’s degree (Experimental Psychology)
1927–30  Taught at Bowdoin College
1930–32  Doctoral study at the Institute of Mediaeval Studies,
         University of Toronto
1932     PhD: “The Doctrine of Rectitude in St. Anselm”
1932–36  Taught at Notre Dame University
1936–66  Taught at Fordham University
1942     Published “Catholic Philosophy and American Culture”
1950     Published “The Basis of Philosophical Anthropology”
         Contributor to Luigi Sturzo’s Del Metodo Sociologico
1951     Published “History is a Matrix”
1952     Published “Freedom and History”
1953     Edited “Luigi Sturzo: An Anthology of His Writings,”
         Published “[William] James: Pragmatism”
1954     “The Person in American Society”
1955     Editor of The Mind of Pius XII
1957     Published “A Reappraisal of Emerson”
         [reprinted as “Ralph Waldo Emerson, 1803-1882: The Single Vision”]
1960     “Process and Experience” [Dewey]
         Fulbright Professor, Luigi Sturzo Institute, Rome
1966-    Taught at Seton Hall University
1968     Published “Dream and Nightmare: The Future as Revolution”
1976     “Emerson and America’s Future” [published in 1988]
1978     Died in NYC (30 May)
Previously, I have commented on aspects of the philosophical work of John Joseph McDermott. Rather than attempting to advance that inquiry on this occasion, I have decided to consider the possible influence on McDermott’s work by his doctoral advisor at Fordham University, Robert Channon Pollock (1901-1978). In various interactions with McDermott over the years, I have been intrigued by his championing of Pollock, who has remained virtually unknown within broader American Philosophy circles. This essay is an initial attempt to consider Pollock’s influence on McDermott.

In 1967, McDermott noted his “gratitude for Robert C. Pollock, who has opened three generations of Fordham University graduate students to the richness of the thought of James. His insights into the world of process, contemporary humanism and to the lasting drama of Western culture, are legendary among those who have heard him lecture.”

McDermott concluded: “Robert Pollock stands out in our time as one who embodies the majestic vision of William James.”

In 1969, McDermott writes that his “concern for the thought of Josiah Royce dates from lectures given some fifteen years ago [in the mid-1950s] by Robert C. Pollock, then professor of philosophy at Fordham University,” who was “the only person who, in my experience, could make the full case for James and Royce.”

McDermott continued in his edition of the writings of John Dewey in 1972 to acknowledge “the imaginative teaching and writing of Robert C. Pollock.” Once again in 1985, McDermott offered his “gratitude for the pedagogical genius of Robert C. Pollock.”

Who was this Robert C. Pollock who, especially through his lecturing and pedagogy, so influenced McDermott (and others) but who left us only a modest published record by means of which we can encounter him directly? Pollock was born in Glasgow, Scotland, and raised Jewish there and in Chicago. He later studied philosophy and psychology at Harvard University, where he earned his bachelor’s and master’s degrees while studying with such professors as Alfred North Whitehead and William McDougall.
During his time at Harvard, Pollock converted to Catholicism, and he later earned his doctorate in philosophy at the University of Toronto after studying at the Institute of Mediaeval Studies. Among his teachers there were Etienne Gilson and Gerald Bernard Phelan. Pollock taught in the graduate school at Fordham from 1936-1966, bringing alive for his students the intricacies of Medieval and American Philosophy. McDermott himself studied with Pollock at Fordham, where he earned his M.A. in 1954 (aet. 22) and his Ph.D. in 1959 (aet. 27); his doctoral dissertation, “Experience Is Pedagogical: The Genesis and Essence of the American Nineteenth-Century Notion of Experience,” was directed by Pollock.

II

In this initial sketch of Pollock’s importance to McDermott, I will first attempt to present Pollock’s general philosophical approach. My method will be to examine a trio of overlapping essays that he published between 1953 and 1960 on the thought of Ralph Waldo Emerson, William James, and John Dewey. As a set, these essays adumbrate a philosophic and pedagogic vision, emphasizing the general themes of context, process, and experience, that is worthy of careful study. Pollock writes, for example, that in order to understand any philosopher it is necessary to recognize that thinker’s context. “No philosophical work can be satisfactorily interpreted until we ascertain the context wherein its meaning may be discerned,” he writes. “It is necessary, therefore, to view every such work in its historical setting, while taking into account whatever can render the thought of the philosopher comprehensible, such as the tendencies and crucial issues of the period under consideration, the state of knowledge and the new intellectual atmosphere in which old problems were set.” This contextual approach “also calls for a progressive widening of perspective, so as to embrace finally a whole cultural evolution as the proper field wherein the philosopher’s work can be objectified and evaluated.” It is also helpful, Pollock writes, to understand the development in
any philosopher’s thought as the result of “a continuous search for the deeper meaning” of that philosopher’s own ideas.  

Pollock’s contextual approach is not a static one, and a conception of the interaction of creative factors within time perhaps better reaches his understanding of context-in-process. McDermott writes that under Pollock’s tutelage, he “came to realize that philosophy, and creative thought of any persuasion, was manifest in and through an historical matrix.” As Pollock himself writes: “History is far too complex an affair to permit of our disposing of a man’s lifework with a few pigeonhole generalities.” Using Emerson as his exemplar, Pollock notes that “in him great historical forces came to expression, forces which … have a core of rightness, even if he himself was not able to express them with an ideal perfection.” If in our work we are conscious of these shifting emphases, we will be better able to uncover our subject’s “thoughts and attitudes” and to enter into them “more sympathetically.” As Pollock continues elsewhere, “[w]ith the maturation of the historical sense and the genetic point of view ushered in by evolutionary theories, a respect for the temporal and becoming aspect of things took a firm hold of men’s minds.”

A third of Pollock’s central emphases is the focus upon “the actual data of experience.” He continues that “once human experience was viewed in the more all-inclusive relationships of history, and on the developmental plane,” people came to recognize the need “to examine the problem of knowledge afresh.” The dual theme of the primacy of experience and the need to rethink knowledge thus shaped the pragmatic movement. “The origin of the pragmatic movement in philosophy coincides,” Pollock writes, with the ripening of age-old tendencies and a multiplication of ferments which left no sphere of human activity untouched. … As the point of convergence of a potentially infinite number of perspectives, the human mind’s interest in itself was enormously intensified, with the result that experience in its widest range assumed a commanding position.
Pollock is careful to balance any emphasis upon individual experience with a recognition of the social experience of community. As he writes, “the convergence of such differentiated minds as those of [Charles Sanders] Peirce, James, Dewey and [George Herbert] Mead bears witness to a rich experience shared in common, as well as to a common awareness of the need for a fresh appraisal of things.” 25 As we continue through an examination of these three essays in sequence, we will see how Pollock’s pedagogic vision is both strongly supportive of, and strongly critical of, the philosophies of Emerson, James, and Dewey.

III

In 1958, Pollock published “Ralph Waldo Emerson, 1803-1882: The Single Vision.” The subtitle of this essay refers to Emerson’s rejection of “a split universe”—“a universe in which the life of the spirit is insulated from man’s life in nature”—and his advocacy that we recognize instead “an experiential wholeness.” 26 Pollock’s overall view of Emerson is that he was a “highly disciplined” thinker who, while “primarily a literary figure,” saw reality as a whole and consequently needed “to function constructively on a theoretical level.” 27 Still, Pollock reads Emerson as a thinker who approaches idealism as a weapon to counter materialism more than as a comprehensive doctrine. 28 Idealism was for Emerson not to be understood as a complete system to be believed, and he thus had no need to create a fully functioning idealistic theory. 29 Other themes that Pollock emphasizes in Emerson are the latter’s assertion in his address at the Divinity School “that God is, not was; that He speaketh, not spake,” and his call, in consequence, that we be ready to place ourselves “firmly in the present” with a faith “in the human soul itself through which God makes Himself heard”; 30 the “affirmation of the vertical or spiritual as against the horizontal or temporal axis in history” to free people from “a deadly fixation on the past”; 31 and the belief that an authentic individual is not “a spiritually self-sufficient entity … devoid of all ties to the universe”
but rather a person among persons “bound together by common roots which run underground.”

We find in Pollock, however, a number of criticisms of Emerson’s position. Perhaps in line with Emerson’s negative remarks on the strait-jacket of consistency, Pollock notes that thinkers, Emerson included, are victims of “inevitable confusions, which only a lifetime of personal growth could eliminate, at least in part.” In spite of what he had said about Emerson’s recognition of the social place of the authentic individual, Pollock still criticizes him for treating it too much as an “ideal” and thus for failing to advocate “the actual expansion of communal life.” History, Pollock writes, “is essentially the process of man’s unfolding within the developing forms of associated life.” Emerson’s failure to grasp the necessity for “social and institutional development” leaves him unable to advance his actual point of differentiating between “a genuine and a spurious individuality,” a failing that is often manifest as an “antagonism between individual self-culture and community-mindedness.” Further, Pollock believes that Emerson needed “to confront the problem and mystery of evil more adequately than he did.” Indicating that Emerson “had dedicated himself to the task of reattaching men to their own experience,” Pollock continues that he violates “the data of experience” by “dealing only obliquely with that which bites so deeply into our lives, namely, evil itself.” Shifting his perspective, Pollock continues that “[i]f Emerson had made a serious study of Catholic thought, he would have been struck by the masterful way” in which it handles the problem of evil. More broadly, Pollock writes that had Emerson “had a better acquaintance with the Classical-Christian tradition, he would have been entranced by its marvelous fusion of elements so dear to him” that it contained. Among these were a fuller sense of nature that is both material and spiritual, an appreciation of experience as “sensuous, intellectual, and mystical,” a recognition of “transcendent truth,” and a sense of both measure and “the immeasurable.” Sadly, however, Emerson allowed “his rejection of Puritan Christianity to cloud his mind in regard to Catholic Christianity itself.”
Pollock’s 1953 essay on William James, “James: Pragmatism,” emphasizes the importance of approaching him as “a great human being” and “a loveable figure” who offers us a comprehensive worldview. Unlike many commentators on James’s philosophy in his day, Pollock sees in James a broad pragmatism that should be recognized within “his breadth of vision, his openness to possibilities and the whole searching character of his thought.” He attempts to address big problems, “the everlasting problems of philosophy, especially as they touch on moral and religious life,” and “to see life in the round.” Pollock continues that James also understood that human action is related to our attempts at understanding. James, he writes, “was endeavoring to take seriously the fact that reality does not address itself to abstract minds but to living persons inhabiting a real world, to whom it makes known something of its essential quality only as they go out to meet it through action.” The relation of mind to the world “is no static, aimless, unmotivated affair, … no passive reception on the part of a supposedly neutral intellect.” Rather, our grasping of reality is “a vital act involving the whole operative personality.” In this analysis, Pollock notes that concepts “enlarge our vision of the real, provided they are redirected into experience,” and “our ideas have not fulfilled their function until they rejoin experience.” James further demonstrates “a real and positive concern with the problem of truth, and not from any desire to evade it.” Pollock also writes that James “construed experience in a much wider sense than was usually done and was always ready to extend its scope.” This expansion requires that we regard our intellectual successes as “triumphs of the human spirit seeking fullness of life” that function within “an epistemology of the person rather than of the mind taken in isolation.”

As with Emerson, however, Pollock finds difficulties in James’s thought. Some of them are to be expected. He cautions us, for example, that we will inevitably have trouble with any radical thinker. “Man has seldom advanced to a more inclusive standpoint,”
he writes, “without throwing well-tested concepts out of alignment and creating new difficulties for himself.” As a result, any “fuller clarification of the new standpoint is the task of those who come after.” Thus, Pollock prefers to read James as “groping to something more significant than the doctrine popularly attributed to him,” and observes that James will need our help if we are to make the most of his insights. Pollock also points repeatedly to other problems that he finds in James’s philosophy. For example, he writes that James’s attempts to oppose vicious intellectualism drift “dangerously close at times to a vicious anti-intellectualism.” Further, Pollock notes that James’s work contains “inconsistencies and metaphysical ambiguity,” “metaphysical fallacies,” “epistemological and metaphysical deficiencies,” and “metaphysical inadequacies,” although he does not explicitly state the perspective from which these criticisms arise. Also, especially with regard to James’s pragmatism, Pollock reminds us that he emphasized “the actual life pattern of the individual to the detriment of the objective character of knowledge,” thus failing “to safeguard the transcendence of truths to which reason has access.” As a result, James’s pragmatism cannot offer us “a comprehensive or even truly integral account of knowledge.” We must seek, instead, “a fuller meaning of pragmatism” that would match James’s “breadth of vision, his openness to possibilities and the whole searching character of his thought.” This fuller pragmatism will be possible only if we integrate “a heightened perception of man as an integral whole, while stressing the multiple aspects and versatility of his nature and the many ties that bind him to reality” that Pollock sees as resulting “from the Christian doctrine of personality.”

V

Pollock’s 1960 essay on Dewey, “Process and Experience,” that McDermott characterized in 1972 as “still the best essay on the philosophy of John Dewey,” gives strong evidence of Pollock’s familiarity with the breadth of Dewey’s thought, including “his constant preoccupation with the field of education.” He especially
emphasizes Dewey’s recognition of our position within a new intellectual world. “John Dewey’s philosophy is itself a powerful reminder of the intimate connection between the life of thought and the real-life situations which so vividly characterize the human story,” Pollock writes. He continues that “it would betray extraordinary obtuseness to attempt an exposition of Dewey’s thought without taking account of a fundamental transformation in human awareness which created a new cultural atmosphere and gave to consciousness itself a new orientation.” Here Pollock points to Dewey’s emphasis on an open future. Following Dewey’s “new image of the universe,” we must both assume an evolutionary perspective and proceed into a “linear and progressive history” that endows our abilities to experiment and create “with a new dignity.” When we fully recognize Dewey’s emphasis upon what he called “the possibility of novelty, of invention, of radical deviation,” Pollock indicates that we will be forced to recognize further that change is “at the very heart of things,” that we live in “an open and incomplete universe.” He continues that for Americans “the notion of an unfinished world was indelibly fixed in the mind by everyday experiences.” Finally, since “in a truly temporal world, the mind must ever face forward,” Dewey advocated pragmatic intelligence as the only one that is “adequate to change, transformation and novelty,” and, although Dewey did not allow for “the notion of the universe as an ethical drama,” Pollock notes that “terms like ‘faith’ and ‘piety’ sprang readily to Dewey’s lips.”

At the same time that he offers this praise for Dewey, Pollock also offers numerous criticisms. Despite his regard for the present and future, for example, Dewey “was singularly lacking in power of penetration into the past” or in interest in what “lies beyond time.” Moreover, Dewey had an understanding of experience that existed only “on the horizontal plane,” without any “deeper level.” Pollock also writes that, although Dewey has a clear appreciation for the role social institutions play in “the liberation and development of the individual’s capacities,” he is weak on individuals. He remarks, for example, that “metaphysically, his
doctrine of the individual, especially at the human level, is far from adequate,” and further that Dewey “cannot offer us a satisfactory portrait of human personality.” As in his essays on Emerson and James, Pollock does not suggest here what would constitute an adequate solution. A related criticism, again without offering the right answer, is that Dewey offers an inadequate understanding of our inner lives. As Pollock writes, Dewey “remained impervious to certain inner experiences which yielded intelligible necessities with respect to truth and value.” Ultimately for Pollock, although Dewey’s work is at times “reminiscent of a religious tradition,” he had a weak understanding of, and appreciation for, Christianity. Had he “had a first-hand acquaintance with the traditions of Christian thought,” Pollock continues, he would have recognized the Christian emphases on action, on the importance of experience and the concrete, and especially on how “the incarnation mentality, fostered by Christianity, made it entirely inevitable that men should strive to bring truth and value down to earth.” Thus, Pollock suggests that a more Christian Dewey would have recognized the Christian core of his own pragmatism.

VI

This initial sketch of the thought of Robert Pollock—in the context of John McDermott’s praise of him as a philosopher and pedagogue—would seem to validate the assumption made at the beginning of this paper that Pollock’s work provides us with one of the keys to understanding McDermott. In particular, none of the positive themes in Pollock that we have considered are alien to McDermott’s thought. Examples of this continuity include: Pollock’s championing of Emerson’s call for experiential wholeness both in our relations to nature and to our fellows; Pollock’s emphasis upon James’s focus on the big problems in existence and his stress upon the role of thought in life; and Pollock’s seconding of Dewey’s call for us to recognize our place in an open and as-yet incomplete universe where pragmatic intelligence can help us to deal with our problems. Unlike these instances of overlap, however, the criticisms
that Pollock offers of the deficiencies he finds in Emerson, James, and Dewey, and especially his suggested revisions, are without parallel in McDermott’s thought. Moreover, while Pollock’s criticisms remain initially vague, they are less so if we remember his roots in mediaeval thought.

It is thus necessary to consider at some point the indications in Pollock’s thought of a fundamental philosophical relationship to Christianity and Catholicism, a relationship that McDermott’s work does not share. As we have seen, Pollock did his doctoral studies at the University of Toronto’s Institute of Mediaeval Studies, and he taught at Catholic institutions for almost his entire career, including over thirty years at Fordham University. If, as Pollock cautions us, we take seriously his own context, his place within the processive intellectual world (in his case, the world of pre-Vatican II thought), and his own individual and social experience, his perspective becomes clearer. It may be, of course, that the Catholic nature of Pollock’s writings is simply an overlay by a cautious faculty member attempting to mirror the viewpoints of his Catholic superiors. It is more likely, however, that Pollock was attempting to bear witness to his own personal and philosophical values. I have in mind here, for example, the values that underlie his complaints about Emerson’s inadequate understanding of evil, James’s failure to recognize transcendent truth, and Dewey’s blindness to the incarnation mentality. A reader like McDermott—although himself deeply grounded in the complexities of the Catholic perspective during his years of study at Fordham and earlier at St. Francis College in Brooklyn—had rejected the presumed Catholic essence that Pollock found underlying these values, and thus did not stress them in his tributes to Pollock. More positively, McDermott found these values more broadly available than Pollock did.

Perhaps a clearer sense of the seamlessness of the religious and the secular in Pollock’s thought that does not appear in McDermott’s thought would emerge if we consider another of Pollock’s essays, “The Person in American Society,” from 1954. In this essay, Pollock offers a clear (and McDermott-like sense of American society as “a great restless, shifting, improvising world … poised …
between order and chaos,” and a sense that “apart from society, the person would remain in an abnormal and nondescript state, incapable of rising beyond a fragmentary sentience.” Moreover, Pollock continues that in this context, the American “became more deliberately and self-consciously a community-builder and, therefore, in the highest degree a maker of history.” There are, of course, problems in this American past; and Pollock emphasizes in particular that our society had been turned into an “economic structure,” and the “entire pattern of economic activities” had become a screen through which reality is filtered. In consequence, we have lost our sense of community, and “society is being squeezed … into an economic world whose depersonalizing pressures are badly distorting the human image.” To repair our situation, Pollock writes that we need to re-integrate the economy “into the total community,” to carry out “a structural reform of society on the basis of the common good.”

With allowances made for developments over the years, this understanding of the American situation could be attributed to McDermott. Only when we consider the means that would affect the solution that Pollock desires do we find a clear difference between them. Pollock writes that “the Church inaugurated a new phase in human history by calling human personality to the center of the social order in place of the family, caste, race, or any other form of privilege.” Christianity, he notes further, “gave man a new consciousness of his creative role in relation to the social world.” Especially in America, the “European mentality, nurtured by the Christian drive to transform the ideal into living fact,” met a situation of openness and possibility. Pollock’s call for deeply religious means to repair our society are in conflict with many other interpretations of our situation, including McDermott’s. For Pollock, however, “the reconciliation of a deeply personal life and a truly cohesive life is inconceivable without a new influx of the Christian spirit,” and “the reconciliation of individualism and collectivism” he views as “a work which belongs in a very special way to the Christian community within society.” For McDermott,
on the contrary, the redemptive possibilities of nature and community do not depend on Christian or Catholic assumptions.

I have been considering the influence of Robert Pollock on the philosophic thought of John McDermott. Clearly, in spite of their powerful appreciations of the work of Emerson, James, and Dewey, Pollock and McDermott do not agree on the religious meaning of the American experience. I have not speculated here about the reasons for their divergence; I have simply attempted to display it. Further work, perhaps autobiographical work on McDermott’s part, might enable us to understand why he did not fully adopt the positions of Pollock.

**BIBLIOGRAPHY**


-----. “Dream and Nightmare: The Future as Revolution.” In Novak, American Philosophy, 60-86.
-----. “Emerson and America’s Future.” In Potter, Doctrine and Experience, 48-74.
-----. “Freedom and History.” Thought 27 (September 1952): 400-20.
-----. “History is a Matrix.” Thought 26 (June 1951): 205-18.


**NOTES**

I am grateful to Raymond Boisvert of Siena University, Greg Moses of Texas State University, David Hildebrand of the University of Colorado Denver, and William J. Gavin of the University of Southern Maine, for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

1 Especially in Campbell and Hart, *Experience as Philosophy*, see 30-57, 275-78.
2 For some accounts of his life and work, see McDermott's memorial in the *Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association* and the *New York Times* obituary.
4 McDermott, ix; cf. xv.
5 McDermott, “Acknowledgements,” in *Basic Writings of Josiah Royce*, ix.
7 McDermott, “Acknowledgments,” in *A Cultural Introduction to Philosophy*, xvi.
8 Pollock was the editor of *The Mind of Pius XII* (New York: Crown, 1955) and the author of various essays and reviews. He was also a contributor to a volume by Luigi Sturzo (1871-1959), *Del Metodo Sociologico: Risposta ai Critici* (Bergamo: Edizioni Atlas, 1950).
9 Pollock’s dissertation was entitled “The Doctrine of Rectitude in St. Anselm,” University of Toronto, 1932, 163 pp. (Mills and Dombra, 98).
10 Retired/fired? Pollock was fired by Fordham at age sixty-five. He later taught at Seton Hall University (1966– ).
11 These three essays are: Pollock, “Ralph Waldo Emerson”; Pollock, “James: Pragmatism”; and, Pollock, “Process and Experience.”
Pollock’s later essay, “Emerson and America’s Future,” does not contain a Catholic shift but ends with a celebration of latter-day Emersonians in American life: Buckminster Fuller, Louis Sullivan, John Roebling, Frederick Law Olmstead, Frank Lloyd Wright, and Charles Ives. See also “Dream and Nightmare,” in which Pollock develops hope and rebirth within the community as his key themes.
45 Pollock, 190 and 189.
46 Pollock, 191.
47 Pollock, 192.
48 Pollock, 192.
49 Pollock, 194.
50 Pollock, 190.
51 Pollock, 188.
52 Pollock, 190 and 197.
53 Pollock, 189.
54 Pollock, 189.
55 Pollock, 189.
56 Pollock, 194.
57 Pollock, 189-90, 192.
58 Pollock, 190-91.
59 Pollock, 193-94.
60 Pollock, 198.
61 Pollock, 193.
63 Pollock, “Process and Experience,” 190.
64 Pollock, 161.
65 Pollock, 161.
66 Pollock, 165.
68 Pollock, “Process and Experience,” 166
69 Pollock, 171.
70 Pollock, 171.
71 Pollock, 173.
72 Pollock, 179 and 168.
73 Pollock, 176 and 190.
74 Pollock, 192.
75 Pollock, 182-83.
76 Pollock, 185.
77 Pollock, 173.
78 Pollock, 193.

Pollock’s edition of The Mind of Pius XII offers an extensive forward and numerous notes.

A good cross-section of Pollock’s relevant writing would include: “Catholic Philosophy,” “Philosophical Anthropology,” “History is a Matrix,” and “Freedom and History.”

Pollock, “Person in American Society,” 45-60.

See, for example, McDermott, “American Angle of Vision,” 37-88.

Pollock, 45-46.

Pollock, 47.

Pollock, 49.

Pollock, 53.

Pollock, 57.

Pollock, 59.

Pollock, 47.

Pollock, 58.

Pollock, 56.

Pollock, 60.