In recognition of the fact that James scholars are publishing articles in other academic journals, the editors believe that it is important to keep our readers informed of the diversity within James scholarship by drawing attention to relevant publications outside of *WJS*. This section of the journal aims to provide articles that address the life, work, and influence of James’s thought. If you have recently published a peer-reviewed article on James or have noticed an omission from this list, please contact our Periodicals Editor, James Medd, at periodicals@williamjamesstudies.org and we will include it at the next opportunity.

The paper presents a re-reading of the explanatory gap problem from the empiricism of William James and Alfred N. Whitehead. Given the respective notions of experience and process of James and Whitehead, the paper seeks to show that the explanatory gap is a philosophical myth in the sense that an ontological continuity is maintained and at the same time combined with an epistemological discontinuity between mind and world or mind and brain—in particular, as illustration of such an incongruity between continuity and discontinuity, the core of the paper is centered around the review of the so-called qualia problem. From the empiricism of James and Whitehead, and in view of the notion of continuity, the paper indicates an alternative to the epistemological deficit of the explanatory gap as well as to the internalist view of mind that it inspires—the idea that the mind is cloistered in the brain. As result, the paper points the timeliness of James and Whitehead’s empiricism in line with the growing non-internalist approaches of mind and cognition in terms of continuity suggested by the respective notions of James and Whitehead’s experience and process.


American Pragmatist philosopher William James and subcontinent Islamic philosopher Allama Iqbal both believe that religious experiences are an important class of those experiences with which empiricism is concerned. They both explain and defend religious belief on empirical grounds and argue that the ultimate empirical justification of a religious
belief must come by looking at its fruits. This is no accident, for James influenced Iqbal on this very point. However, they diverge in some matters. James defends the right to diverse religious belief and eventually articulates his own account based on religious experience—an account which is intentionally philosophical and not reliant on any religious authority. Iqbal, however, reconsiders and defends Islam understood along largely traditional lines. I compare and contrast James’ and Iqbal’s religious epistemologies in order to understand both of them better and, hopefully, enrich contemporary reflection on faith and reason through a better awareness of the past dialogue on the subject.

In a letter dated July 25, 1894, George Ayers recommends to William James a list of books on Theosophy. Ayers was a Boston lawyer and prominent figure in the New England Theosophical community.

http://hdl.handle.net/2027/spo.3521354.0019.032.
William James’s religious writing displays a therapeutic concern for two key social problems: an epidemic of suicide among educated Victorians who worried that a scientific worldview left no room for God; and material poverty and bleak employment prospects for others. James sought a conception of God that would therapeutically comfort his melancholic peers while also girding them to fight for better social conditions—a fight he associated with political anarchism. What is perhaps most unique about James’s approach to religion emerges when we consider the
relationship of his therapeutic project to his treatment of religious epistemology. For James took his suicidal peers to need more than tea and sympathy. They needed to be convinced, through rational argument, that religious faith is epistemically permissible in light of their methodological naturalism. That is to say that theoretic success in James’s treatment of religion is to be measured by therapeutic success. His argument for epistemic permissibility began by treating religious faith as a “hypothesis.” He took naturalism to permit entertaining a hypothesis just in case it is testable, and not contravened by available evidence. So he developed a distinctive conception of God—what he called the “pluralistic hypothesis”—that proposed a plurality of independent entities in the universe, only one of which is God. In contrast to the monistic hypothesis, pluralism is empirically testable in principle. But crucially, the hypothesis is underdetermined by any evidence available now. This purported, in-principle testability would make religious pluralism epistemically permissible to entertain. And since salvation is possible on this view without being guaranteed, the pluralistic hypothesis stands to discourage social and political quietism.

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The American psychologist and philosopher William James drew inspiration from British evolutionary theory, neurology, psychiatry, psychology and philosophy. Trained in anatomy, physiology and medicine, he developed a physiological psychology that offered acute analyses of consciousness and of the relations between mind and brain, habit and thought, cognition and emotion and other aspects of psychology. One of his insights, regarding the relation between attention and will, was based upon his own
experience of panic anxiety, which was resolved through his reading of several British authors. The story of his psychiatric experience, practical response and later theoretical conclusion offers a potential contribution to contemporary therapeutic practice.


This article presents new insights into the status of the psychologist William James’s membership in and relationship to the Theosophical Society. It is no surprise that a number of professional and scholarly individuals were attracted to the Society’s teachings, so James’s involvement should not surprise us. The author presents some notable contributions about James’s involvement, not least of which is his discovery of the inclusive years of his membership. His admission date is actually later (1891) than that given in other publications. Although his resignation is not known for certain, the author gives the most likely date to be 1897 because of certain factors explained in the article. James’ membership, although brief, is somewhat deceiving since he continued to correspond and associate with prominent Theosophists, including George David Ayers, William Scott-Elliot, and Edward Douglas Fawcett. Membership in any society, however, is not necessarily indicative of a person’s degree of commitment to its teaching and principles. From the evidence provided in this article, it would seem that James was not as engaged in the Theosophical teachings principally espoused in Blavatsky’s writings or in those that followed. The same could be said about Jack London, James Joyce, and a host of artists such as Piet Mondrian and Wassily Kandinsky, who were familiar with Blavatsky’s works by Blavatsky or those who followed her. Was their interest predominant or was it only one of
many casual interests introduced through intellectual inquisitiveness? The author raises this question and by doing so reveals a more complex relationship than otherwise suspected.


According to what is now the standard account in the history of psychology, in the 1880s William James and the Danish physician Carl Georg Lange independently developed a strikingly new theory, commonly referred to as the ‘James-Lange’ theory of emotion. In this paper it is argued that this standard account is highly misleading. Lange’s views on affect in his (1885) Om Sindsbevægelser were more cautious than James allowed, and not open to criticisms that have often been levelled against the theory of emotion that James claimed he shared with Lange. In fact, Lange argued for distinctions that James did not mention in his discussion of Lange’s work. Even with regard to the primary emotions, the two thinkers’ explanatory models diverged significantly. The contrast between James and Lange on affect is especially striking in their respective discussions of topics in aesthetics, as is established with reference to Lange’s little-known (1899) Bidrag til Nydelsernes fysiologi som grundlag for en rationel æstetik.


William James (1842–1910) is recognized as one of the main proponents of the then-emergent field of scientific
psychology in the 19th century, and Carl Gustav Jung (1875–1961) is regarded as one of the most prolific authors within the fields of psychiatry and psychology of the 20th century. Previous studies have highlighted the practical and theoretical impact of James on the work of Jung. The present article makes use of detailed research for a deeper look at their theoretical relationship, with a focus on James’s (1902/2010) *Varieties of Religious Experience*. This text, written in 1902, was particularly important for Jung’s emphasis on fundamental subjective experience, which he evaluated in the book *Psychology and Religion* (Jung, 1938/1973). Moreover, we investigate important aspects of dynamic psychology developed by James, which Jung advanced in some of his works, particularly in “On the Nature of the Psyche” (Jung, 1946/1975a), an essay included in *Structure & Dynamics of the Psyche*. We focus on the idea that Jung’s acquaintance with James led him to move away from psychoanalysis. In addition, their meeting shaped Jung’s view regarding religious experience and influenced the formulation of his concept of the unconscious.


This article conceptualizes racism and privilege as habitual orientations located at the bodily level, not merely at the level of intention and consciousness. Engaging contemporary critical race thinkers, the analysis explores how William James’s psychological-pragmatic perspective on habit opens up fresh insight into the nature and function of racist habits. The author looks specifically at the value of James’s metaphors of “habits as scars” and “habits as grooved pathways” for conceptualizing racism embedded as bodily habit and habitual orientation. He also applies
Bourdieu’s notion of habitus to Christian churches in the United States in order to examine the church as a habituating locus of power and to account for the role of social structures in the formation and reproduction of racist habits. Given the difficulty, even implausibility, of completely erasing racist habits, he considers how James’s view of habit change translates into practical theological approaches for confronting Whiteness and developing more racially just pedagogies and practices that gradually orient the body in new habitual ways of being.


The article presents and discusses the theories of emotions of W. James and A. Damasio, with emphasis on the intentionality of emotions and their connection with practical rationality. It argues that James’ proposal encounters several difficulties in accounting for both aspects of emotions, and shows how Damasio’s neo-Jamesian theory partly overcomes some of those difficulties, while giving rise to other objections. Finally, it summarizes Jesse Prinz’s proposal regarding emotions as “embodied appraisals,” which seeks to combine the cognitive aspect and the corporeal nature of emotions.

Journal of Business Ethics recently published a critique of ethical practices in quantitative research by Zyphur and Pierides (J Bus Ethics 143:1-16, 2017). The authors argued that quantitative research prevents researchers from addressing urgent problems facing humanity today, such as poverty, racial inequality, and climate change. I offer comments and observations on the authors’ critique. I agree with the authors in many areas of philosophy, ethics, and social research, while making suggestions for clarification and development. Interpreting the paper through the pragmatism of William James, I suggest that the authors’ arguments are unlikely to change attitudes in traditional quantitative research, though they may point the way to a new worldview, or Jamesian “sub-world,” in social research.


In his lectures on pragmatism, William James famously proposed that the question of ‘the one and the many’ constitutes the most central of all philosophic problems, and that it is ‘central because so pregnant’. Prompted by James’ proposition, this article explores the intimately political connection in James’ thought between his pluralistic metaphysics and the nature of the problematic as a generative force that impregnates worlds and thoughts with differences: what I here call ‘the pluralistic problematic’. Exploring the generative significance of the problematic in James’ philosophy, I propose that, where James is concerned, the pluriverse has a thoroughly problematic mode of existence. And pluralism, rather than a celebration of the many, rather than a philosophical exposition on multiple worlds and ontologies, or a theory of the organization of a diverse polis, is first and foremost a
pragmatics of the pluriverse—a political, experimental and pragmatic response to the ongoing insistence of the pluralistic problematic.